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On February 3 and 4, 2016, the Denver Law Review hosted a
conference entitled Future World IP: Legal Response to the Tech
Revolution.' The conference brought together academics, practicing
lawyers, interest groups, and government officials to discuss emerging
technology and related legal issues. Through a number of panels,
lectures, and roundtable sessions academics and industry leaders
discussed a variety of issues concerning intellectual property (IP) and
information law. The wide variety of perspectives that these individuals
brought highlighted both the importance of these issues and their legal
complexity. Panels discussed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,2 the
doctrine of exhaustion, standards essential patents, patent thickets, post
grant review strategies under the American Invents Act, and
cybersecurity and privacy.
This Symposium Issue of the Denver Law Review includes papers
authored by several of the conference's academic participants. In
Exhaustion and the Limits of Remote-Control Property, Professor Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling characterizes exhaustion as a doctrine that limits
the ability of property owners to "remotely control" objects covered by
their intellectual property rights. 4 She goes on to identify unique
characteristics of intellectual property and argue that courts and Congress
should not overly rely on concepts drawn from tangible property.
Instead, Van Houweling advocates for an intellectual property specific
exhaustion policy that is attentive to the specific costs and benefits of
remote control IP. Professor Samuel Ernst looks at exhaustion from a
different vantage point in Why Patent Exhaustion Should Liberate
Products (and Not Just People). Focusing on the recent Federal Circuit
decision in Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times Co.,6
t Associate Professor and Director of the Intellectual Property certificate program,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. Symposium, Future World IP: Legal Response to the Tech Revolution, 93 DENV. L. REV.
(2016). Both the University Denver Sturm College of Law and the Denver Law Review would like to
thank all of our sponsors, namely: the Mabel Y. Hughes Charitable Trust (Platinum Sponsor); Hogan
Lovells (Silver Sponsor); and Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP, Cooley LLP, and HolzerlPLaw, PC (Bronze Sponsors).
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
4. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Exhaustion and the Limits of Remote-Control Property, 93
DENV. L. REV. 951 (2016).
5. Samuel F. Ernst, Why Patent Exhaustion Should Liberate Products (and Not Just People),
93 DENV. L. REV. 899 (2016).
6. 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Ernst argues that the exhaustion doctrine should not be conceptualized as
just shielding authorized acquirers but should be thought of as adhering
to a patented device.
Professor Margot Kaminski examines the critical issue of regulating
data privacy in When the Default Is No Penalty Negotiating Privacy at
the NTIA. She first describes how the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) is currently relying on a
multistakeholder process to regulate data privacy. She then argues that
the process has largely failed and suggests implementing stronger default
penalties to motivate private actors to take the NTIA's process more
seriously.
In Secrecy Is Dead - Long Live Trade Secrets, Professor Derek
Bambauer focuses on the balance between trade secret and patent law.8
He predicts that changes in both law and technology will force
innovators to turn to trade secret law instead of patent law. According to
Bambauer, these changes implicate issues of free speech, federalism, and
criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Finally, in A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, and the
Internet Professor Jorge Contreras describes how Internet standards
evolved with substantially lower patent filing and assertion activity than
other parts of the high tech industry.9 Contreras suggests that these
choices were not just motivated by altruism but by profit. He then urges
participants and policy makers in future industries (e.g., the Internet of
Things, the Smart Grid, and wearable devices) to look at this "patent-
light" environment when considering new rules and policies.
We hope our readers will enjoy both the variety of topics and
expertise that these authors bring to the Denver Law Review's
Symposium Issue.
7. Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA,
93 DENV. L. REV. 925 (2016).
8. Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy Is Dead - Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. L. REv. 833
(2016).
9. Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, and the Internet, 93
DENV. L. REV. 855 (2016).
SECRECY Is DEAD - LONG LIVE TRADE SECRETS
DEREK E. BAMBAUERf
ABSTRACT
The future of intellectual property is in trade secrets. Changes to pa-
tent law make obtaining a patent more costly in some cases and impossi-
ble in others. The relentless spread of networked computing, with its
inevitable vulnerabilities, and digital data make non-legal means of
maintaining secrecy increasingly unreliable. Innovators will be forced to
turn to trade secrets. This newfound prominence for trade secrecy will
generate tensions with freedom of speech protections, federalism, and the
balance between civil and criminal enforcement. The Article, part of a
symposium on the Future World IP by the Denver Law Review, closes
with a set of testable empirical predictions to evaluate its claims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The future of intellectual property is in trade secrets.
This Article predicts that innovators will shift to using trade secret
law to safeguard advances, rather than filing for patent protection or us-
ing contractual and technological self-help to keep inventions confiden-
tial. There are two reasons for this coming rise of trade secrets. The first
is that other means of keeping advances secret are becoming far less ef-
fective in the digital networked era. The second is that obtaining a patent
has become more difficult and less certain with recent doctrinal devel-
opments. By process of elimination, that leaves trade secret law to fill the
t Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. This Article is
part of a symposium on Future World IP: Legal Responses to the Tech Revolution, hosted by the
Denver Law Review. Thanks for helpful suggestions and discussion are owed to Jane Bambauer, Dan
Hunter, Thinh Nguyen, Simone Sepe, and the participants in the conference on Competition Policy,




gap-innovators will rely on relative rather than absolute secrecy. This
will lead to development of and pressure on that field's doctrine, raising
questions of federalism, enforcement, and conflict with other legal re-
gimes. Normatively, this Article comes neither to praise the rise of trade
secret nor to bury it, but to elucidate tensions and issues that will accom-
pany its new prominence.
This Article continues with three additional Parts. The first explains
why doctrinal changes have made patents harder to obtain and what
technological changes have made secrecy more difficult to maintain The
second explores the changes that increased reliance on trade secret will
generate, including pressure on other doctrines, on federalism, and on
criminal enforcement of intellectual property. The final Part concludes
by making a set of testable predictions about the shift this Article fore-
sees.
II. SECRETS AND DISCLOSURE
A. Two Roads Diverged: Protecting InnovationI
Intellectual property scholars typically present the decision on how
to protect innovation, such as a new medication or the process used to
synthesize it, as a binary choice: apply for a patent, or protect the ad-
vance as a trade secret.2 That framing is inaccurate. The correct way to
understand the decision is to contrast patenting, with its concomitant
disclosure of the advance to the public, with secrecy.3 Trade secret law is
merely one way of protecting a secret. It is normally called into action
when other methods of maintaining secrecy-non-disclosure agreements,
encryption, printing on copy-proof pages-have failed or are about to do
so.4 If the precautions to maintain secrecy that are required by the doc-
trine function as designed, then, there is no reason to call the legal sys-
tem into action. Trade secret operates in an ex post world, a last ditch
effort to prevent information from being revealed or to claw it back once
it has been disclosed.' The innovator's choice, then, is whether to try to
keep the advance secret, or to disclose it in the hope of obtaining a pa-
tent, knowing that each road brings risks and costs.
1. With apologies to Robert Frost. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in THE ROAD NOT
TAKEN AND OTHER POEMS 1, I (Stanley Appelbaum ed., 1993).
2. See, e.g., David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics
of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 62-66 (1991).
3. See Derek E. Bambauer & Simone M. Sepe, Top Secret(s) 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
4. See Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEx. L. REv.
1803, 1818 (2014); Joshua Rivera, Here's the Extreme Measure Taken to Prevent the 'Star Wars:
The Force Awakens' Script from Leaking, TECH INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2015, 11:16 AM),
http://www.techinsider.io/how-star-wars-is-keeping-its-script-secret-2015-8.
5. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequen-
tial Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 46-47 (2007).
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The trade-offs between patents and trade secrets are well-known.
Patents last for twenty years from the date of filing; secrets (including
trade secrets) last as long as sufficient secrecy is maintained. Patents
protect against everyone who makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or imports
the patented invention in the United States (and some who engage in
specified extraterritorial conduct)6 ; trade secret law protects only against
those who procure the information through improper means or who are
in specified relationships with a misappropriator.7 Trade secret offers
broader subject matter coverage.8 Its protection occurs immediately,
while patent rights are enforceable, with minor exceptions, only after
examination and registration by the Patent Office.9 Patents provide great-
er notice of the boundaries of the owner's rights, as defined by the
claims, while the scope of a trade secret is determined entirely during
litigation.Io And, patents enjoy a statutory presumption of validity, such
that challengers in litigation must prove invalidity by a clear and con-
vincing standard, while trade secret owners bear the burden of establish-
ing validity during suits." Patent enforcement is entirely private, while
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)-(g) (2012).
7. The counterpart to the strength of these rights is the availability of defenses. Patent law
has very few defenses. The experimental use defense is effectively non-existent under the Federal
Circuit's jurisprudence. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There
are a few industry-specific statutory defenses, such as for doctors performing patented surgical
methods, prior business users performing patented business methods, and generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers making patented compounds as part of applying to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (surgical methods); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (pharmaceuticals); 35
U.S.C. § 273 (2012) (business methods). By contrast, trade secret includes broader defenses, includ-
ing independent discovery, reverse-engineering, and insufficient knowledge on the part of a third-
party regarding the existence of an acquired secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended
1985) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1986) (describing proper means);
id. § 1(2) (describing third-party liability); Robert G. Bone, Secondary Liability for Trade Secret
Misappropriation: A Comment, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 529, 532-33
(2006).
8. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 317 (2008).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(4)(A) (2012) (establishing provisional rights).
10. This point can be overstated. The meaning of claim language is determined by the court
during litigation. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996); see also
Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101, Ill
(2005); Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A
Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 717-18 (2010). Even
then, certainty is elusive, as the Federal Circuit reverses district court decisions in roughly one-
quarter to one-third of its cases. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of the Standard of Appellate Review for Patent Claim
Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2013); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001)
(noting a 44% reversal rate in an approximately two-year sample); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239
(2005) (finding a 34.5% reversal rate after a de novo appeal). But see Ted Sichelman, Myths of
(Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (2010).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100-
02 (2011).
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trade secret misappropriation can result in both state'2 and federal1 3 crim-
inal penalties. Finally, relative costs vary widely and are indeterminate.
The cost of obtaining a patent depends upon the technology, claims, and
skill of the drafter, among other variables;14 two 2013 surveys estimate
the prosecution cost for a moderately complex patent at roughly
$10,000.' The cost of protecting a secret includes the expense of precau-
tions, such as drafting non-disclosure agreements and installing physical
safeguards, and also the expense of litigation if the precautions fail.16
Innovators facing the choice between disclosure and secrecy must
thus consider a number of factors and then balance them. In some cir-
cumstances, there may be only one plausible choice. For example, if the
inventor has been selling a product or service embodying the innovation
for more than a year, obtaining a patent is not possible, since those sales
can be cited as disqualifying prior art against an application.17 Similarly,
the invention may be too small an advance relative to the state of the art
in its field, such that an application would be rejected on obviousness
grounds.' 8 There are also considerations pressing in the other direction:
the innovation may be readily discovered on inspection of the product or
by reverse-engineering it, such that trade secret protection would be eva-
nescent.'9
Patenting may also be more valuable for business reasons. Once a
patent application has been filed, innovators can rely on it to protect their
invention (assuming that the application will be granted in time). Thus,
they can disclose details of the invention covered by the patent to poten-
tial partners, investors, potential acquirers, and the like, since there is
little risk of expropriation.20 By contrast, innovators relying on secrecy
must use devices such as contractual restrictions to ensure that limited
disclosure does not destroy the innovation's value. Patents may be easier
12. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b)-(c) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266,
§ 30(4) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.035 (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05(b) (West
2015).
13. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (2012).
14. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 77, 92 n.79 (2014).
15. Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University
Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 310 n.76
(2014).
16. See Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 63.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
19. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
623, 639 (2013).
20. There could be exceptions. The application's disclosure may be greater than the coverage
of the claims, or the mere existence of the application could provide useful information to a competi-
tor about how to design its products. But patent is no worse than trade secret here, since an innovator
could always use similar mechanisms (such as non-disclosure agreements) to reinforce its rights.
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to value than secrets, since they are readily inspected after publication,21
and the market may treat patents as a proxy for an innovating firm's val-
ue since they act as costly screens.22 Thus, patents may be treated as hon-
est signals by investors, making innovators more likely to select disclo-
sure over secrecy.
This Article's focus is on changes that shift the equilibrium between
secrecy and disclosure. Some changes are industry-specific, such as ex-
clusions from patentable subject matter,2 3 and some sweep across all
fields, such as the falling cost of disseminating information.24 In the ag-
gregate, these changes will push innovators away from patent and away
from absolute secrecy, towards the relative secrecy of trade secret law.
B. Disclosure and Patents
The conventional wisdom for both innovators and scholars is that
patenting is preferable to secrecy. While the road to patenting is costly
and long, it rewards an inventor with strong property rights at the suc-
cessful conclusion of the journey. The shorter duration of patent protec-
tion is seen as outweighed by the strength of those rights and by the
21
greater ease of valuing the patent. Patents help innovators exclude
competitors, since neither independent discovery nor use after reverse-
engineering operate as defenses to liability for infringement. Scholars see
the disclosure from patents as driving follow-on innovation and diffusing
knowledge.26
Regardless of whether one agrees with the conventional wisdom,
innovators are likely to use trade secrets more and patents less in the
future, due in part to changes in the Patent Act and doctrine that make
obtaining a patent more difficult. First, both the text of the statute and
judicial interpretations of it have narrowed the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter relative to trade secret. The Patent Act protects only four
categories of inventions: processes, machines, manufactures, and compo-
sitions of matter.27 Furthermore, with the America Invents Act (AIA),
Congress acted to exclude one category of innovation-inventions de-
21. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609
(1962).
22. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 679-82 (2012).
23. See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted M. Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1325 (2011).
24. See Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 64, 64 (2012).
25. See generally Schwartz, supra note 19, at 626-42.
26. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustifi-
cation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 266 (1998) ("If an inventor chooses trade secret instead of patent,
others will be denied ready access to the information, access that would exist under patent law.").
The disclosure function is disputed, though-Mark Lemley notes that many firms do not read pa-
tents and do not perform prior art searches before developing new products. Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 n.89 (2008).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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signed to reduce income tax liability-from patentability, but by treating
such inventions as uniformly within the prior art rather than by deeming
28them ineligible subject matter. Some defenses, such as prior user
rights2 9 and lack of liability for physicians who practice patents covering
surgical methods,30 mean that while an innovator may formally hold a
patent, she may not be able to protect her invention effectively against all
those who make, use, or sell it. And, for inventions that may implicate
U.S. national security, government entities can prevent inventors from
obtaining patents (with the resulting disclosure of sensitive information)
via administrative orders.3 1
Courts have grafted a set of exceptions onto the text of the Patent
Act's eligible subject matter provision, and the ambit of these exceptions
has widened recently. Abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phe-
nomena cannot be patented.32 The Supreme Court has taken up each of
these exceptions recently, using its decisions to exclude more inventions
from patentability.33 For example, the Court invalidated claims in a pa-
tent held by the biotech firm, Myriad Genetics, that covered isolated
DNA codings with a specified sequence of amino acids.34 The claimed
sequences corresponded to mutations that significantly increase a wom-
an's lifetime risk of developing breast or ovarian cancers. The Court held
that the claimed sequences were ineligible because they were naturally
occurring, even though the patent claimed only the isolated sections of
the genes. Even before the case was decided, though, Myriad had
changed tactics: it built a confidential database of genetic mutations and
the maladies associated with them.35 Frustrated by patent, Myriad turned
to secrecy. Only it could offer a test detecting the risks from these muta-
tions, because only Myriad knew about them.
Second, the AIA increased the amount of prior art that can be cited
against an application during prosecution or introduced to invalidate a
patent during litigation. Under the previous version of the Patent Act,
knowledge or use of the claimed invention counted as prior art only if it
28. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012)) ("[Alny strategy for reducing, avoiding, or defer-
ring tax liability ... shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior
art.").
29. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 122(d).
32. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
33. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609
(2010).
34. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
35. See Monya Baker, Policy Paper: Myriad Turns Cancer Genetic Data into Trade Secrets,
NATURE (Oct. 31, 2012, 23:14 BST), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/10/policy-paper-myriad-
turns-cancer-genetic-data-into-trade-secrets.htmi.
36. Id. The pattern is the same for methods of reducing tax liability: firms hold these tech-
niques or transactions as secrets. Id.
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occurred within the United States.37 The AIA removes that geographic
limitation-knowledge or use anywhere that antedates the filing of the
patent application will prevent issuance.38 The AIA also increases the
temporal scope of the prior art. Before its enactment, references such as
patent applications were available only as of their U.S. filing date or pub-
lication date, not their foreign filing date.39 The AIA alters this rule by
treating such applications as prior art based on their filing date, even if
the applications were not published or otherwise available to the public
on that date.4 This expands the storehouse of "secret" prior art that can
be used to deny or invalidate a patent. The AIA eliminates the possibility
of "swearing behind" invalidating prior art that existed under the prior
version of the Patent Act-the relevant date is when the application was
filed, not when the applicant invented the claimed advance.4 1 And, the
reform expands the ability of third parties to submit prior art during ex-
amination, increasing the likelihood that relevant references will be con-
sidered.42 Finally, the inclusion of a prior user defense under the AIA
moves the patent regime towards trade secret in that independent inven-
tion, if the defendant made commercial use of the claimed invention
more than one year prior to the relevant date of filing or public disclo-
sure, prevents liability. 43 In short, the AIA makes more references avail-
able in the prior art that can prevent a patent from issuing.
Lastly, the AIA offers new avenues for challenging an issued patent
other than litigation in federal district court. Post-grant review enables
anyone to attack the validity of a patent within a nine-month period after
issuance." The challenge can be based on any of the grounds for invali-
dating a patent during litigation, such as lack of novelty or obviousness.4 5
The party instituting post-grant review bears the burden of persuasion,
but that burden is less weighty: it is by a preponderance of the evi-
dence," rather than the clear and convincing standard that applies in liti-
gation in district court.47 Inter partes review can be invoked after the
post-grant review period expires.4 The basis for the challenge is more
limited, covering only lack of novelty or obviousness based upon prior
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("If a device was 'known or used by others' in this country before the date of inven-
tion . . . it qualifies as prior art.").
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
39. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 861 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
41. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2016).
42. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315-16 (codi-
fied at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e)).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (noting that the defendant must
establish the requisite commercial use based upon clear and convincing evidence).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(b)(3) (2012)).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2012).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012).
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art consisting of patents or printed publications.49 Here, too, the chal-
lenger bears the burden of showing unpatentability by a preponderance
of the evidence.50 Inter partes review has been surprisingly popular: as of
October 2015, challengers were filing thirty petitions per week, and the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidated slightly more than half of
challenged claims.51 Thus, even a successful effort to patent an innova-
tion may be undone after the fact after the implementation of the AIA.
In short, recent changes to patent doctrine reduce the availability of
patents to innovators and may increase costs for those who do obtain
one.
C. Absolute and Relative Secrets
It is increasingly difficult to keep secrets. Sharing information is
nearly costless as Internet connectivity becomes ubiquitous, and perva-
sive indexing and capable search make it easy to discover that data.52
Some information spills inadvertently, as when a personal lubricant
company released over 250,000 customer names and addresses onto the
Internet by mistake.53 And some is forced into the open, as when attack-
ers broke into the Office of Personnel Management's database to extract
sensitive information about federal employees.54 Even governments, who
have the greatest capacity to impose secrecy, have struggled. Daniel
Ellsberg had to photocopy the Pentagon Papers slowly over time to re-
veal one government report.5 WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning,5 7 and Ed-
ward Snowden58 disclosed more information, by orders of magnitude,
with far greater speed and ease. Corporations struggle even more to
49. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
51. Matt Cutler, 3 Years of IPR: A Look at the Stats, LAw360 (Oct. 9, 2015, 3:59 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/699867/3-years-of-ipr-a-look-at-the-stats; Harnessing Patent Office
Litigation, HARNESS DICKEY (2015), http://ipr-pgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11 /IPR-PGR-
Report-Vol.-l .pdf.
52. See Bambauer, supra note 24, at 64.
53. Ryan Singel, Security Researcher Wants Lube Maker Fined for Privacy Slip, WIRED
(July 10, 2007, 5:35 PM), http://www.wired.com/2007/07/security-resear/.
54. See Dustin Volz, More Than a Million OPM Hack Victims Still Not Notified, REUTERS
(Dec. 11, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cybersecurity-opm-
idUSKBNOTU2NI20151211.
55. Michael Cooper & Sam Roberts, After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/us/08pentagon.html?_r-0.
56. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. Clv. RTS.-Civ. LIBERTIES L. REV. 311, 315-17 (2011).
57. Adam Gabbatt, "I Am Chelsea Manning, " Says Jailed Soldier Formerly Known as Brad-
ley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-gender-
reassignment (stating also that Manning's first name is now Chelsea).
58. See Jason M. Breslow, How Edward Snowden Leaked "Thousands" of NSA Documents,
PBS: FRONTLINE (May 13, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-edward-snowden-
leaked-thousands-of-nsa-documents/.
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maintain control over data.59 Hackers break into a defense contractor's
computers to steal information on the Joint Strike Fighter.0 Attackers
breach corporate networks in movie studios61 and department stores62
alike. While rigorous data are difficult if not impossible to find, both the
number of breaches and their scope appears to be on the rise.6 3 Firms are
trying to hold back the tide-information technology is designed to re-
duce the costs of accessing information, not to augment them.
Secret information faces internal threats as well. Most employees
carry smartphones that feature high-resolution cameras, e-mail and file
transfer programs, and access to the corporate network.4 Firms routinely
defer to employees' choice regarding what devices to attach to corporate
networks and what, if any, security precautions to take with those devic-
es.65 Personnel with access to secrets stored in digital form can store and
share them readily, and information stored in analog form can be readily
digitized by means of a scan or photograph. Even innocent employees
can spill secrets simply by losing their device or having it compro-
mised.66 Analog information is similarly at risk, as when hospital em-
ployees leave a briefcase with information about patients with HIV on
the subway.67 Intellectual property (IP) attorneys have responded with a
59. See, e.g., Kaveh Waddell, Hospitals Aren't the Only Ones Bleeding Stolen Health Rec-
ords, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/hospitals-
arent-the-only-ones-bleeding-stolen-health-records/420636/.
60. See, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gady, New Snowden Documents Reveal Chinese Behind F-35
Hack, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 27, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/new-snowden-documents-reveal-
chinese-behind-f-3 5-hack/.
61. See, e.g., Mark Seal, An Exclusive Look Inside Sony's Hacking Saga, VANITY FAIR (Feb.
4, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/02/sony-hacking-seth-rogen-evan-
goldberg.
62. See, e.g., Michael Riley, Benjamin Elgin, Dune Lawrence & Carol Matlack, Missed
Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13,
2014, 8:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-
hack-of-credit-card-data.
63. See, e.g., Janet Brumfield, Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://news.verizonenterprise.com/2015/04/2015-data-breach-report-info/#release;
Fahmida Y. Rashid, The Most Innovative and Damaging Hacks of 2015, INFOWORLD (Dec. 28,
2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/3017980/security/the-most-innovative-and-damaging-
hacks-of-2015.html; 2015 Second Annual Data Breach Industry Forecast, EXPERIAN 2 (2015),
https://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2015-industry-forecast-experian.pdf.
64. See Bone, supra note 26, at 274-75 n.147; Ivan. P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence
from State Trade Secrets Laws 6 (June 15, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-1755284 (showing that
75% of misappropriation cases involve current or former employees).
65. This phenomenon is known as "Bring Your Own Device" in the IT sector. See Dean
Evans, What Is BYOD and Why Is It Important?, TECHRADAR (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.techradar.com/us/news/computing/what-is-byod-and-why-is-it-important-- 1175088.
66. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1057-
58 (2d Cir. 1985).
67. Carey Goldberg, MGH Settles for $1M After HIV Patient Records Lost on Subway,
WBUR'S COMMON HEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2011/02/mass-general-privacy/.
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panoply of warnings and advice, but they fight a rearguard action against
technology and human error.
The plummeting costs of information have put intellectual property
regimes under significant stress. For example, copyright law operates
against an implicit assumption of costly reproduction and dissemination.
With the shift to digital media and high-speed networks, those activities
became increasingly cheap, if not effectively costless, as exemplified by
the rise of Napster and its progeny. Copyright owners turned to law as a
means of artificially driving up the cost of copying and sharing. Both
69Congress and the courts reacted by making copyright more potent.
Congress passed the No Electronic Theft Act, augmenting the penalties
for infringement and making criminal prosecution easier.70 It enacted
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, threatening liability for
users sophisticated enough to bypass technological protection measures
employed by copyright owners.7n The courts expanded vicarious and
contributory liability to hold intermediaries responsible for infringe-
ment72; when firms circumvented those schemes through clever software
design, the Supreme Court invented the new theory of inducement to
ensnare them.73 As technological changes caused information costs to
fall, copyright law responded to take up some of the slack.
Patent law faces similar pressures. The advent of low-cost, comput-
er-aided design drawings, and software to produce them, means that con-
sumers increasingly have the information necessary to duplicate patented
products, such as dentures74 and aircraft parts.75 And, the rise of relative-
ly cheap 3-D printers provides consumers with the means to use those
76
blueprints. Patent owners have responded by attempting to have the
68. See Michael H. Bunis & Anna Dray-Siegel, You Need to Work Harder to Fight Trade
Secret Theft, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:38 PM),
https://www.choate.com/uploads/1 78/doc/Bunis,_Dray-Siegel_-_Law360_-
YouNeedToWorkHarderToFight TradeSecretTheft.pdf; Trent Livingston, Today's
Connected Employee: A License to Steal, TRADING SECRETS (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2014/09/articles/trade-secrets/todays-connected-employee-a-
license-to-steal/.
69. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 153-54, 160-61 (2d ed. 2006).
70. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(b), (d), 111 Stat. 2678, 2678-79
(1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A)C) (2012), and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a)-(d) (2012), re-
spectively).
71. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-
65 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012)).
72. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
73. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
74. See Susan Decker, Silicon Valley Beats Hollywood in Teeth-Straightening Case,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1l-
10/align-loses-patent-appeal-over-copycat-dental-aligners.
75. See Frank Catalano, Boeing Files Patent for 3D-Printed Aircraft Parts-and Yes, It's
Already Using Them, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 6, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2015/boeing-files-patent-for-3d-printing-of-aircraft-parts-and-yes-its-
already-using-them/.
76. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the
Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1691, 1693 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S.
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International Trade Commission and federal courts block sharing of
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) plans via the Internet.77 Similarly, the
ease of moving information technology functions outside U.S. borders
has given firms new possibilities for evading infringement liability, par-
ticularly for method patents. The response from courts has been mixed.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted a flexible test for
systems claims that assesses whether the patented system has been used
in the U.S., thereby triggering infringement liability.78 The Federal Cir-
cuit's test evaluates "where control of the system is exercised and bene-
ficial use of the system obtained."79 This approach meant that the com-
pany Research In Motion (RIM), maker of the then-famous Blackberry
messaging devices, infringed patents on electronic mail systems that in-
corporated wireless components.80 Even though one part of the RIM ser-
vice was located in Canada, the Federal Circuit reasoned that control and
beneficial use were enjoyed in the U.S., where Blackberry users fanati-
cally checked their messages.8' Similarly, the Federal Circuit interpreted
liability for direct infringement of method patents to find that an Internet
company was an infringer, even though the company had arranged ac-
tivity such that its customers performed one step of the patented method
for delivering Internet content.82 A single entity must perform all of the
steps of the patented method to infringe, but the Federal Circuit broad-
ened the scope of joint patent infringement to reduce the risk of strategic
behavior, particularly in the on-line context.83
By contrast, the Supreme Court limited the extraterritorial reach of
some aspects of patent law by holding that software code installed on
computers outside U.S. borders did not count as a "component," since it
was a copy of the code residing on the PCs, rather than the original com-
pact disc itself.4 This distinction allowed Microsoft to evade liability for
infringing a patent on an apparatus for compressing and encoding
speech.8 5 Thus, while patent law has been attentive to the implications of
reduced costs for sharing (and creating) patented inventions, it has only
partially reacted to mitigate those effects.
Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1321-
22 (2015); Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1922-23 (2015).
77. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286-87, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing International Trade Commission order that the ITC had jurisdiction to
ban "electronically imported data" under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
78. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abro-
gated on other grounds by Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012), as recognized in
IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., 769 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
79. Id at 1317.
80. Id. at 1317, 1325.
81. Id. at 1317.
82. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306, 1313, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev'd Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111
(2014).
83. See id at 1317-18.
84. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449-51, 454 (2007).
85. Id. at 458-59.
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Lastly, trademark law has had to respond to falling information
costs. The rise of the commercial Internet, especially the Web, led to a
wave of cybersquatting, where infringers used well-known marks in do-
main names, meta tags, e-mail messages, or page content to draw users
to their sites. Trademark holders responded with the usual array of
claims sounding in the Lanham Act or state equivalents, unfair competi-
tion, or tort. However, some behavior, such as registering but then
warehousing infringing domain names, fell outside the boundaries of
these doctrines, and some foreign defendants evaded enforcement.8
Congress responded by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act (ACPA), which penalized registering and trafficking in in-
fringing domain names, enabled plaintiffs to proceed in rem against do-
main names in the absence of in personam jurisdiction, and offered
heavy statutory damages to drive up the cost of infringement.89
There are at least two additional shifts on the horizon that are likely
to make it more difficult to maintain secrets. The first is technological.
The much-lauded "Internet of Things" is beginning to become reality.
The standard example is the refrigerator.90 The functionality of the fridge
is largely unchanged from the era of the icebox-multiple temperature
zones and built-in ice and water dispensers count as major feature chang-
es. But, many refrigerators have chips-CPUs-that determine when to
run the compressor, when to defrost, and other cooling-related decisions.
The humble fridge is thus catching up to other appliances, such as coffee
makers, which use chips that allow users to program automatic brewing
of coffee; washing machines, which use CPUs to determine wash cycle
time and water temperature; and heating/air conditioning units, which
employ chips to implement schedules for warming or cooling the house-
hold.91 Increasingly, however, the refrigerator-and by extension other
household appliances-will have an Internet connection as well. It will
be able to schedule maintenance, report on inventory, and display your
daily calendar by connecting to the Net. The networked refrigerator has
two important ramifications for secrecy. First, these devices will generate
new data.92 For example, a smart fridge used in a lab might generate a
86. See Nicholas Foss Barbantonis, Should Contributory Cybersquatting Be Actionable?, 17
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 79, 83, 96 (2015).
87. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
88. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2000).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
90. And that is not the most ridiculous one. See Andrew Liszewski, This Smart Rubber Duck-
ie Makes Bathtime Even More Fun (and Safer), TOYLAND (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:07 PM),
http://toyland.gizmodo.com/this-smart-rubber-duckie-makes-bathtime-lots-of-fun-an-1 678038671.
91. See Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: The Internet of Toasters
(and Other Things), CNET (Mar. 2, 2015, 11:26 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/appliance-
science-the-internet-of-toasters-and-other-things/.
92. See Klint Finley, Hacked Fridges Aren't the Internet of Things' Biggest Worry, WIRED
(Mar. 12, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/hacked-fridges-arent-intemet-things-
biggest-worry/.
844 [Vol. 93:4
2016] SECRECY IS DEAD -LONG LIVE TRADE SECRETS
report notifying scientists that a particular chemical stored inside it is in
short supply. Previously, the scientists would have learned this infor-
mation via visual inspection. Now, though, the appliance itself produces
the information. Data that is more widely shared is more vulnerable to
disclosure. This brings up the second point: connecting additional devic-
es to the Internet makes them vulnerable to hacking and data breaches.93
For example, Samsung smart efrigerators implement the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) encryption protocol, but fail to authenticate the digital cer-
tificates used in SSL, leaving the fridges vulnerable to hackers, who suc-
cessfully impersonate the certificates via a "man-in-the-middle" attack.94
Thus, the advent of the Internet of Things means that devices generate
more data, and also increase the attack surface for hackers.95 The trend
will be similar to the introduction of the Internet-connected cell phone in
the workplace, which presented new cybersecurity challenges for firms.96
The second change is legal. Recent federal cybersecurity legislation
immunizes firms, such as Internet service providers, that share infor-
mation on IT threats with the federal government. In theory, this new
legal regime is intended to protect trade secrets (among other things) by
helping private companies and the government collaborate to prevent
hacking, intrusions, and other forms of threats. However, it also increases
risks to secrecy. As more information is monitored, shared, and stored,
some information pertinent to trade secrets will be collected and is thus
at risk of disclosure.98 The new statute imposes few requirements upon
the firms that share information and immunizes them from any legal lia-
bility for doing so." The federal cybersecurity program increases infor-
mation dissemination, in part by protecting firms from liability when
they engage in sharing. 1 As data related to trade secrets flows across the
network, some is likely to be collected, deliberately or inadvertently, and
then shared. The sharing entity has sub-optimal incentives to sort or
93. See Julie Bort, For the First Time, Hackers Have Used a Refrigerator to Attack Business-
es, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-use-a-
refridgerator-to-attack-businesses-2014-1.
94. John Leyden, Samsung Smart Fridge Leaves Gmail Logins Open to Attack, REGISTER
(Aug. 24, 2015, 9:03), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/24/smartfridgesecurityfubar/.
95. See generally Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Smart Fridge Only Capable of Displaying
Buggy Future of the Internet of Things, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:33 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/smart-fridge-only-capable-of-displaying-buggy-future-of-the-
internet-of-things ("This is the future, where your fridge has apps, and can probably be hacked.").
96. See, e.g., Rebekah Mintzer, From Smartphones with Love: Devices Aid Corporate Espio-
nage, CORP. COUNSEL (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202652989359/From-
Smartphones-With-Love-Devices-Aid-Corporate-Espionage?slretum=20160215171934.
97. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), S. 754, 114th Cong., was
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in December 2015. Everett
Rosenfeld, The Controversial 'Surveillance' Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html.
98. See Jennifer Granick, OmniCISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and FTC on User Privacy,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 16, 2015, 6:09 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28386/omnicisa-pits-
govemment-against-self-privacy/.




safeguard the information because it is relieved of liability when it dis-
closes it.1 oi
Technology has shifted to make it harder than ever to control who
can access and use information. Firms face low-skilled attackers, who
employ automated tools to look for vulnerabilities and misconfigura-
tions; high-skilled ones, who can write custom exploits; and insiders,
who can misuse their access to systems and information.'02 It is not pos-
sible to reverse or even meaningfully modify this change with technolo-
gy alone. Rather, innovators will have to supplement code with law, turn-
ing inevitably to trade secret as their only alternative. 103
III. IMPLICATIONS
The expanded use of trade secret that this Article predicts will cause
growing pains. Trade secret prioritizes protecting an owner's legitimate
expectations of confidentiality, to encourage innovation, to discourage
unethical behavior, or both.'1 Enforcing rights in a trade secret, howev-
er, will at times implicate, if not override, other important values. To
date, trade secret doctrine has not had to grapple much with when and
how to accommodate those countervailing values. Courts tend to invoke
the property label or condemn unfair business practices without any real
analysis-the conclusion is treated as self-supporting.o But a failure to
do so risks override, either by judicial decision or legislative fiat. Courts
and legislators will have to grapple with whether to maximize protection
for covered secrets or to accommodate countervailing interests;106 wheth-
er to prefer experimentation or uniformity;'0 7 and whether to continue the
expansion in criminal enforcement or to curtail it to mirror patent law.ios
This Part explores each of these challenges.
Perhaps the greatest risk to trade secret is when it clashes with free
speech. Unlike trademark or copyright, trade secret contains no built-in
101. Seeid
102. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1011, 1016, 1022-23
(2014); see also David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287
(2014).
103. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 passim
(1998) (discussing how law regulates behavior both directly and indirectly).
104. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974).
105. The cases often remind one of a line from Ring Lardner's novel The Young Immigrunts:
"Shut up he explained." RING W. LARDNER, JR., THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS 778 (1920). Thanks to
Toni Massaro for this reference.
106. See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infra-
structure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 passim (2007).
107. See Michael Risch, An Empirical Look at Trade Secret Law's Shif from Common to
Statutory Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 151, 156 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
108. See Robert M. Isackson & Sonia Valdez, New Year, New Progress. The Defend Trade
Secrets Act Reports Out from the Senate Judiciary Committee, ORRICK: TRADE SECRETS WATCH
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2016/01/29/new-year-new-progress-the-
defend-trade-secrets-act-reports-out-from-the-senate-judiciary-committee/#more- 1749.
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accommodation for First Amendment interests.109 Scholars have criti-
cized this myopia, but courts have rarely faced cases that present signifi-
cant free speech issues.o10 An increase in trade secret protection, and
hence litigation, makes such a clash inevitable, though. For example,
energy companies have begun to extract natural gas through a process
known as fracking.i" Fracking requires injection of chemicals into the
ground to enable withdrawal of the gas; the firms treat the components
and make-up of the inoculants as trade secrets.'12 Critics have charged
that the chemicals pose significant health risks. Energy companies have
refused to divulge their formulas, even to legislators, by citing trade se-
crecy. A whistleblower, who made the formula public-or a newspa-
per that published it-might be held liable for misappropriation, perhaps
even facing an injunction against further distribution."14 Such a remedy
would immediately implicate the First Amendment, especially if the
health risks proved to be real. 5 Courts have refused to block dissemina-
tion of other content obtained in violation of various laws, and it is likely
that free speech interests would eventually trump here, too." 6
The second tension is with federalism. Trade secret is a creature of
state law, developing initially as a tort that policed unfair business prac-
tices."7 The advent of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979
was an important shift towards greater uniformity among the states, near-
ly all of which have adopted it."'8 However, three states (New York,
Massachusetts, and Texas) with important innovation sectors do not use
the UTSA." 9 States differ from one another on which UTSA provisions
they have adopted and the statutory language used to implement them.20
109. See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1404-06,
1412 (2014).
110. See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the
First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J, 777, 777-78 (2007).
111. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 955, 962 (2015).
112. Mary Winter, Drilling Down on Shale Gas, ST. LEGISLATURES, July-Aug. 2013, at 8,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/magazine/articles/2013/SL_0713-Trends.pdf.
113. Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolu-
tion, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1-2 (2010).
114. Cf Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16-17) (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 2686565, Nov. 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-2686565 (discussing that injunctions are routine-
ly used to suppress the disclosure of trade secrets).
115. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectu-
al Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-32 (1998).
116. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (per curiam) (explaining that a prior restraint suppressing the distribution of a classified study
violates the First Amendment); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that
disclosure of an illegally recorded conversation was protected by the First Amendment because it
was about a matter of public concern).
117. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-93 (1974) (discussing the evolu-
tion and policy of trade secret law).
118. See generally Risch, supra note 107.
119. Png, supra note 64, at 2.
120. See generally Risch, supra note 107.
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Common law precedent continues to play a role in cases brought under
UTSA-based statutes, and some states, such as California, have not en-
tirely pre-empted common law trade secret.121 All of these features gen-
erate variation among state trade secret regimes. This accords well with
the concept of state regimes as useful policy experiments.12 2 The federal
role in trade secret law is currently limited to enforcement via criminal
prosecution under certain circumstances, such as where misappropriation
benefits a foreign power.123
That is likely to change as trade secret usage expands. The past sev-
eral congressional sessions have seen the introduction of legislation to
federalize trade secret.1 24 Supporters tout he benefits of uniformity and
predictability, particularly for firms that operate in multiple states.125 A
federal trade secret system would have drawbacks, however.126 It would
sacrifice the distributed development and evolution of doctrine that state
variation produces.127 It would increase the workload of the federal court
system, particularly if jurisdiction were to be exclusively federal.12 8 And,
a federal statute would need to decide between pre-empting similar state
claims, as with patent and copyright, or whether to operate in parallel, as
with trademark.
Shifting to a federal trade secret system also heightens the clash
with other legal regimes. California, for example, denies enforcement to
any contractual term that limits labor mobility.1 29 While it may be nomi-
nally possible to craft an agreement that protects a firm's trade secrets
after an employee leaves the company, success at that task has been
scarce to date.'30 A federal trade secret regime would thus have spillover
effects into other areas of state-based regulation.
121. Id
122. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
124. See, e.g., Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong.,
https://www.congress.gov/l 14/bills/hr3326/BILLS-ll 4hr3326ih.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Orrin Hatch & Chris Coons, Pass the Defend Trade Secrets Act, HILL (Jan. 27,
2016, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/267205-pass-the-defend-trade-secrets-act.
126. See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L.
REV. 317, 321-22 (2015).
127. See Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law et al. to




128. Id. at 1, 5-6.
129. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2016) ("[E]very contract by which anyone is
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.").
130. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008) (holding that an
employee's non-competition and non-solicitation agreement was invalid because it restricted the
employee from practicing his profession). But see Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Sols., No.
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The third tension relates to enforcement. While patent law provides
stronger property-like rights over an invention, trade secret's enforce-
ment regime does have one significant advantage: criminal penalties at
both the state131 and federall32 level. Patent law is unusual in this regard:
the federal Copyright Actl33 and Lanham Actl34 (trademark) both create
criminal liability in some circumstances, and some neighboring rights,
such as the federal anti-bootlegging statute,13 5 also impose criminal pen-
alties. Scholars largely conclude that the lack of criminal penalties for
patent infringement is not a deliberate policy decision, but rather derives
from public choice issues.136 Criminal enforcement of IP rights is attrac-
tive to at least some innovators, since it can augment deterrence through
greater sanctions, and because it transfers some of the cost of vindicating
intellectual property rights from the owner to the public fisc. If innova-
tors shift to relying more on trade secret, they are likely to push prosecu-
tors to pursue charges against infringers. And while the number of feder-
al criminal cases involving intellectual property is quite small, state pros-
ecutors may be more amenable to such pressures, especially where the
rightsholder is a state resident and the alleged infringer is not.137
To date, trade secret doctrine has largely evaded clashes with other
legal regimes. The increasing use of legal protections for confidential
information will mean that legislators and courts must confront and re-
solve clashes with free speech protections, federalism concerns, and
choice of enforcement models.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to prophesy, especially about the future.138
1-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at *15-21 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (holding (in a trial for a
preliminary injunction) that a non-compete clause may be enforceable and employees may have
engaged in unfair competition and breached a non-disclosure agreement).
131. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2016); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(4)
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.035 (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 2015).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (2012).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3) (2012).
136. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 505-12 (2011).
137. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2053 n.157 (2014) (first citing
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT ANN. REP. FY2012, at 31 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/201 3/01/29/doj-pro-ip-rpt2O12.pdf; and then
citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. JUST. STAT., 2009, at 13 (2011),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf).
138. This quote has been variously attributed, most prominently to Niels Bohr and Yogi Berra
(an unlikely pairing). It is likely a variant of a Dutch aphorism. It's Difficult to Make Predictions,
Especially About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20, 2013),
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/; see also Letters to the Editor, The Perils of




To summarize, I argue that innovators must inevitably turn to trade
secret, as patents are increasingly costly or unavailable, and other
measures of maintaining more absolute secrecy are less reliable. This
framework usefully generates some predictions that can be tested empiri-
cally. First, it suggests that trade secret litigation should not only in-
crease, but that the rate of increase should go up over time.1 39 Second, the
ratio of trade secret suits to patent suits should increase as well, if inno-
vators are shifting from the latter to the former as their preferred method
of protection. Third, criminal prosecution of trade secret cases hould
increase at both the state and federal levels, both in absolute terms and
relative to IP cases as a whole.1"4 Fourth, firms are likely to attempt to
develop new ways of measuring the value of trade secrets to address the
valuation problem.141 Finally-and perhaps most difficult to quantify-
the frequency with which defendants interpose defenses unrelated to
trade secret will increase. California may be an especially useful testing
ground for this prediction since the state has several other legal regimes
that can conflict with trade secret protection.
One challenge to evaluating claims empirically is that trade secrets
are hard to detect. There is no registration process for a trade secret; it is
defined only retrospectively in litigation to determine whether misappro-
priation has occurred.142 Secrets are hard to value on a firm's books and
difficult to measure in quantity or quality.143 An increase in utilization of
trade secrets might be detected by proxy, such as the volume of litiga-
tion, perhaps after a lag time. But, by definition, these advances are se-
crets and not amenable to measurement. The existence and scale of any
shift will be challenging to determine, and will likely need to use sec-
ondary or partial measures, such as proxies or surveys, rather than direct
observation.
Litigation is one such secondary measure, and this Article predicts
that trade secret litigation will increase; that the rate of increase will also
go up; and that it will increase relative to patent litigation.' An increase
in litigation assumes that actual or threatened misappropriation is either
independent of the volume of trade secrets or varies directly with it.
Thus, more trade secrets generates more misappropriation, particularly
given that self-help becomes less effective with technological shifts that
139. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 301 (2010); see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis
of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 61 (2011); Png, supra note 64, at 3.
140. This is concededly difficult to measure. See Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand
Trade Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration 8 (Aug. 2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=922520.
141. See Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 29-30.
142. See Chagai Vinizky, Trade Secrets Registry, 35 PACE L. REV. 455, 457 (2014) (proposing
registration for trade secrets).
143. See Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 5.
144. See Lerner, supra note 140, at 11-12.
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drive the cost of distributing information down. Those shifts also explain
the change in the rate of increase-firms will need to employ litigation to
protect secrets more often than in the past because their own precautions
become less effective.
Lawsuits are not always successful even when claims are meritori-
ous, leading to suboptimal deterrence. Misappropriators know there is at
least some chance that they will escape detection or, if caught, will avoid
liability. 145 Trade secret owners are thus likely to lobby both for criminal
penalties for misappropriation and for prosecutors to bring charges
against alleged infringers. Law enforcement resources are relatively stat-
ic. If reliance on trade secrecy does increase, prosecutions will likely
remain mostly constant in the short run, which means that criminal en-
forcement would decrease relative to the level of misappropriation. Trade
secret owners will respond by pressing for more resources to be devoted
to the problem, in an absolute sense and as a share of a prosecutor's time
and budget. This prediction mirrors what has happened in other areas of
IP, where rightsholders have pressed successfully for more resources to
battle infringement. For example, the PRO IP Act of 2008 created dedi-
cated federal positions in the executive branch and in embassies to com-
bat violations of IP rights.'4 Politically, it is likely palatable to go after
misappropriation, given the roots of trade secrecy in policing unethical
commercial behavior. 147 Prosecutions for trade secrets offenses are likely
to rise over time.
As innovators shift to trade secret, they face the risk that outsiders,
such as shareholders, will be unable to value correctly their advances.148
Indeed, underpricing is likely to occur. Because claims of having a secret
invention are cheap talk, markets will rationally discount those claims,
and innovators will be unable to realize fully the value of their secret
advances. Firms are likely to try to overcome Arrow's paradox to realize
the full value of their innovation. 149 There are a number of standard valu-
ation models, but all rely on access to information-precisely the prob-
lem with a secret.50 The most likely answer is to use a third-party certifi-
145. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages. An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 887-95 (1998).
146. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-403, § 301, 122 Stat. 4256, 4264-66 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8111 (2012)).
147. Changes to patent enforcement are somewhat cabined politically because firms can rea-
sonably predict that they may be an infringer as well as a rightsholder, particularly given the uncer-
tain definition of a patent's claims or boundaries before trial. By contrast, firms are likely to believe
(even if inaccurately) that hey will not engage in unethical behavior such as espionage or inducing
employees to breach agreements. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
485-87 (1974) (discussing the steps companies and individuals will take to protect against breaches
of confidence and "industrial espionage").
148. Bambauer & Sepe, supra note 3, at 29-32.
149. Arrow, supra note 21, at 623-25.
150. See, e.g., Gavin C. Reid, Nicola Searle & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What's It Worth to Keep
a Secret?, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 116, 137-40 (2015); Robert P. Schweihs, The Value ofa Trade
851
DENVER LAW REVIEW
er, where the certifier is under a duty of confidentiality to the trade secret
owner, but is sufficiently trustworthy that its estimate of the secret's val-
ue will be credible.15 1
Unfortunately, the history of third-party certifiers is mixed at best.
Certifiers must constantly balance credibility, which protects their repu-
tation and makes their signals valuable, against appealing to clients, who
want the highest possible rating for their secrets. There can be adverse
selection, as with services that rate the privacy protections provided by
Web sites.15 2 Firms can set up their own certifiers, a practice known in-
formally as "greenwashing."i5 3 Companies may be selective about the
information they disclose to certifiers. And, the time lag between the
certifier's estimate and the eventual revelation of the secret's value (as
embodied in products and services) may make it hard to gauge how accu-
rate those calculations were. One can expect firms to try to gain credit in
the marketplace for their secret innovations, but it will be challenging to
do so.
This Article's claim about the coming rise of trade secrecy is a de-
scriptive one, not a normative one. Trade secret is generally viewed with
skepticism by legal scholars, who tend to prefer the disclosure-based
regime of patents.154 Ultimately, whether the shift towards trade secret is
desirable depends upon a complex and likely unknowable empirical cal-
culus. If trade secrecy enables innovators to capture more of the returns
from inventions, since secrets can have indefinite duration, the change is
likely to increase incentives to engage in this type of research and devel-
opment. And, depending upon whether one prefers coordinated versus
distributed investigation of an advance's prospects, trade secret could
increase or decrease development of an invention.156 Finally, secrecy
prevents others in the field from learning about innovation, which may
Secret, INSIGHTS, Autumn 2009, at 48, 51-53,
http://www.willamette.com/insightsjournal/09/autumn_2009_5.pdf.
151. The use of trusted third parties to overcome information asymmetry problems, and specif-
ically Arrow's paradox, has occurred in a number of situations, including when motion picture and
television producers receive unsolicited scripts. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Role ofPrivate Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild ofAmeri-
ca, 1938-2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215, 249-50, 261-664 (2011). I have proposed such
a method for managing markets for software vulnerability disclosures. See Derek E. Bambauer &
Oliver Day, The Hacker s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1100-03 (2011).
152. See Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online "Trust" Certifications and Search
Results, ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS passim (2010),
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/advsel-trust-se.pdf.
153. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 440-41 (2009).
154. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 26, at 282-84, 292-93.
155. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
623, 637-38 (2013); see also Png, supra note 64, at 1.
156. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 288 (1977).
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decrease research and development by others.'57 The net effect on inno-
vation is unclear, but the coming rise of trade secrets could provide a
valuable, quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the merits of secrecy ver-
sus disclosure.
157. This assumes that patents function to disseminate information, an assumption challenged
by Mark Lemley and other scholars. Some firms instruct researchers not to read patents, for fear of
increased damages if the companies are later found to infringe those patents. Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 n.89 (2008).
Moreover, patents often do not reveal key information related to commercializing an invention, as
opposed to simply practicing it. See also Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REv. 227, 247-54 (2012).
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In recent years, high-profile lawsuits involving standards-essential
patents (SEPs) have made headlines in the United States, Europe, and
Asia, leading to a heated public debate regarding the role and impact of
patents covering key interoperability standards. Enforcement agencies
around the world have investigated and prosecuted alleged violations of
competition law and private licensing commitments in connection with
SEPs. Yet, while the debate has focused broadly on standardization and
patents in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector,
commentators have paid little attention to differences among technology
layers within ICT.
This Article uses both existing and new empirical data to show that
patent filing and assertion activity is substantially lower for Internet-
related standards than for standards relating to telecommunications and
other computing technologies. It analyzes historical and social factors
that may have contributed to this divergence focusing on the two princi-
pal Internet standards bodies: the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). It counters the
dominant narrative that standards and SEPs are necessarily fraught with
litigation and thereby necessitate radical systemic change. Instead, it
shows that standards policies that de-emphasize patent monetization have
led to lower levels of disputes and litigation. It concludes by placing re-
cent discussions of patenting and standards within the broader context of
openness in network technologies and urges both industry participants
and policy makers to look to the success of Internet standardization in a
patent-light environment when considering the adoption of new rules and
policies.
t Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and Senior Policy
Fellow, American University Washington College of Law. The author thanks Scott Bradner and
Wendy Seltzer for their helpful background discussions of IETF and W3C, respectively. The author
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tion of this Article. Support for the preparation of this Article was provided by the Centre for Inter-
national Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
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We reject: kings, presidents and voting.
We believe in: rough consensus and running code.
Dave Clark, 19921
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Standards and Interoperability
Technical interoperability standards are sets of protocols and design
parameters that enable products manufactured by different vendors to
work together with minimal user intervention. These standards are em-
bodied in nearly every electronic and technological device today. Broad-
ly adopted interoperability standards can produce significant efficiency-
]. Dave Clark, Senior Research Scientist, Mass. Inst. Tech, A Cloudy Crystal Ball - Visions
of the Future, Presentation at the Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Internet Engineering Task Force
(July 16, 1992), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
543, slide 19 (Megan Davies et al. eds., 1992), https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/24.pdf.
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enhancing network effects and other benefits and are integral to the mod-
2em technology infrastructure.
Standards may be developed in a variety of settings. Some health,
safety, and environmental standards are developed by governmental
agencies. Most interoperability standards, however, are developed in the
private sector. Individual firms may develop proprietary technologies
that, through broad market adoption, become de facto standards (e.g.,
Adobe's "portable document format" (PDF)). In several well-known
cases competing firms have engaged in commercial "standards wars" to
determine which of their proprietary formats will prevail in the market.
Over the past two decades, however, most interoperability standards
have been developed by groups of market participants that collaborate
within voluntary associations known as standards-development organiza-
tions (SDOs).4 The standards produced within these organizations are
often referred to as "voluntary consensus tandards," as they are devel-
oped through consensus-based collaborative processes, and there is no
requirement that participants use the resulting standards.
B. The Architecture ofInternet Standardization
Gartner Group estimates that more than six billion devices are con-
nected to the Internet in 2016.' The interconnection and communication
of these devices is made possible by hundreds of different standards at
many different technological layers. The TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol/Intemet Protocol) data model provides an abstract representa-
tion of the four functional layers of a computing or communications sys-
tem and is frequently utilized to conceptualize the different technology
layers that comprise the Internet.6 In Table 1 below, the four TCP/IP
layers are shown with a set of exemplary standards as well as the SDOs
responsible for these standards.
2. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 186 (1999); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2025-29 (2007).
3. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 2, at 17 (describing well-known standards wars such as
Betamax v. VHS).
4. The alternative term "standards-setting organization" (SSO) is also used in the literature.
5. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 6.4 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in
2016, up 30 Percent from 2015 (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317.
6. See, e.g., ANDREW G. BLANK, TCP/IP FOUNDATIONS 24 (2004).
7. Id. Table 3, of course, grossly oversimplifies the vast array of standards and SDOs in-
volved in Internet technologies. In addition to the listed SDOs, at every layer there are numerous





4. Application XML (data exchange) W3C, OASIS
HTTP, HTML (web) IETF, W3C
IMAP, POP, MIME IETF
(email)
3. Transport TCP, UDP IETF
2. Internet IPv4, IPv6, ICMP, IETF
ARP
1. Network Ethernet, ISDN, DSL, IEEE
Wi-Fi, X.25 ETSI
3G/4G
As Table 1 illustrates, there are three distinct groups of SDOs in-
volved in Internet standardization at different levels of the network archi-
tecture.8 The first group focuses on Layer 1, which corresponds to physi-
cal transmission and data link technologies.9 These include standards for
both wired connections (e.g., Ethernet, DSL, and ISDN) as well as wire-
less connections (2G/3G/4G). 0 The major SDOs that serve these tech-
nical areas are ETSI and IEEE, though a host of smaller SDOs and trade
associations are also involved in various aspects of this field. Levels 2
and 3 include the "core" Internet protocols TCP and IP." These stand-
ards are maintained by IETF. At the Application layer, IETF is joined by
W3C, primarily responsible for the HTML descriptor language, and
OASIS, which focuses on software interfaces.12
In order for the Internet to operate seamlessly, the standards defin-
ing each of these layers must interface with the layers immediately above
and below it. While this technical compatibility has largely been
achieved in today's many Internet-connected devices, there are striking
differences among the SDOs that operate at the Network,
Transport/Internet and Application levels. One of the largest areas of
divergence among these SDOs relates to their treatment of patents.
8. See generally BLANK, supra note 6, at 24.
9. See id
10. See id at 46-52.
I1. See id at 24-25.
12. Id. at 55-56.
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II. PATENTS AND STANDARDS
A. Standards-Essential Patents
A patent is a form of governmental grant that gives its owner the
exclusive right to practice (i.e., make, use, and sell) a claimed invention
throughout the issuing country.13 Patent protection in most countries lasts
for a period of twenty years from the date a patent application is filed.14
Patents may cover any system, device, product feature, process, or im-
provement so long as it is useful, novel, and not obvious in view of exist-
ing technologies." These basic features of patent law are applicable to
most developed countries through treaties including, most importantly,
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).16 In some countries, including the United States, patents are
authorized for the express purpose of promoting innovation and scientific
17progress.
While patents have historically covered new machines, composi-
tions of matter, and industrial processes, patents covering intangible in-
ventions-such as software and methods of doing business-began to
emerge in the last half-century. In the United States, beginning in the
early 1980s, the Supreme Court confirmed the patentability of computer
software programs" (traditionally protected via copyright in the pro-
gramming code itself). By the late 1990s, patents on "business methods"
were also being recognized by the courts.'9 While recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions are believed to have substantially limited the ability to
patent both software and business methods,20 it is estimated that at least
11,000 Internet-related business method patents are still in force in the
United States.2' Outside of the United States, patents on software and
business methods are less common, though they may often be upheld if
13. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
18. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 179-82, 191-93 (1981).
19. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (holding that "transformation of data ... by a machine ... constitutes" patentable subject
matter").
20. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (holding that an intermediat-
ed settlement patent covered an abstract idea and was not patenable subject matter); Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (holding that a risk-hedging patent was not patentable subject
matter); see also Lois D. Mermelstein, Cyberspace-Related Patents Since Alice, 71 BUS. LAW. 343,
34-44 (2015) (describing limitations on software/cyberspace patents since Alice Corp.).
21. MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, GLOBAL INTERNET LAW 785 (2014).
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they are tied to a "technical effect" or other outcome in the bricks and
mortar world.22
The product interface protocols and designs specified by technical
standards are often covered by patents. Most of these patents are owned
23by one or more firms engaged in the standards-development process.
Patents that will always be infringed by a product conforming to a par-
ticular standard are referred to as "standards-essential patents" or
"SEPs." Complex technological products may implement dozens or even
24hundreds of standards -each of which may be covered by hundreds or
thousands of SEPs.25 The result is a very large number of patents cover-
ing different aspects of certain standards.
B. Patent Concerns: The Debate over Hold- Up and Stacking
The existence of patents covering standards is not inherently nega-
tive, and many argue that the availability of patents provides the financial
incentives necessary to fund significant advances in technology. Howev-
er, once a standard is adopted, patents reduce the ability of competitors to
create compatible products and raise prices for consumers.2 6 Patents are
thus two-edged swords when it comes to standardization; they have the
potential to tip the balance of benefits and burdens sharply in favor of
one group or another.
In the recent literature, commentators have observed two scenarios
in which the balance of equities may tip too far in the direction of patent
holders: royalty stacking and patent hold-up. Royalty stacking is a spe-
cies of collective action problem that can occur when multiple SEP hold-
ers each charge a royalty to the manufacturer of a standards-compliant
product. While any given royalty, viewed individually, might be reason-
able and within market norms, the aggregate royalty burden on the prod-
uct, accounting for hundreds or thousands of SEPs, could be excessive.27
22. See Patenting Software, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/softwarepatents fulltext.html (last visited July 23, 2016);
see also Andr6s Guadamuz GonzAlez, The Software Patent Debate, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC.
196 (2006).
23. SDOs typically hold no patent rights in the standards that they produce.
24. See Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Ques-
tions), INT'L TELECOMM. UNION 123 (Dec. 13-15, 2010), http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-
t/opb/proc/T-PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf.
25. See KNUT BLIND ET AL., STUDY ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRs) 34, 36-37 (2011).
26. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 176-78 (2004).
27. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The court in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., observed that
[t]here are at least 92 entities that own 802.11 [standard-essential patents]. If each of the-
se 92 entities sought royalties imilar to [the patent holder's] request of 1.15 % to 1.73 %
of the end-product price, the aggregate royalty to implement the 802.11 Standard, which
is only one feature of the Xbox product, would exceed the total product price.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIO-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, 1 456 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (footnote omitted).
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Royalty stacking could, if not curbed, impose barriers to market entry,
raise prices for consumers, and reduce innovation in product markets.28
Patent hold-up refers to a scenario in which a SEP holder may de-
mand excessive royalties after product manufacturers have made signifi-
cant investments in a standardized technology. Once such investments
have been made, these manufacturers are said to be "locked-in" to the
standard.29 In such cases, the cost of switching from the standardized
technology to an alternative may be prohibitive--dramatically increasing
a patent holder's leverage in any ensuing licensing negotiation and ena-
bling it to charge excessive royalties.3 0
A heated debate is underway regarding whether patent hold-up and
royalty stacking are legitimate threats to standardization and technology
markets, or whether they are mere theoretical possibilities. On one hand,
some argue that there is little empirical evidence of these market failures
in the vibrant and rapidly advancing telecommunications marketplace
where prices continue to fall, product capabilities continue to expand,
and new market entrants continue to appear from all corners of the
globe. ' Others, however, respond that there is substantial empirical evi-
dence for the general theory of hold-up, that its application to SEP mar-
kets is particularly salient, and that evidence of hold-up in these markets
is difficult to obtain primarily due to confidentiality restrictions placed
on licensing agreements by the parties.32 It may also be the case that,
whatever the theoretical risk of patent hold-up and royalty stacking may
be in an unregulated SEP market, affirmative measures already taken by
SDOs and enforcement agencies may have reduced the occurrence of
these behaviors-demonstrating not that hold-up and stacking are not
serious issues, but that they must continue to be policed to prevent future
occurrences.33
C. SDO Patent Policies
Many SDOs have adopted internal policies intended to reduce the
possibility of royalty stacking and patent hold-up. While such policies
28. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 61-62 (2007).
29. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 2, at 11, 116; Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 608 (2007).
30. Farrell et al., supra note 29, at 608; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2049.
31. Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up 2 (Nat'i Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2588169.
32. Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up: Myth or Reality? (Oct. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
33. In this respect, I have analogized the situation to that of Ebola outbreaks in the United
States. As of this writing, there is no evidence of a serious Ebola outbreak in the United States.
However, this does not mean that Ebola is not a threat to the public health (as there is ample evi-
dence of its seriousness from other jurisdictions). Rather the absence of Ebola infection in the United
States is a credit to our public health agencies and healthcare facilities, which have carefully moni-
tored, contained, and addressed potential outbreaks.
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existed as early as the 1950s,34 SDO patent policies began to assume
their current forms in the late 1990s prompted by a settlement that Dell
Computer reached with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC).15 In
this case, the FTC accused Dell of engaging in unfair methods of compe-
tition by seeking to enforce patents against implementers of a video bus
standard after a Dell engineer had signed a statement certifying that Dell
held no patents essential to the standard. In the settlement reached with
the FTC, Dell agreed not to assert its patent against any third party im-
plementing the standard.36
A second wave of policy revisions occurred in the mid-2000s fol-
lowing litigation involving semiconductor design firm Rambus.3 7 In this
litigation, the FTC accused Rambus of engaging in anticompetitive prac-
tices by concealing, and later seeking to enforce, patents that it otherwise
should have disclosed to an SDO.38 Though Rambus eventually prevailed
on technical grounds,39 the case underscored the importance of drafting
extremely clear and detailed SDO patent policies.
The result is that today almost all SDO patent policies impose one
or both of the following obligations on SDO participants: (1) an obliga-
tion to disclose patents essential to implementation of a standard, (2) an
obligation to license patents essential to implementation of a standard-
either on a royalty-free (RF) basis or on a royalty-bearing basis at rates
that are "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND or RAND).40
Yet within these parameters, major differences exist among SDO
patent policies. These differences can be observed, to a large degree,
when comparing SDOs in the different layers described in Table 1. Thus,
SDOs in the Network Layer, including ETSI, ITU, and IEEE, typically
permit their participants to charge FRAND royalties for SEPs covering
the SDO's standards. The primary Transport/Internet SDO, IETF, per-
34. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 43 (2015).
35. In re Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 623-24 (1996).
36. Id. at 616-26.
37. See generally In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006),
rev d, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (The FTC "f[ound] that Rambus engaged in exclusionary
conduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets").
38. Id
39. Though the FTC found that Rambus had engaged in anticompetitive conduct, this decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which held that while Rambus's conduct
may have been questionable, the Commission failed to prove any cognizable antitrust harm resulting
from Rambus's actions. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
40. In addition to constraints on royalty rates, most SDO patent policies contain a number of
additional provisions. RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE,
U.S. NAT'L ACADEMIES SCI. 48-49 (2012),
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga 072197.pdf,
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 27-46 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007); Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1889, 1904-05 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations].
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mits royalties to be charged, but has strong informal norms favoring RF
licensing. And Application-focused SDOs such as W3C and OASIS
largely produce standards subject to RF licensing commitments.4 '
The reasons for these distinctions and what they mean in practice
are explored in the remainder of this Article. For the sake of expediency,
in this Article I will refer to "Internet" standards as the network and
software layer standards that define the Internet and World Wide Web,
because the Network standards published by ETSI, IEEE, and others
have utility in a wide range of applications beyond the Internet (e.g.,
mobile telephony, computer networking, etc.).
III. SEP DISPUTES: IS THE INTERNET DIFFERENT?
A. Patent Acquisition and Standards
Despite the precautionary policy measures taken by many SDOs,
over the past decade voluntary consensus standards have become the
subject of significant private litigation, regulatory enforcement, and poli-
cy debate around the world. As one senior U.S. government official la-
mented in a 2012 address to the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), "The world ... is awash in lawsuits related to patented technolo-
,,42
gies ....
Many recent patent controversies have revolved around the en-
forcement of SEPs against manufacturers and users of standardized
products and the terms on which patent holders may be required to grant
licenses permitting use of their SEPs. For example, in both Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola Mobility, Inc.43 and Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.," the
SEP owner (Motorola) offered to license SEPs covering two widely-
adopted standards at rates that the potential licensees argued were in ex-
cess of reasonable levels and thus in violation of Motorola's FRAND
commitments.45 In both cases, the manufacturers of standards-compliant
products brought breach of contract actions against he SEP owner for
the alleged violation of its FRAND commitments among other things.46
Though there is a natural tendency to paint all technologies in the
information and communications technology (ICT) sector with the same
brush, there are dramatic differences among fields when patents are con-
41. For more detailed comparisons of the terms of different SDO patent policies, see
BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 40, at 13. More detailed comparisons of the terms of different
SDO patent policies can also be found in Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations, supra note 40, at
1894-95.
42. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six "Small" Proposals for SSOs Before
Lunch 9 (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf.
43. No. I 1-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 157525 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012).
44. 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
45. Apple, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157525, at *13-14; Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1054.
46. Apple, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157525, at *4-5; Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1030.
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cerned. Recent studies have shown that, by far, the largest number of
SEPs have been disclosed in the wireless telecommunications area.47 In
2015 Baron and Pohlmann collected more than 200,000 patent disclo-
sures from nineteen major SDOs.48 Of these, nearly 170,000 (84%) dis-
closures were made at the European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute (ETSI) alone.4 9 In contrast, a total of only 667 patents were dis-
closed as essential to Internet standards developed at IETF.
This discrepancy of three orders of magnitude is notable given that
both ETSI and IETF produce comparable numbers of standards and
count many of the same multinational corporations as participants. It
arises both from the number of patents that are being filed on aspects of
the SDO's technology, as well as the number of patents being disclosed
to the SDO. While studies have shown that a degree of patent over-
declaration exists, particularly at ETSI 5 over-disclosure alone cannot
account for the dramatic difference in declared patents between these two
SDOs. Nor, I suspect, can differences in the inherent complexity of these
two technology categories account for this degree of variation. Thus, in
addition to over-disclosure, higher patenting levels at ETSI could arise
from factors such as the intentional inclusion of optional and non-
essential patented features in ETSI standards (sometimes referred to as
patent 'stuffmg'), 52 more feature-rich standards in general, and greater
granularity in patent claim drafting.53
B. SEP Litigation Today
Similar contrasts between Network and Internet standards emerge
when SEP-related litigation is examined. Table 2 shows all SEP-related
cases that reached judgment in the U.S. federal courts and International
Trade Commission (ITC), as well as courts in Europe and China, as re-
ported by the Essential Patent Blog.54
47. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using Databases of De-
clared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems ofTechnological Classification 9-10 (Regulation &
Econ. Growth Working Paper, 2015), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/BaronPohmannMappingStandards.pdf see
also BLIND ET AL., supra note 25, at Table 3-5.
48. Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 47, at 8, 12.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 10.
51. See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 60-61 (2013) (discussing evidence and literature on over-
disclosure).
52. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the
2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last Four Years,
20-21 (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf.
53. This area is ripe for further empirical study.
54. Beginning in February 2012, the Essential Patent Blog has tracked law and policy devel-
opments relating to standards-essential patents and related issues. ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG,
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). The cases in Table 2 are limited to
those resulting in reported judicial decisions, which represent a small minority of all SEP-related
cases that are brought. See infra Table 2. For a more complete picture of SEP litigation relating to
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TABLE 2




Microsoft v. Motorola (2012) W.D. Wash. ITU H.264
(jury) IEEE 802.11
9th Cir.
Apple v. Motorola (2012) W.D. Wis. ETSI UMTS,
N.D. Ill. GPRS
Fed. Cir. IEEE 802.11
Apple v. Samsung (2013) N.D. Cal. (jury) ETSI UMTS
Fed. Cir.
ITC
Golden Bridge v. Apple D. Del. GSMA W-CDMA
(2013) (part of ETSI
UMTS)
In re Innovatio IP Ventures N.D. Ill. IEEE 802.11
(2013)
Wi-LAN v. Apple (2013) E.D. Tex. (jury) ITU CDMA2000
IEEE 802.11
IPCom v. Apple (2014) Germany - ETSI UMTS
Mannheim
NXP v. Blackberry (2014) M.D. Fla. (jury) IEEE 802.11
JEDEC eMMC
InterDigital v. Huawei, ITC ETSI UMTS
Nokia, ZTE, Nokia (2014, D. Del. ETSI LTE
2015) China - Shen- ITU CDMA2000
zhen
Fujitsu v. Tellabs (2014) N.D. Ill. (jury) ITU G.692
LSI v. Realtek (2014) N.D. Cal. (jury) IEEE 802.11
9th Cir.
ITC
seven widely adopted standards (GSM, UMTS, LTE, H.246, 802.11, Bluetooth and USB), see Jorge
L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls - Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, J. COMP. L.
& ECON. (forthcoming 2017). For a census of all FRAND-related litigation brought through 2012,




Ericsson v. D-Link (2014) E.D. Tex. (jury) IEEE 802.11
Fed. Cir.
Rembrandt v. Samsung E.D. Tex (jury) Bluetooth SIG
(2015)
CSIRO v. Cisco (2015) E.D. Tex. IEEE 802.11
Fed. Cir.
Huawei v. ZTE (2015) CJEU ETSI LTE
As Table 2 illustrates, all cases pertained to Network standards, ei-
ther in the field of telecommunications (ETSI and ITU) or computing
(Bluetooth and IEEE's 802.11 Wi-Fi standards).
C. Litigation Involving Internet Standards
Notably absent from the SEP litigation picture described in the pre-
ceding section are network and software standards pertaining to the In-
ternet. To gain a better understanding of how Internet standards are used
in litigation, we compiled all cases in which IETF was requested (either
through formal subpoena or an informal request for a written declaration)
to authenticate the text or publication date of a standards-track document.
These results are presented in Appendix 1.
As shown in Appendix 1, thirty-seven cases involving Internet
standards were identified. They involve U.S. district court litigation as
well as administrative actions before the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) and Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (PTAB).
These data offer a comparison with the telecommunications and
computer networking SEP cases described in Table 1. Several distinc-
tions are immediately apparent. First, unlike the cases in Table 1, which
relate to a small group of heavily litigated standards (802.11 and
2G/3G/4G), the cases in Appendix 1 relate to a wide range of IETF
standards. In fact, other than a handful of fundamental IETF standards
such as Internet Protocol (IP, RFC 791) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP, RFC 1945), there is almost no overlap among the standards rele-
vant to each particular case. This observation suggests that no particular
Internet standard is strongly dominated by patents.
Second, unlike the cases in Table 1, which involve several repeat
players (e.g., Motorola, Apple, InterDigital, Huawei, ZTE), there are
fewer repeat players involved in litigation relating to Internet standards.
This observation may indicate that fewer firms (plaintiffs) in the Internet
space make a business of monetizing patents through the initiation of
serial lawsuits and that the overall field of market participants (defend-
ants) is larger.
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Perhaps the most striking distinction between these two groups of
cases is the role that standards play in them. Thus, in the Network-
focused cases in Table 1, the plaintiff has often asserted one or more
SEPs against manufacturers of standard-compliant products. In some of
the cases, the defendant manufacturer has asserted, as a defense, that the
SEP owner has violated a FRAND commitment to an SDO. But in al-
most all of these cases, there is a direct link between the allegedly in-
fringing product, the standard, and the SEPs. In contrast, in most cases
involving Internet standards, the defendant has simply sought to use dis-
closures and developments at IETF as prior art to invalidate a patent as-
serted by the plaintiff.55 In these cases the standard does not play a major
role in the suit as conceived by the plaintiff and is largely ancillary to the
dispute.
Together, these features of the Internet standards landscape suggest
an environment in which patents, while valuable, play a more modest
role than they do in the Network space. At first blush, the lack of patent
acquisition and litigation surrounding Internet standards is surprising.
After all, nearly every computer, smart phone, and tablet in the world
communicate via the Internet, and the market for Internet-enabled devic-
es is enormous, suggesting that potential verdicts might present lucrative
incentives for litigation. Why, then, have the patenting and litigation
trends observed among Network technologies not affected the Internet?
The remainder of this Article will seek to address this question.
IV. WHAT THE INTERNET Is NOT (YET)5 6
In many respects, the differences in standardization practices be-
tween the Network world and the Internet arise from differences in the
historical development of these two fields. While the layperson may see
no discernable difference between the 4G LTE standard that enables his
or her smart phone to connect to a mobile network and the TCP/IP proto-
cols that define the size and configuration of the data packets that trav-
erse that network, these two technical areas exist across a significant gulf
of history-a gulf that has shaped the policies and norms that character-
ize these industries today.
55. If discussion of a technology occurred at an SDO prior to the applicant's filing of a patent
application, that discussion can constitute prior art potentially anticipating the patented invention and
rendering it unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
56. The title of this section owes a debt to Jonathan Zittrain's influential book The Future of
the Internet and How to Stop It, a cautionary tale about he direction that the Internet could take
under increased regulation. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO
STOP IT (2008).
57. Over a decade ago, Suzanne Scotchmer recognized the fundamental differences between
Internet and telecom standards, even before the most recent wave of SEP-related litigation. See
generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 26. Yet the debate today has lost sight of many of these distinc-
tions.
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Standardization in the telecommunications sector began not as a co-
operative effort among competing firms, but as a (largely successful)
attempt by national telephone monopolies to preserve their control over
the industry. This approach was epitomized by AT&T in the United
States, which operated under the telling slogan "One System, One Poli-
cy, Universal Service."5 8 As described by historian Andrew Russell,
AT&T standardized many aspects of the U.S. telephony system to ensure
that it could obtain a consistent and reliable supply of components from
subcontracted manufacturers and to enable local exchanges to connect to
its long-haul lines thereby avoiding competition in the long distance
market.
Other national operators in Europe and Asia exerted similar levels
of control. In Japan, for example, telecommunications standardization
was largely driven by its century-old national telecommunications mo-
nopoly Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Co. (NTT). For decades, NTT,
with the backing of the Japanese government, designed Japan's tele-
communications infrastructure and supported a dedicated "family" of
equipment manufacturers including Hitachi, Fujitsu, and NEC. 0 The
NTT network was, until recently, characterized by proprietary standards
developed in NTT's research labs and mandated by the national Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) for deployment by NTT's ded-
icated suppliers.61
In most countries, wireless telecommunications were not as heavily
regulated as wireline communications, but scarce spectrum still invited
governmental allocation and control, and standards were adopted at na-
62tional and regional levels. The contest among competing technologies,
often played out by incumbent telecommunications monopolies, fre-
quently involved wrangling over patents. While first generation analog
wireless technologies represented a patchwork of largely incompatible,
vendor-specific technical approaches, by the early 1980s the industry
recognized the need for second-generation (2G) digital wireless tele-
communications standards that would support both voice and data com-
munications.6 3
58. ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY,
AND NETWORKS 97 (2014); TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES 51 (2011).
59. RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 99.
60. Kenji E. Kushida, Wireless Bound and Unbound: The Politics Shaping Cellular Markets
in Japan and South Korea, 5 J. IN Fo. TECH. & POL. 231 (2008).
61. Id.
62. Peter F. Cowhey et al., The Peculiar Evolution of 3G Wireless Networks: Institutional
Logic, Politics, and Property Rights, in How REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION?
293-95 (John Zysman & Abraham Newman eds., 2006).
63. See generally RUDI BEKKERS & JAN SMITS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND APPLICATIONS (1999).
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In Europe, Ericsson promoted a 2G standard based on time-division
multiplex access (TDMA) technology, which eventually led to the Euro-
pean Groupe Sp6cial Mobile (GSM) standard. Ironically, the largest
holder of SEPs in GSM technology was Motorola, a United States firm
that conducted significant manufacturing R&D operations in Europe.6 4 A
competing 2G proposal was advanced by a coalition of French and Ger-
man firms, which had strong patent positions in their own technology.6 5
Before this coalition agreed to support GSM at the newly-formed ETSI,
technology covered by some of these patents had to be included in the
standard.66 By the time that GSM was approved by ETSI in 1990, five
firms (Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Motorola, and Alcatel) held broad pa-
67tent coverage of the standard. The situation in the United States was
less fractured, but even more patent-centric, as Qualcomm's code divi-
sion multiplex access (CDMA) technology became the basis for the lead-
ing 2G standard.68 And, as noted above, each successive generation of
wireless telecommunications standards has been burdened with more
patents, opening the way for further disputes and litigation.
V. THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (IETF)
In contrast to telecommunications technologies, the Internet devel-
oped along a path that emphasized patents and patent enforcement far
less. The evolution of the two principal SDOs developing Internet stand-
ards-IETF and W3C-is discussed in this and the following sections.
A. The Origins and Growth ofIETF
The history of IETF is inextricably entwined with the history of the
Internet itself.69 The Internet was initially conceived and funded by the
U.S. Department of Defense through its Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA, also known as ARPA). The project was in-
tended to design a reliable and resilient computer network that did not
rely on the then-dominant circuit-switched technology.70 Building on
64. Rudi Bekkers et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization: The Case of GSM,
26 TELECOMM. POL'Y 171 (2002).
65. Id. at 177.
66. Bjom Lundqvist, Standardization Under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws 59
(2014).
67. Bekkers, supra note 64, at 179.
68. LUINDQVIST, supra note 66, at 59.
69. The origins of the world's biggest network have been documented many times. See, e.g.,
LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2 (2014); KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996);
RUSSELL, supra note 58, at ch. 8; STEPHEN SEGALIER, NERDS 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET (1998); WU, supra note 58.
70. Paul Baran at the Rand Corporation was one of the early theorists of distributed compu-
ting. He believed that a distributed network was more likely to survive a nuclear attack than a net-
work dependent on end-to-end switching, as the then-existing AT&T network was. See Memoran-
dum from Paul Baran, prepared for the United States Air Force Rand Project: On Distributed Com-
munications: I. Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks i, v (Aug. 1964),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchmemoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf ("[Th[is]
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theoretical work done at MIT and the Rand Corporation in the early
1960s, host computers at UCLA, Stanford, UC Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah were connected in 1969 to form a prototype packet-
switched network known as ARPANET. In 1973, Robert Kahn at
DARPA and Vint Cerf at Stanford developed the TCP/IP protocols to
enable ARPANET to connect with other computer networks, thereby
laying the groundwork for the modem Internet.71 As personal computers,
workstations, and local area networks proliferated in the 1980s, the In-
ternet expanded in size and popularity.
Prior to 1985, technical work relating to the Internet was carried out
in a series of task forces chaired by leading researchers at DARPA and a
few universities. In 1985, this activity was placed under the umbrella of a
new, loosely organized organization called the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF). Around this time, Kahn and other leaders of the Internet
project left DARPA, leaving IETF and its sister organization, the Internet
Activities Board (now the Internet Architecture Board) (IAB), to chart
the future direction of the Internet. One of the over-arching features of all
of these organizations was a distinctly non-commercial culture that val-
ued technical capability over than economic returns.72
As the Internet grew in popularity and usage, commercial users rap-
idly began to outnumber earlier academic and government users.73 In
order to create an organization in which commercial, academic, and gov-
ernment representatives could collaborate, a non-profit corporation called
the Internet Society (ISOC) was formed in 1992.74 ISOC became the
memorandum is directed toward examining the use of redundancy as one means of building commu-
nications systems to withstand heavy enemy attacks."]; see also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 69.
Some recent commentators have questioned whether nuclear survival was the driving force behind
ARPANET, arguing instead that developing remote time sharing capability was the primary motiva-
tion for DARPA's interest in distributed computing. See, e.g., Ian Peters, The Beginnings of the
Internet, NET HISTORY,
http://www.nethistory.info/History%20of/`2Othe%20Internet/beginnings.html (last visited July 23,
2016).
71. The original TCP Protocol was published in December 1974 as RFC 675, and the Internet
Protocol (IP) was published in 1981 as RFC 791. The IETF document series extends back to an
academic Request for Comments (RFC) published in 1968. The term RFC has in recent years lost its
meaning as "Request for Comments" and now simply refers to the definitive standards and reference
document series published by IETF. See DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 71-72.
72. See Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1257, 1268 (1998) (discussing non-commercial norms of Internet community); Jeffrey V. Nickerson
& Michael zur Muehlen, The Ecology of Standards Processes: Insights from Internet Standard
Making, 30 MIS Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 467, 469 (2006) ("The founders of the Internet consciously
resisted marketplace pressures, establishing a protected niche in which they could pursue their re-
search. In this way, the Internet is unusual. Most modem inventions occur within a commercial
context. The Internet, funded by the government and sheltered in research and evelopment labs for
decades, created a broad following interested in both its technical and its social characteristics well
before commercial interests sensed its importance." (citation omitted)).
73. See Mother of Consensus, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/intemational/21693920-engineering-internet-too-big-task-one-
outfit-mother-consensus.
74. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 70.
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"organizational home" of IETF in 1996 and still provides administrative,
personnel, and financial support to IETF.
Participation in IETF is, and always has been, on an individual basis
even though firms often sponsor attendance and participation by their
employees. In recent years, at any given time, over a hundred different
working groups are operational within IETF,76 and between 1200 and
1500 individuals regularly attend IETF's meetings held three times per
year.77 IETF is famously open and transparent.78 Almost all proceedings,
documents, and records are freely available on the IETF web site, and
anyone who is interested may join a technical working group. Docu-
ments that advance through the "standards track" are based on open con-
sensus processes overseen and managed by a group of semi-elected Area
Directors and other leaders. The IETF standardization process is largely
"bottom-up," in which technical proposals are generated by individual
participants who must defend and advocate their proposals both in writ-
ten e-mail communications and at in-person IETF meetings.
While IETF's open culture and transparent procedures have been
79praised by commentators, they have also shown weaknesses. Most no-
tably, the speed of standardization at IETF has flagged, and the organiza-
tion has become notorious for lengthy technical debates and delays.80 As
discussed below, this slowdown contributed to Tim Berners-Lee's for-
mation of W3C as an independent organization in 1994.
B. Patents at IETF
1. Evolution of the IETF Patent Policy
As described above, the pioneers of the Internet were employed
primarily by the U.S. government, its academic collaborators, and a
small number of private contractors (e.g., the Cambridge-based Bolt
Beranek and Newman (BBN)), leading to a distinctly non-commercial
75. Memorandum from Eric Huizer, Chief Tech. Officer, SURFnet ExpertiseCentrum, on
IETF-ISOC Relationship (Oct. 1996), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc203 1.
76. The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF TRUST,
http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2012).
77. Jorge L. Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan,
Korea and China, 30 TELECOMM. POL'Y 916 (2014).
78. Richard S. Whitt, A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a Three-Dimensional Public
Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 689, 702-03 (2013); A.
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116
HARV. L. REV. 749, 787 (2003); LARRY LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
79. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 78, at 702-03; Whitt, supra note 78, at 722; Dieter Ernst,
America's Voluntary Standards System - A "Best Practice" Model for Innovation Policy? 16-18
(East-West Center Working Papers, Econs. Series No. 128, Feb. 2012).
80. See, e.g., Timothy Simcoe, Delay and dejure Standardization: Exploring the Slowdown
in Internet Standards Development, in STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 261, 268-70 (Shane Green-
stein & Victor Stango eds., 2006); Nickerson & zur Muehlen, supra note 72, at
479-80.
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culture. Large firms such as IBM and AT&T, which were heavily in-
vested in patenting activity, were not part of the early Internet.82 In the
days before the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,83 which provided a framework
for patenting federally funded inventions, universities and federal agen-
cies engaged in little patenting activity. The combination of these factors
resulted in few patents being filed on the fundamental protocols that de-
fined the Internet.84
The IETF's first formal patent policy was adopted in 1992 as RFC
1310 to accommodate the needs of the growing community of commer-
cial Internet users.85 This policy, largely mirroring the language of the
American National Standards Institute's (ANSI) patent policy,86 con-
tained a rudimentary FRAND or RF licensing requirement. The policy
was strengthened in 1994 with the publication of RFC 1602.87 This ver-
sion of the policy required that patent holders grant a RF license to ISOC
and commit to license implementers of IETF standards on RF or RAND
terms.
Despite these policy enactments, patents did not play much of a role
in deliberations at IETF until 1995 when Motorola disclosed patents
claiming features of the PPP Compression Control Protocol (CCP, RFC
1962) and Encryption Control Protocol (ECP, RFC 1968). Motorola
initially refused to commit to license these patents to users of the PPP
standards, leading to significant opposition within the IETF working
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 218, 241-43 (describing tension between IBM-
backed OSI networking standard and early Internet proponents).
83. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§§ 200-01, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2012)). The Bayh-Dole Act
both authorized and encouraged universities and other government contractors to patent inventions
funded by federal agencies. Id Prior to the Act, there was no uniform federal policy regarding pa-
tenting of federally-funded inventions, and most of the inventions were not patented. Id.
84. See Daniel J. Weitzner, Standards, Patents and Dynamics of Innovation on the World
Wide Web, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Nov. 2004), https://www.w3.org/2004/10/patents-
standards-innovation.html.
85. Memorandum from A. Lyman Chapin, Chair, Internet Activities Bd., on Internet Stand-
ards Process, RFC 1310, at 1-3 (Mar. 1992), https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfcl310.txt.pdf;
see Simcoe, supra note 80, at 260, 270-72 (describing increased commercial involvement in IETF
and Internet standardization).
86. Though ANSI is not itself an SDO, it accredits U.S. SDOs as developers of American
National Standards. See ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, at 10-11 (AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. 2015). Among
ANSI's requirements for accredited SDOs, which are embodied in its Due Process Requirements for
American National Standards, are rules regarding the way that accredited SDOs must handle patents
held by their participants. Id.
87. Memorandum from Christian Huitema, IAB Chairman, & Phill Gross, IESG Chairman,
on Internet Standards Process, RFC 1602, § 5.6, at 31-34 (Revision 2 Mar. 1994), https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc I 602.txt.pdf.
88. Simcoe, supra note 80, at 271-72. One earlier patent disclosure at IETF was made in 1993
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) relating to a patent covering its Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm. See Reported Statement from NIST Regarding Use of DSA, IETF
DATATRACKER (Jul. 23, 1993), https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/449/. However, NIST committed to
license the patent to users worldwide on a royalty-free basis, eliminating any serious concern. Id.
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group,89 IETF eventually published the PPP standards with the patented
technology, but only after Motorola agreed to offer implementers of the
standard licenses on RAND terms.9
The PPP incident led IETF to review and revise its patent policy as
part of a 1996 overhaul of its standardization procedures (RFC 2026).
The IETF's 1996 policy departs from its earlier RAND/RF licensing
commitment by requiring only that participants disclose the existence of
patents covering IETF standards, but not that they license these patents
on any particular terms. IETF's current policy (contained in RFC 3979
and subsequent addenda, collectively known as Best Common Practice
(BCP) 79) preserves this disclosure-only approach.9'
2. IETF's Preference for RF
Given IETF participants' discomfort with Motorola's RAND licens-
ing proposal for PPP, it may seem curious that IETF elected to adopt a
policy with no licensing commitment at all. That is, IETF's 1992 policy
at least contained an upper bound on royalties charged by participants
(reasonableness), whereas the 1996 policy gives SEP holders carte
blanche to charge anything they wish, or even to withhold licenses en-
tirely.
But the seeming flexibility under this policy is, in practice, an illu-
sion. Rather than empower SEP holders to charge high or unreasonable
royalties for their patents, it actually discourages them from charging
anything at all. How? If an SDO policy expressly permits a SEP holder
to charge RAND royalties, then such royalties are effectively condoned
by the organization. But if a policy neither permits nor prohibits royal-
ties, then all decisions regarding royalty-bearing technologies will be
made by working groups. As such, IETF continues to exhibit a strong
preference for royalty-free standards. It does so in two ways: (a) through
express statements of preference in BCP 79 and elsewhere, and (b)
through working group deliberations.
a. RF Policy Preferences
While IETF does not require its participants to commit to license
their patents on any particular terms, reasonable or otherwise, it does
89. See E-mail Archive for IETF Working Group (Dec. 16-18, 1995),
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/info.ietf/raixEKiWbMc/PK9BQuXjnoJ. It is possible that
Motorola was unwilling to follow the licensing procedure outlined in RFC 1602 out of (a legitimate)
fear that the RF license granted to ISOC would exhaust Motorola's patent rights as to subsequent
users of the standard. This likely defect in the IETF patent policy was corrected in 1996 with the
adoption of RFC 2026.
90. See Memorandum from Frank Kastensholz, FTP Software, Inc., on Internet Best Current
Practice, RFC 1915, at 1-3 (Feb. 1996), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcl9l5.pdf.
91. IETF patent disclosures are published and archived on the IETF website. See Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR), IETF.ORG, www.ietf.org/ipr (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
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express a preference for RF standards in many contexts. For example,
Section 8 of RFC 3979 explains that
In general, IETF working groups prefer technologies with no known
[patent] claims or, for technologies with claims against them, an offer
of royalty-free licensing. But IETF working groups have the discre-
tion to adopt technology with a commitment of fair and non-
discriminatory terms, or even with no licensing commitment, if they
feel that this technology is superior enough to alternatives with fewer
[patent] claims or free licensing to outweigh the potential cost of the
licenses.
Thus, the preference for oyalty-free standards at IETF is just that: a
preference-and one that is not universally shared. However, the express
statement of that preference is telling.
Additional evidence of the IETF community's preference for RF is
displayed in connection with specific technology areas such as Internet
security. In these areas, which are viewed as critical for Internet integrity,
the institutional preference for royalty-free standards is articulated more
strongly:
An IETF consensus has developed that no mandatory-to-implement
security technology can be specified in an IETF specification unless
it has no known [patent] claims against it or a royalty-free license is
available to implementers of the specification unless there is a very
good reason to do so.
Thus, while IETF lacks strict positive rules requiring royalty-free
standards, these statements are reflective of broadly held community
norms. Accordingly, while room is left for IETF to adopt an Internet
security standard that is subject to royalties if "there is a very good rea-
son to do so," it does not appear that such a reason has ever been found.
b. Working Group Deliberations
IETF working groups are charged with considering and evaluating
the implications of patent burdens on technologies being considered for
standardization. RFC 3669, which offers guidance to IETF working
groups, provides that
every working group.. . . needs to take IPR seriously, and consider
the needs of the Internet community and the public at large, including
possible future implementers and users who will not have participat-
ed in the working group process when the standardization is taking
place.92
92. Memorandum from Scott Brim, Cisco Sys., Inc., on Guidelines for Working Groups on
Intellectual Property Issues, RFC 3669, § 5, at 8 (Feb. 2004), https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc3669.txt.pdf.
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In addition to statements of preference in IETF policy documents,
IETF participants and working groups exhibit their own preferences for
RF standards in the selection of technical proposals for standardization.
The fact that patents must be disclosed to IETF early in the standardiza-
tion process enables participants to evaluate the extent to which patented
technologies may be essential to draft standards under consideration. If
the members of a working group do not wish to include a patented tech-
nology in the standard, they have the opportunity to redesign the standard
to avoid the relevant patents.
Thus, while explicit group negotiation of patent royalty rates is dis-
couraged,93 working group members are advised to consider the potential
impact of disclosed patents and proposed licensing terms on the useful-
ness of a technology under consideration for standardization.94 In prac-
tice, IETF working group participants have exhibited a keen awareness
of which technical proposals are burdened by potential patent royalties
and take this information into account when designing standards.95
c. Voluntary Licensing Disclosures
Decisions regarding the inclusion of patented technologies in IETF
standards are facilitated by voluntary disclosures that SEP holders may
make regarding their licensing intentions. Thus, while patent disclosures
at IETF must contain certain key information such as patent numbers,
affected standards, and the like, IETF also permits the disclosure of addi-
tional relevant information regarding patents. Accordingly, many IETF
participants make express licensing commitments in their patent disclo-
sures.96 These can include commitments to license the disclosed SEPs on
RAND or RF terms as well as broad commitments not to assert patents in
particular contexts.
Not surprisingly, given IETF's stated preferences, many voluntary
licensing commitments indicate that RF licensing of SEPs will be of-
fered. In a study covering the period between 2007-2010, I analyzed 481
patent disclosures made at IETF covering a total of 594 different stand-
93. Potential antitrust concerns arise in the context of such group negotiations. Non-lawyer
IETF working group leaders do a good job of curbing these discussions. For example, the 2009 e-
mail list discussion of the Robust Header Compression standard, in which a working group leader
writes, in typical tongue-in-cheek IETF fashion, "please do *not* discuss specific patents/patent
claims on the mailinglist [sic], as such a discussion might require a number of contributors tounsub-
scribe [sic] and stop contributing. (It might also cause you or your employer to become liable for
damages in interesting ways.) . . . . If you want to discuss this, meet in a hallway and make sure
nomicrophones [sic] are nearby." See E-mail Archive for Robust Header Compression (ROHC)
(Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/rohc/current/msg05691.
94. See Memorandum from Scott Brim, supra note 92, at 12-13.
95, There are multiple examples of potential patent issues considered by IETF working
groups. See id. § 4 (detailing patent issues arising in connection with standardization efforts for IPS,
PEM and PKI, VRRP and SecSH).
96. The enforceability of such commitments in the absence of a formal contractual framework
is discussed in Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other
Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REv 479.
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ards documents. Of these disclosures, 283 (59%) contained voluntary
commitments to license the disclosed SEPs on royalty-free terms or the
equivalent. These data reveal strong community alignment behind a pa-
tent policy that outwardly disadvantages patent holders.
The strength of IETF's community norms around royalty-free pa-
tent licensing is further exemplified by the agreement-even of IETF
participants with well-known patent monetizing programs-not to assert
their SEPs under certain circumstances.97
IV. THE WORLDWIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (W3C)
A. The Origins of W3C
By the late 1980s, the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN) was a key European Internet node.98 Around 1989 a young
software engineer at CERN named Tim Berners-Lee began work on im-
proving the Internet's user interface to facilitate scientific collaboration
and data exchange both within CERN and with external collaborators. In
doing so he developed the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and hyper-
text markup language (HTML), 99 which became the foundational proto-
cols for the World Wide Web. Berners-Lee, heavily influenced by the
open source software movement, released his code online in 1991.
The graphically oriented World Wide Web was a significant im-
provement over existing text and directory-based file sharing systems
such as Gopher and FTP. Enthusiasm for the Web grew rapidly among
academic researchers. Berners-Lee, aware that researchers were likely to
tinker with and improve his original Web protocols, recognized the need
to standardize the technology to avoid fragmentation and proliferation of
incompatible versions. His first efforts at publishing the Web protocols
as standards were made at IETF.o'0 He was discouraged, however, by the
slow and contentious deliberations at IETF and decided that the Web
would best be served by a new and more flexible standardization body.102
97. See QUALCOMM Incorporated's Statement About IPR Related to RFC 6330, IETF
DATATRACKER (Mar. 19, 2015), https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2554/. Qualcomm committed to not
assert SEPs against implementers of IETF RFC 6330 so long as the standard was not implemented in
a device that uses a wireless wide-area standard (e.g., a mobile phone).
98. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 74.
99. Memorandum from Tim Bemers-Lee, Dir., W3 Consortium, & Daniel Connolly, Re-
search Tech. Staff, W3 Consortium, on Hypertext Markup Language - 2.0, RFC 1866, § 1.1, at 1, 3
(Nov. 1995), https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfcl866.txt. ("HTML is an application of ISO Standard
8879: 1986 Information Processing Text and Office Systems; Standard Generalized Markup Lan-
guage (SGML).").
100. Andrew L. Russell, Constructing Legitimacy. The W3C's Patent Policy, in OPENING
STANDARDS 159, 162-64 (Laura DeNardis ed., 2011).
101. Bemers-Lee submitted a version of HTML for standardization to IETF in June 1993. See
Memorandum from Tim Bemers-Lee & Daniel Connolly, supra note 99. The standard was pub-
lished by IETF as RFC 1866 in November 1995. Id.
102. Russell, supra note 100, at 163-64. It has also been alleged that Bemers-Lee preferred a
standardization process over which he exerted more direct control. In this regard, W3C has been
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In 1994 Berners-Lee left CERN for MIT, which became the home of a
new SDO devoted to Web standards-the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C). Berners-Lee brought the page descriptor language HTML to
W3C, while leaving HTTP at IETF, where it continues to be maintained.
Soon after MIT became the base for W3C, several other universities
in Europe and Asia joined W3C as organizational hosts. W3C received
early funding from DARPA and the European Union but soon shifted to
a self-sufficient member fee funding model.10 3
B. Patents and W3C
1. The Increasing Relevance of Patents to the Web
The open source movement was, to a large extent, a reaction to in-
creases in intellectual property protection for computer software. As not-
ed above, by the late 1980s and 1990s, an increasing number of software-
related patents were being issued in the United States. In addition, pa-
tents purporting to cover broad categories of Internet technology, includ-
ing British Telecom's 1989 patent that allegedly covered all hyper-
links, drew increasing press coverage and public oncern, along with a
degree of scorn and ridicule from the technical community.'0 5 According
to Richard Stallman, one of the founders of the "free" software move-
ment, "the worst threat we face comes from software patents."'0
In 1993, the University of Minnesota, which developed the popular
Gopher Internet file sharing system, announced that it would begin to
charge commercial users to use Gopher.'07 This announcement caused
concern among many Internet users and prompted Berners-Lee to seek
assurances from his own employer (CERN) that it would not do the
same.1os Later that year, CERN agreed to contribute its intellectual prop-
erty rights in the code underlying the Web to the public domain to "fur-
referred to as a "benevolent dictatorship," one in which the ultimate authority lies in the organiza-
tion's director. See TINKEKE M. EGYEDI, BEYOND CONSORTIA, BEYOND STANDARDISATION?: NEW






103. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 74-75.
104. See British Telecomms. PLC v. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106-07
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
105. See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Patently Ridiculous Claims, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2001, at E-1;
BT Pushes Hyperlink Patent, GEEK (Dec. 15, 2000, 1:55 PM), http://www.geek.com/news/bt-
pushes-hyperlink-patent-542562/15 ("If BT keeps pushing this 'we own hyperlinks' nonsense it's
going to take an image beating without precedent . . . .").
106. Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in OPEN
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 53, 67 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999);
see also Weitzner, supra note 84, at Part 11.
107. Russell, supra note 100, at 162.
108. Id.
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ther compatibility, common practices, and standards in networking and
computer supported collaboration."',
09
Given W3C's origins in the scientific research community, the first
five years of its existence were relatively free from patent-related contro-
versy. As Berners-Lee observed of that period:
Many participants in the original development of the Web knew that
they might have sought patents on the work they contributed to W3C,
and that they might have tried to secure exclusive access to these in-
novations or charge licensing fees for their use. However, those who
contributed to building the Web in its first decade made the business
decision that they, and the entire world, would benefit most by con-
tributing to standards that could be implemented ubiquitously, with-
out royalty payments.no
However, as noted in the Introduction, throughout the 1990s patents
were becoming an increasingly important force in the commercial world.
Patent concerns finally reached W3C in 1999. That year, Microsoft and
Sun Microsystems disclosed patents covering W3C's CSS and XLink
technical proposals, respectively, and a small firm called Intermind ob-
tained a patent claiming key aspects of W3C's Platform for Privacy Pref-
erences (P3P) standard."' W3C feared that Intermind's royalty demands
would chill adoption of the P3P standard. As a result, W3C engaged the
prestigious New York law firm Pennie & Edmonds to opine that P3P did
not infringe Intermind's patent. Eventually, Intermind backed down and
P3P was released without the threat of patent infringement. Nevertheless,
the Intermind incident caused W3C to re-evaluate its informal "gentle-
men's agreement" whereby participants would not seek to patent W3C
standards.
2. W3C's Royalty-Free Patent Policy
In 1999 W3C began the arduous task of developing a formal patent
policy. Daniel Weitzner, one of the organization's early leaders, offers a
detailed account of this difficult and contentious multi-year process.1 12
The first policy that W3C's drafting group developed included require-
ments relating both to patent disclosure and patent licensing. The patent
licensing provisions were the most controversial because they would
have required W3C members to license SEPs to all implementers of
109. W. Hoogland, Dir. Research, & H. Weber, Dir. Admin., Declaration at the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) Concerning CERN W3 Software Release into Public
Domain 2 (Apr. 30, 1993), https://tenyears-www.web.cem.ch/tenyears-
www/Declaration/Page2.html.
110. Tim Bemers-Lee, Director's Decision, W3C Patent Policy, W3C (May 20, 2003, 7:50
AM), https://www.w3.org/2003/05/12-director-patent-decision-public.html.
111. See Russell, supra note 101, at 165-66; Weitzner, supra note 84, Parts II-IV.
112. Weitzner, supra note 84, Section III.A.
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W3C standards on royalty-free or royalty-bearing RAND terms.' The
possibility that monetary royalties could be charged on W3C standards
alarmed some W3C participants and members of the public particularly
the Open Source Initiative (OSI) and other open source software devel-
opers and advocates."14 They claimed that large corporate interests within
W3C were attempting to "hijack" the organization and subvert its histor-
ically open tradition. W3C received nearly 2,500 public comments on the
draft policy, most of which opposed it." 5
This reaction from the open source community sent W3C back to
the drawing board. In 2002, after extensive internal discussions and de-
bate, W3C proposed a new patent policy, this time requiring royalty-free
licensing by all members of the working group that developed a standard.
Berners-Lee justified the move to a royalty-free model as follows:
The open platform of royalty-free standards enabled software com-
panies to profit by selling new products with powerful features, ena-
bled e-commerce companies to profit from services that on this foun-
dation, and brought social benefits in the non-commercial realm be-
yond simple economic valuation. By adopting this Patent Policy with
its commitment to royalty-free standards for the future, we are laying
the foundation for another decade of technical innovation, economic
growth, and social advancement."6
To accommodate the concerns of some of its corporate members,
the W3C included an exception in its policy that allowed the inclusion of
patented technologies in W3C standards, but only after a "Patent Adviso-
ry Group" (PAG) comprising representatives of all working group mem-
bers and the Chair of W3C determined that the patented technology was
essential to the standard and could not be worked around. The new ver-
sion of the patent policy was approved and went into effect in 2004, the
tenth anniversary of the W3C's formation. The policy remains in effect
today with only minor revisions.
The new W3C patent policy was not universally applauded by W3C
members, and it has been reported that the royalty-free requirement
caused large patent holders such as IBM, SAP, and Microsoft to bring
standardization proposals to SDOs with more patent-friendly policies."8
113. Id.; Mark Cutler, W3C Working Group on Patent Policy Weighing Royalties for Patented
Contributions, 2 Computer Tech. L. Rep. (BNA) 446 (2001).
114. E-mail from Brett Serkez, Techie, to OpenSource.org (Nov. 13, 2001),
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-voice/2001 OctDec/0037.html.
115. Nickerson & zur Muehlen, supra note 72, at 477.
116. Bemers-Lee, supra note 110.
117. See W3C Patent Policy, W3C (Feb. 5, 2004), https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-
Policy-20040205/.
118. Paul Festa, W3C Makes Patent Ban Final, CNET (May 22, 2003, 5:13 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/w3c-makes-patent-ban-final/; Russell, supra note 100, at 166-67. SDOs
face the risk that members will depart with any controversial policy change. Such fears arose in 2007
when the small SDO VITA amended its patent policy to require members holding SEPs to disclose
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Nevertheless, some of these firms eventually expressed support for the
policy acknowledging the growing importance of open source software
to the Web ecosystem.
Since the W3C's royalty-free policy went into effect, there have
been relatively few invocations of the PAG process. One of the first
arose in 2003, when a PAG was formed to assess the potential impact of
four patents on W3C's draft VoiceXML standard.119 The PAG ap-
proached the owners of the four patents and received a commitment of
royalty-free licensing with respect to two of them and an assurance that
the owner of the third did not consider the patent to be essential to the
standard. But Rutgers University, the owner of the fourth patent, did not
make any commitment regarding the patent and seemingly reserved its
right to seek royalties against implementers of the standard. The W3C
proceeded to adopt the standard in the face of this threat, and it appears
that Rutgers did not actively seek to license the patent.
A more contentious incident arose, also in 2003, with respect to a
patent held by a small firm called Eolas, which allegedly covered a key
aspect of the HTML standard.120 After Eolas obtained a $521 million
infringement verdict against Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, W3C
convened a PAG to assess the potential impact of the Eolas patent on
HTML.121 As a result of the PAG, W3C petitioned the PTO to re-
examine the Eolas patent. In one letter to the PTO, Berners-Lee potently
expressed the concerns of the PAG and the broader Web community:
The barriers imposed on the information technology industry by the
[Eolas] '906 patent are of such concern because they cause fragmen-
tation in the basic standards that weave the Web together. Denial of
access to any particular technology is a problem that engineers can
successfully address, provided they have knowledge of the barrier be-
fore it becomes part of a standard. However, as the '906 patent
threatens widely deployed, standard technology, the damage is mag-
nified. If the '906 patent remains in force, Web page designers and
software developers will face a dangerous dilemma. They may com-
their maximum royalty rates prior to approval of a standard. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards
and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 193-
94 (2013). Despite vigorous opposition, only one member, Motorola, actually withdrew from VITA
as a result of the policy change. Id. at 193-94. Similar concerns have been raised in the wake of
recent policy amendments by IEEE. See, e.g., Susan Decker & Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won't
Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. I1, 2015, 9:23 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-I l/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-
unfair-may-not-take-part; Ron D. Katznelson, IEEE-USA Comm., Presentation: Will New IEEE
Standards Incorporate Patented Technologies Under the Proposed Patent Policy? 12 (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/sdieee/I 824-1806-SD%2BSection-IEEE-Standards-
Patent/o2BPolicy/2BDec-23-2014v2.pdf (first quoting Letter from Nokia to IEEE (Nov. 18, 2014);
and then quoting Letter from Ericsson to IEEE (November 7, 2014)).
119. W3C, VOICE BROWSER PAG REPORT (2003), http://www.w3.org/2003/06/VBPAG-
Report.html.
120. Weitzner, supra note 84.
121. Id.
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ply with globally-recognized Web standards resulting in an inade-
quate user experience of their content. Or, they may attempt to design
to the various work-arounds chosen by different browser developers
and face the uncertainly of not knowing who will be able to use their
content or applications properly. W3C's development and the indus-
try's acceptance of a single common base of standards for Web infra-
structure arose out of a need to avoid just this sort of dilemma. The
'906 patent is a substantial setback for global interoperability and the
success of the open Web.1
22
The Eolas patent was subsequently invalidated by the PTO on the
basis of the prior art presented by W3C.1 23
Despite these relatively high-profile incidents and the large number
of standards published by W3C, only a handful of PAGs have been
formed to investigate patents not subject to royalty-free licensing com-
mitments. During the first ten years of the royalty-free patent policy, a
mere twelve PAGs were formed, all of which resolved the relevant issues
without serious disruption of W3C's standardization activities. 124 It thus
appears that the RF policy at W3C has largely been a success.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE LOGIC OF ROYALTY-FREE
As this Article shows, the primary SDOs responsible for Internet
standards, IETF and W3C, have evolved strong policies and norms fa-
voring royalty-free standards. Many of the resulting standards have taken
on the character of public goods "free for everyone to use without re-
strictions."l25 This approach has likely contributed to the relatively low
level of patent litigation relating to Internet standards in comparison with
Network standards.
The preference for RF standards at IETF and W3C can be traced, in
part, to the historical origins of these groups in academia and government
and their ties to the open source movement. Suzanne Scotchmer called
the circumstances resulting in the open Internet "one of the most fortu-
nate accidents in industrial history." 26
Today, however, IETF and W3C are dominated by private firms
that are as motivated by profit as their counterparts in the Network space.
Their reasons for favoring RF models are not entirely ideological or al-
truistic. As I have written elsewhere, a range of commercial considera-
tions motivate firms to relinquish potentially profitable exploitation of
122. Letter from Tim Berners-Lee, Dir., World Wide Web Consortium, to Hon. James E.
Rogan, Dir., USPTO (Oct. 28, 2003), http://www.w3.org/2003/10/27-rogan.html (emphasis omit-
ted).
123. Weitzner, supra note 84.
124. W3C Patent and Standards Interest Group: Continued Maintenance of W3C's Patent
Policy, W3C, http://www.w3.org/2004/pp/psig/ (last updated May 3, 2016).
125. Whitt, supra note 78, at 722.
126. SCOTCHMER, supra note 26, at 307.
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their patent rights in the service of broader commercial goals, such as the
seeding of new markets, the establishment of technological leadership,
and the desire to achieve industry-wide interoperability.127
Whatever the reasons for its development, the royalty-free patent
landscape of the Internet has yielded significant benefits. It has enabled
substantial innovation and experimentation, it has yielded entirely new
industries such as social media, and it has facilitated virtually unrestrict-
ed market entry and competition.128 It has also influenced groups devel-
oping other important standards, such as USB (uniform serial bus) and
Bluetooth, to adopt royalty-free licensing requirements.129  Finally,
groups such as IETF and W3C have demonstrated that technical stand-
ards are not incompatible with open source software projects, which con-
tinue to increase in importance.130
Defendants of patent monetization argue that a financial return on
patents is necessary to fuel innovation and product development in com-
plex and rapidly advancing technologies. There is clearly some truth to
this assertion-and a recognition in no less than the U.S. Constitution
that patents are intended to promote innovation. However, proponents of
strongly-monetized patent structures may lose sight of the innovation
that could potentially be enabled by lowering barriers to technology mar-
kets. 131
127. Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 543, 572-73 (2015). See also Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, 1 15 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013) ("Industry participants in the standard-setting process enjoy significant potential bene-
fits to having their technology incorporated into a standard independent of potential royalty income
from licensing patents they own. These non-income benefits can include increased demand for partici-
pants' products, advantages flowing from familiarity with the contributed technology potentially
leading to shorter development lead times, and improved compatibility with proprietary products
using the standard.").
128. DENARDIS, supra note 69, at 75-76.






&sig2=7eWxYkJfmL-Or9WyhU0G4Q; USB 3.0 Adopters Agreement,
http://www.usb.org/developers/docs/USB_3_0_AdoptersAgreementFinal_020411 .pdf.
1 30. See Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A Primer on Intellectual Property Policies
of Standards Bodies, in EFFECTIVE STANDARDIZATION MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATE SETTINGS
220-21 (Kai Jakobs ed., 2016).
131. In a way, today's patent monetization justifications echo those made by AT&T in the
heyday of the telephony monopoly. As Tim Wu has described it, AT&T justified its state-sanctioned
monopoly, in part, by arguing that the resulting rents were plowed back into research and develop-
ment at facilities like Bell Laboratories, where no fewer than seven Nobel laureates hung their hats
and to which we owe the transistor and many other technological marvels. Yet in hindsight, Wu
points.out these arguments ring hollow. After all the basic residential telephone unit remained essen-
tially unchanged for forty years notwithstanding the brain trust at Bell Labs. What's more, AT&T
imposed a daunting array of intellectual property, regulatory and commercial barriers to block any
innovator who sought to improve telephony in the slightest degree (culminating in the notorious
"Hush-a-Phone" debacle). When the FCC finally grew skeptical of the monopoly's virtue and or-
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Today's debate over SEPs and patent monetization is really just one
skirmish in a much larger war over openness and closure in technology
networks. Scholars including Larry Lessig,13 2 Jonathan Zittrain,13 3 Milton
Mueller,13 4 Tim Wu,"' and Laura DeNardis1 36 have warned about the
consequences of over-regulating, closing, and monetizing the Internet.
The open and royalty-free nature of the Internet was not pre-ordained
and it may not last forever. Slight changes in history could have sent the
Internet off in very different directions. Just as a single meteor or climat-
ic event can shift the course of biological evolution, so can a single judi-
cial decision or regulatory pronouncement change the course of a tech-
nology field. I doubt that many today would prefer to live in a world in
which most content is meted out by commercial networks, as it was in
the 1980s under pay services like American Online (AOL), Compuserve,
and Prodigy. Could the proliferation of patents on fundamental interop-
erability standards nudge us back in this direction?
Rapid technical change will occur in the near future with the advent
of the Internet of Things, the Smart Grid,137 wearable devices, and other
technological advances, as well as the continuing convergence of compu-
ting, networking and telecommunications technologies.138 Each of these
developments will require new standards and common protocols that
build on top of the existing Internet infrastructure. Let us hope that these
new technologies remain as open to future innovation and competition as
the Internet is today.'39
dered the standardization of telephone jacks via the now-ubiquitous RJ- I1 connector, an explosion
of innovation occurred leading to the introduction of connected devices including fax machines,
answering machines, and speakerphones. WU, supra note 58, at 9, 307-08.
132. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 4 (2006); LESSIG, supra note 78.
133. See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 56, at 246.
134. See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 7-10 (2002).
135. See generally WU, supra note 58, at 317-19.
136. See generally LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014); DENARDIS, supra note 69.
137. For example, I describe the influence of telecommunications and electronics patent hold-
ers on discussions of Smart Grid standardization. Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents and the
National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L. REV. 641, 642-43 (2012).
138. Weitzner observed the influence of telecommunications and computing technology on the
increasing prominence of patents in Internet standards as early as 2004. Weitzner, supra note 84
("[A]s the Web comes into contact with the telecommunications, broadcast media and consumer
electronics industries, there is pressure to change the traditional role patents have played in Web
standards.").
139. A group of SDOs led by IETF. W3C, and IEEE took a tentative step toward formalizing
this ethos in 2012 with the publication of the OpenStand Modern Paradigm for Standards. See
Principles, OPENSTAND, https://open-stand.org/about-us/principles/ (last visited May 30, 2016). The
principles espoused by OpenStand include laudable ideals such as cooperation, due process, trans-
parency, and consensus. Id. The OpenStand position regarding patents, however, does little other
than accept both RF and FRAND licensing models for patented standards.
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APPENDIX 1
PATENT CASES INVOLVING IETF STANDARDS
Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
14014
2003 Cisco Sys., Inc. 1 RFC 2281 - Hot Standby Router
v. Huawei Protocol ("HSRP")
Techs., Co., 266 RFC 3768 - Virtual Router Re-
F. Supp. 2d 551, dundancy Protocol ("VRRP")
552 (E.D. Tex.
2003).
2004 Amended Com- 2 RFC 1866 et seq. - Hypertext
plaint at 6, Markup Language - 2.0 (HTML)
Foundry Net- RFC 2616 - Hypertext Transfer








140. Indicates year in which request for document authentication was made.
141. Indicates the role of IETF standards in the case:
1 - Commercial dispute
2 - Patent holder alleges that standards-compliant products infringe patents
3 - Unknown
4 - Challenge to patent validity/Use of IETF documents to establish patent in-
validity
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Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2005 Complaint at 11, 2 RFC 2002 - IP Mobility Support
Fenner Invest- RFC 2003 - IP Encapsulation
ments, LTD. v. within IP
Juniper Net- RFC 2004 - Minimal Encapsula-
works, Inc., No. tion within 1P
2-05CV-05, RFC 2006 - The Definitions of
2005 WL Managed Objects for
320552 (E.D. IP Mobility Support
Tex. Jan. 6, using SMv2
2005). RFC 2344 - Reverse Tunneling
for Mobile IP
RFC 2794 - Mobile IP Network
Access Identifier
Extension for IPv4
RFC 3012 - Mobile iPv4 Chal-
lenge/Response Extensions
2005 Connectel, LLC 2 RFC 1479 - Inter-Domain Policy
v. Cisco Sys., Routing Protocol
Inc., 391 F. Specification: Ver-
Supp. 2d 526, sion 1
527 (E.D. Tex. RFC 1771 - A Border Gateway
2005). Protocol 4 (BGP-4)
RFC 1772 - Application of the
Border Gateway
Protocol in the In-
ternet
RFC 1773 - Experience with the
BGP-4 protocol
RFC 1774 - BGP-4 Protocol
Analysis
RFC 1775 - To Be "On" the In-
ternet
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494 F. Supp. 2d
34, 49 (D. Mass.
2007).
42007
2008 Alcatel USA Res. 3 Middlebox Communications






RFC 882 - Domain names: Con-
cepts and facilities
RFC 883 - Domain names: Im-
plementation speci-
fication
RFC 973 - Domain system
changes and obser-
vations
RFC 1001 - Protocol standard
for a NetBIOS ser-
vice on a TCP/UDP
transport: Concepts
and methods
RFC 1002 - Protocol standard
for a NetBIOS ser-
vice on a TCP/UDP
transport: Detailed
specifications
RFC 1034 - Domain names -
concepts and facili-
ties
RFC 1035 - Domain names -
implementation and
specification
RFC 1105 - Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)
RFC 1163 - Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)
RFC 1164 - Application of the
Border Gateway
Protocol in the In-
ternet
RFC 1546 - Host Anycasting
Service
RFC 1794 - DNS Support for
Load Balancing
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2009 UTStarcom, Inc. 4 Draft proposals re. Virtual Tun-
v. Starent Net- neling Protocol and Tunnel Es-
works, Corp., tablishment Protocol
675 F. Supp. 2d
854, 870 (N.D.
Ill. 2009).
2009 Answer and 4 RFC 2109 - HTTP State Man-
Counterclaims at agement Mechanism
25, Valueclick, RFC 2965 - HTTP State Man-







2009 Brief of Defend- 4 Draft proposals relating to Media
ant at *2-6, Gateway Control Protocol
Voxpath Net- (MGCP), Session Description
works, Inc. v. Protocol (SDP), and Session Ii-
Verizon Bus. tiation Protocol (SI), Telephony
Network Servs. Routing Information Protocol
Inc., No. 4:08- (TRIP), IP Network Address





2009 Amended Coin- 2 RFC 3031 - Multiprotocol Label
plaint & De- Switching Architec-
mand for Jury ture
Trial at 13, 16, RFC 3471 - Generalized Multi-
Cheetah Omni Protocol Label
LLC v. Verizon Switching (GMPLS)
Bus. Network Signaling Function-







Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2012 Apple, Inc. v. 4 RFC 791 - Internet Protocol
Motorola Mobil-




2011 SSL Servs., LLC 3 RFC158-GenericSecurity
v. Citrix Sys., Service Application




2012 VirnetX v. Mitel 2 Large number of documents re-
Networks Corp., lating to L2TP, SSL, SMTP,














2012 Summit Data 4 All documents relating to Inter-
Sys. v. EMC net Small Computer Systems
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2012 Realtime Data, 4 RFC 1144 - Compressing TCP/IP
LLC v. Thomson Headers for Low-
Reuters Corp., Speed Serial Links
No. 1 1CV06703, RFC 1332 - The PPP Internet
2011 WL Protocol Control
4576896 Protocol (IPCP)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. RFC 1661 - The Point-to-Point
27, 2011). Protocol
RFC 1662 - PPP in HDLC-like
Framing
RFC 1962 - The PPP Compres-
sion Control Proto-
col (CCP)
RFC 2395 - IP Payload Com-
pression Using LZS
RFC 2507 - IP Header Compres-
sion
RFC 2509 - IP Header Compres-
sion over PPP
2012 Alberta Tele- 3 Numerous draft documents relat-



















2012 Innova Patent 2 8 RFCs relating to DomainKeys








RFC 741 - Specifications for
the Network Voice
Protocol (NVP)
RFC 1633 - Integrated Services
in the Internet Ar-
chitecture: an Over-
view
RFC 1190 - Experimental Inter-
net Stream Protocol:
Version 2 (ST-II)
RFC 1889 - RTP: A Transport
Protocol for Real-
Time Applications
RFC 1890 - RTP Profile for Au-
dio and Video Con-
ferences with Min-
imal Control
RFC 2205 - Resource ReSerVa-
tion Protocol
(RSVP) -- Version 1
Functional Specifi-
cation
RFC 2210 - The Use of RSVP
with IETF Integrat-
ed Services




RFC 2212 - Specification of
Guaranteed Quality
of Service
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2012 Certain Elec. 4 All documents relating to HTML
Imaging Devic- 2.0, Multipurpose Internet Mail























4 RFC 977 - Network News
Transfer Protocol
RFC 1738 - Uniform Resource
Locators (URL)
RFC 1941 - Frequently Asked
Questions for
Schools
RFC 1392 - Internet Users' Glos-
sary
RFC 1630 - Universal Resource
Identifiers in
WWW: A Unifying
Syntax for the Ex-
pression of Names
and Addresses of
Objects on the Net-
work as used in the
World-Wide Web
RFC 2806 - URLs for Telephone
Calls









Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
140 141
2013 Brixham Sols. 4 RFC 2663 - IP Network Address
Ltd. v. Juniper Translator (NAT)
Networks, No. C Terminology and
13 0616 JCS, Considerations
2013 WL RFC 3209 - RSVP - TE: Exten-
664425 (N.D. sions to RSVP for
Cal. Feb. 12, LSP Tunnels
2013). RFC 3386 - Network Hierarchy
and Multilayer Sur-
vivability
RLFC 4762 - Virtual Private LAN
Services over MPLS




2014 Prism Techs. 4 RFC 2138 - Remote Authentica-
LLC v. T-Mobile tion Dial In User






2014 Datascape, Inc. 4 RFC 1055 - Nonstandard for
v. Spring Spec- transmission of IP
trum, L.P., No. datagrams over ser-
1:07-CV-0640- al lines: SLIP
CC (N.D. Ga. RFC 1945 - Hypertext Transfer
Mar. 31, 2014). Protocol --
HTTP/1.0
RFC 1980 - A Proposed Exten-
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2014 Samsung Elecs. 4 RFC 1866 - Hypertext Markup
















2014 Straight Path IP 4 RFC 791 - Internet Protocol,
Grp. v. Samsung RFC 793 - Transmission Control
(E.D. Tex. Protocol,
2014). RFC 1541 - Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol
2014 Ericsson Inc. v. 4 RFC 2341 - Cisco Layer Two
Intellectual Ven- Forwarding (Protocol) "L2F"
tures , LLC, No. RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
IPR2014-00527, ing Protocol "L2TP"
2014 WL RFC 827 - IP Encapsulating Se-
3885902 curity Payload (ESP)
(P.T.A.B. Aug. RFC 2784 - Generic Routing
6,F2014). Encapsulation (GRE)
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
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2015 Genband USA 4 RFC 792 - Internet Control Mes-
LLC v. sage Protocol
Metaswitch Net- RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
works Ltd., No. ing Protocol L2TP
2:14-CV-33- RFC 2543 - SIP: Session Initia-
JRG-RSP, 2015 tion Protocol
WL 1518007, at RFC 3261 - SIP: Session Initia-
*17-18, *30-31 tion Protocol
(E.D. Tex. Apr. RFC 5806 - Diversion Indication
1,2015). in SIP
RFC 3891 - The Session Initia-
tion Protocol (SIP)
"Replaces" Header
RFC 5359 - Session Initiation
Protocol Service Examples
2015 PTAB Inter 4 RFC 792 - Internet Control Mes-
partes review of sage Protocol
U.S. Patent No. RFC 2661 - Layer Two Tunnel-
7,224,668 (Cis- ing Protocol L2TP
co).
2015 Arista Networks, 4 RFC 2401 - Security Architec-
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42015 RFC 1098 - Simple Network
Management Proto-
col (SNMP)




RFC 2570 - Introduction to Ver-








RFC 2742 - Definitions of Man-




Year Case/Court Type IETF Standards
I4 14
Intellectual Ven-









42015 RFC 2305 - A Simple Mode of
Facsimile Using In-
ternet Mail
RFC 2532 - Extended Facsimile
Using Internet Mail
RFC 2542 - Terminology and
Goals for Internet
Fax
RFC 1530 - Principles of Opera-
tion for the TPC.INT
Subdomain: General
Principles and Policy
RFC 791 - Internet Protocol
RFC 1825 - Security Architec-
ture for the Internet
Protocol
RFC 1826 - IP Authentication
Header
RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating
Security Payload
(ESP)
RFC 2401 - Security Architec-
ture for the Internet
Protocol
RFC 2402 - IP Authentication
Header
RFC 2403 - The Use of HMAC-
MD5-96 within ESP
and AH
RFC 2405 - The ESP DES-CBC
Cipher Algorithm
With Explicit TV
RFC 2406 - IP Encapsulating
Security Payload
(ESP)
RFC 2407 - The Internet IP Se-
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WHY PATENT EXHAUSTION SHOULD LIBERATE PRODUCTS
(AND NOT JUST PEOPLE)
SAMUEL F. ERNSTt
ABSTRACT
Patent exhaustion is a doctrine that excuses infringement where the
patent holder has either authorized the sale of a patented item or licensed
its use or sale. Absent an effective contractual restriction, the patent
holder's rights in the patented item are exhausted and the patent holder
cannot sue for infringement based on further use or resale of the item.
This Article explores the question of whether patent exhaustion adheres
in the patented device or if it is a defensive doctrine that only adheres to
the benefit of particular parties. Traditionally courts have articulated the
doctrine as liberating the accused product from patent rights, allowing it
to pass through the stream of commerce to subsequent users with all
rights exhausted. With respect to actual holdings, however, the Federal
Circuit recently concluded that exhaustion has only excused infringement
in the case law where the claim of infringement was against an "author-
ized acquirer" of the device, or against a party accused of inducing or
contributing to the infringement of such an authorized acquirer. Appar-
ently a third party can be liable for infringement by unwittingly taking
action that facilitates the end user's use of the device for its intended
purpose, even if the device is licensed to perform that function.
This Article argues that the exhaustion doctrine should not be lim-
ited to shielding authorized acquirers of a patented device or any other
particular classes of persons. The Supreme Court has never pronounced
such a limitation on the doctrine. Rather, the Court has consistently char-
acterized exhaustion as adhering in the patented device itself, allowing it
to pass unimpeded through the stream of commerce to be used for its
intended purpose.
A conception of patent exhaustion as adhering in the patented de-
vice is supported by all of the policy theories that have been used to justi-
fy the doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine has traditionally been justified
by (1) a policy to retain the balance between the need to encourage in-
vention and the harm of a limited monopoly by ensuring that the inventor
does not receive double recovery for the value of the patented invention
and (2) the policy against restraints on alienation of servitudes. Recently
scholars have argued that the patent exhaustion doctrine serves a third
t Associate Professor of Law, Fowler School of Law, Chapman University. The author
thanks his research assistant, Griffin Schindler.
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purpose: to guard the domain of the federal patent law, such that it does
not interfere with the general commercial law of contracts. In fact, the
Supreme Court has long embraced all three theories as supporting patent
exhaustion.
Moreover, all three theories support a concept of patent exhaustion
as adhering in the patented device. If the purpose of the exhaustion doc-
trine is to police the domain of intellectual property statutes, such that
they do not interfere with commercial law, then the ability of patent
holders to police the use of downstream goods is properly limited by
contract law rules such as privity of contract and unconscionability. Pa-
tent rights must be exhausted to avoid interference with those laws. If the
exhaustion doctrine is justified by the related statutory domain policy
against overcompensation for patent holders for the use of their patented
inventions, then third parties should not be charged for interacting with
patented devices for which the patent holders have already received mar-
ket-based compensation. If the exhaustion doctrine is justified by the
common law policy against restraints on alienation of chattels, then ex-
haustion adheres in the patented goods, such that they may move down
the stream of commerce unimpeded with restrictions on their lawful and
intended uses.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 901
A. Patented Products in the Stream of Commerce ............... 901
B. The Federal Circuit's New "Authorized Acquirer" Restriction on
Patent Exhaustion ......................... ...... 902
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REVEALS THAT EXHAUSTION ADHERES
IN PRODUCTS AND NOT AS TO PARTICULAR PERSONS ........... 908
III. ALL THREE THEORIES OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
ARTICULATED BY CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS SUPPORT
EXHAUSTION ADHERING IN THE PATENTED DEVICE, AND NOT AS TO
PARTICULAR PERSONS .............................. ....... 915
A. The Policy Against Double Recovery Supports Exhaustion
Adhering in the Patented Device ................. .... 916
B. The Policy Against Servitudes Supports Exhaustion Adhering in
the Patented Device ......................... ..... 919
C. The Domain Theory Supports Patent Exhaustion Adhering in the
Patented Device ........................... ...... 922
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................. 924
900 [Vol. 93.4
2016] PATENT EXHA USTION SHOULD LIBERATE PRODUCTS 901
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Patented Products in the Stream of Commerce
Consider the journey of a modem high technology product through
the stream of commerce. An automobile, smartphone, or a semiconductor
device is likely to practice the claims of thousands of patents., Patents on
the design, methods of manufacture, and individual aspects of each com-
ponent of the product must be acquired, licensed, or ignored by the mul-
tiple companies that join together to make the new product.2 Then there
are the hundreds of patents the product innovator never learns about, any
one of which can lead to a subsequent lawsuit, royalties, or a crippling
injunction. Mark Lemley writes that "[t]he prevalence of patents in these
industries has caused a number of people to worry about an 'anticom-
mons' in patent law, in which companies that want to make a product
find it impossible to acquire all the rights they need from many different
owners."3
Now consider a situation in which all of these difficulties are over-
come. The necessary patents are licensed to the manufacturers of the
high-tech product, in some cases, for inflated royalties in light of the
minor contribution that each individual patent makes to the larger prod-
uct.4 Next, the new product moves down the stream of commerce to dis-
tributors and end users. At this level, the new product can become en-
snared in the patent thicket again as patent holders demand licenses from
or sue resellers, or even end users of accused products.5 "Customer
1. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 53-54 (2009) ("In industries such as semiconductors, by contrast, new products are so
complex that they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of different inventions-inventions
frequently patented by different companies.").
2. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. STATE L. REV. 19, 19-20 (2008).
3. See id. at 19 (first citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); and then citing Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 Sd. 698, 698-701 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967)); see also Amit Makker, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercializa-
tion, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1175-76 (2011) ("Generally, a patent thicket will require an innova-
tor to seek out and negotiate licenses with many patent holders in the field of endeavor to ensure that
the innovator will not be sued for patent infringement when building upon the work of others. Not
only could the licenses themselves be costly, the transaction costs associated with seeking out these
patent holders could also be large."); Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket. A Proposed
Patent Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology "Building Block" Patent Thicket Problem, 4
DREXEL L. REv. 555, 562 (2012) ("The dense tangle of existing IP rights prevents downstream
entities from producing innovative technology because they cannot afford to license the litany of
'building block' patents necessary to provide protection from infringement litigation.").
4. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1991 (2007) ("Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a
minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that
themselves have made substantial research and development investments.").
5. See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law's Customer Suit Exception,
93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1606-15 (2013) (discussing the rise of patent law suits against resellers and
customers who did not make the accused product).
DENVER LA WREVIEW
suits," particularly those brought by non-practicing patent assertion enti-
ties, frequently garner settlements that reflect the high cost of defense
more than the low value of the patented invention, which is at best mere-
ly one small component of a much larger commercial product.6 Customer
suits, moreover, result in needless judicial inefficiencies. Because the
accused resellers or customers did not make the accused product, exten-
sive third party discovery, confidentiality disputes, motions practice, and
other difficulties are required to defend the litigation on its merits.7
Under the right circumstances, the patent exhaustion doctrine may
be able to prevent some of this needless tax on innovation caused by the
patent thicket. If the manufacturer at the top of the chain of production
takes a license to a patent portfolio, and the patent holder thereby author-
izes the manufacture and sale of the device, then "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."8 Hence, in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court held that
when LGE granted Intel a license to make, use, and sell LGE's patented
microprocessors, LGE's rights in the licensed microprocessors were ex-
hausted.'0 LGE could not sue Intel's customer, Quanta, when Quanta
inserted the microprocessors into computers and thereby practiced LGE's
method claims. This is because "[t]he authorized sale of an article that
substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale
use of the article."'
B. The Federal Circuit's New "Authorized Acquirer" Restriction on
Patent Exhaustion
But what happens when we follow the licensed product down the
stream of commerce a little bit further? End users of a licensed automo-
bile or smartphone cannot be sued for using the device for its intended
purpose as embodied in the licensed patents.12 But what about third par-
ties who unwittingly broadcast content to the licensed car or smartphone,
or otherwise assist the end user in using the device for its intended pur-
pose? If such conduct infringes the method claims of a patent licensed by
the manufacturer, does patent exhaustion shield the third party from
claims of patent infringement for practicing that method?
6. Id at 1614.
7. Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able
to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 445,
450 (2014).
8. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625-26 (2008).
9. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
10. Id at 637.
11. Id. at 638.
12. See id. ("The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use
of the article.").
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At first blush, one would think that patent exhaustion shields the
third party broadcaster from infringement liability. This is because the
authorized first sale of the device exhausts the patent rights in that de-
vice, and the patent holder cannot sail down the stream of commerce to
sue persons who subsequently use the device for its intended purpose.
The Supreme Court very early said, "[W]hen the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.
It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of
Congress."l3
Over the years, the Court has repeatedly articulated patent exhaus-
tion as adhering in the patented device, shielding all subsequent users of
the device for its intended purpose from claims of infringement, absent
valid license restrictions.14 The Court has said that when exhaustion oc-
curs, the patent holder "ceases to have any interest whatever in the pa-
tented machine."15 By parting title with the machine, the patent holder
"has placed the article beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the
patent act."'6 The Court's most recent pronouncements are in accord with
the older opinions in characterizing patent exhaustion as adhering in the
sold or licensed item. In 2008, the Court wrote that "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that he initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."' And in 2013, the
Court held that patent exhaustion did not prevent a patent holder from
suing for infringement when a farmer made a new patented seed without
the patent holder's permission, because "the doctrine restricts a patent-
ee's rights only as to the 'particular article' sold." 8 The Court has re-
peatedly and consistently characterized patent exhaustion as adhering in
licensed or sold items and not to protect particular classes of individuals.
However, in Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times
Co.,19 the Federal Circuit traced a new limit on the law of patent exhaus-
tion, holding that patent exhaustion only protects "authorized acquirers"
of a sold device or parties who are accused of inducing or contributing to
the infringement of an authorized acquirer.20 The court reviewed the ex-
haustion case law to conclude that "[t]he doctrine has never applied un-
less, at a minimum, the patentee's allegations of infringement, whether
direct or indirect, entail infringement of the asserted claims by authorized
acquirers-either because they are parties accused of infringement or
13. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
14. For an analysis of license restrictions that may be sufficient to "contract around" exhaus-
tion, see Ernst, supra note 7, at 459-65.
15. Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895).
16. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
17. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added).
18. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765-66 (2013).
19. 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Helferich II].
20. Id. at 1302.
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because they are the ones allegedly committing the direct infringement
,,21
To understand the scope of the Federal Circuit's new authorized ac-
quirer restriction on patent exhaustion, it is necessary to delve briefly
into the details of the Helferich case. The plaintiff, Helferich, owns some
thirty U.S. patents related to wireless cell-phone technology, all of which
"derive from a common specification."22 The Federal Circuit conceived
of the patents as containing two types of claims: (1) "handset claims,"
which relate to "wireless-communication devices" (e.g., smartphones)
and methods for such smartphones to receive and request information
over a wireless network; and (2) "content claims," which cover methods
of storing and updating information, and sending it to the smartphones
over a wireless network.23 The court assumed that the handset claims and
the content claims covered patentably distinct inventions because that
was the conclusion of the Patent and Trademark Office.24 It is presuma-
bly the owner of the smartphone who may practice the handset claims,
by, for example, requesting content to be sent to the phone. And content
providers may practice the content claims, by, for example, sending con-
tent to the smartphone. In other words, the court proceeded on the prem-
ise, for lack of proof to the contrary, that content providers may practice
the content claims independently without the smartphone users perform-
ing any steps of those methods.25
Nonetheless, Helferich apparently licensed all of these thirty pa-
tents, including both types of claims "to what, at least at one time, consti-
tuted most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile hand-
sets for sale in the United States."26 Hence, Helferich authorized cell
phone manufacturers to make and sell devices that could practice both
the handset claims and the content claims, free from claims of direct or
indirect infringement. And because this authorization exhausted Helfer-
ich's patent rights in the cell phones, purchasers of the smartphones are
immune from claims of patent infringement when they use the phones
for their intended purposes of requesting and receiving content over the
internet:
It is undisputed that, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, those li-
censes eliminate for the owners/possessors of handsets acquired from
the licensed manufacturers-"authorized acquirers"-any legal re-
striction the patents would otherwise impose on them through the pa-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1295.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1296.
25. Id. at 1300 ("[D]efendants do not contend that handset possessors practice any of the
asserted [content] claims-that such handset users perform the steps of the claimed methods (even
any of the steps) or put into service and thereby use the claimed systems." (emphasis added)).
26. Id. at 1296.
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tent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, regarding their sale or use of the
handsets.27
In short, Helferich bargained for and received from cell phone mak-
ers market-determined compensation for the use of both its handset
claims and content claims. Helferich cannot pursue the cell phones down
the stream of commerce to collect double recovery from end users.
Presumably, however, the owners of the licensed smartphones
would like to use them to receive content and not only to request content.
But Helferich has followed the patented devices down the stream of
commerce to sue content providers, such as the New York Times and
CBS, for broadcasting content to the licensed devices in a way that may
practice the claims of the licensed patents.28
The district court held that he content providers were shielded from
liability, quoting the Supreme Court for the rule that "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."29 The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that patent exhaustion itself had been exhaust-
ed.30 It appears that once the patented item floats this far down the stream
of commerce, the exhausted patent rights can pull themselves out of the
drink and stand as a new dam against the intended use of the licensed
device.
To revive the patent rights, the Federal Circuit articulated a new
orientation for patent exhaustion. Exhaustion no longer terminates patent
rights in the licensed device itself. Instead, "[e]xhaustion protects an au-
thorized acquirer's freedom from the legal restrictions imposed by the
patent statute."31 The court reasoned that because the infringement stat-
ute defines infringement as an act committed by a person, patent exhaus-
tion must also be limited to "remov[ing] those legal restrictions on cer-
tain persons."32 The court found no actual language or holdings in Su-
preme Court precedent putting such a limit on patent exhaustion. But the
27. Id. at 1296-97.
28. Id. at 1295.
29. Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co. (Helferich 1), 965 F. Supp. 2d 971,
976, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617, 625 (2008)), rev'd, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
30. Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1311.
31. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
32. Id. ("Exhaustion protects an authorized acquirer's freedom from the legal restrictions
imposed by the patent statute. The statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from, e.g.,
making or using or selling a patented invention, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), and it then imposes concomi-
tant legal restrictions on acts that violate the exclusivity right by defining, in closely related terms,
what it means for a person to 'infringe' the right, § 271. Patent exhaustion removes those legal
restrictions on certain persons in certain circumstances: it eliminates the legal restrictions on what
authorized acquirers 'can do with an article embodying or containing an invention' whose initial sale
(or comparable transfer) the patentee authorized." (quoting Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct.
1761, 1766 & n.2 (2013))).
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Federal Circuit's review of the precedent revealed that patent exhaustion
had not occurred in the case law
unless, at a minimum, the patentee's allegations of infringement,
whether direct or indirect, entail infringement of the asserted claims
by authorized acquirers-either because they are parties accused of
infringement or because they are the ones allegedly committing the
direct infringement required by the indirect infringement charged
against other parties.33
Accordingly, the Helferich opinion reframes the orientation of ex-
haustion. Exhaustion does not liberate particular patented items from the
reach of the Patent Act; it liberates particular persons or classes of per-
sons from claims of patent infringement.
The court in Helferich takes pains to point out the limitations of its
holding.34 The Helferich defendants were accused of infringing patent
claims that the customer did not necessarily practice in using the licensed
devices.3 5 The Helferich defendants did not argue that they "use[d]" the
licensed devices by practicing the licensed patents.36 Nonetheless, the
asserted patent claims were claims under which the devices themselves
were licensed and for which license Helferich had already received com-
pensation.37 In other words, the devices were licensed to perform the
functions that formed the basis for the infringement accusations. The
only reason patent exhaustion did not preclude these claims of infringe-
ment was because of the Federal Circuit's new rule that exhaustion only
excuses infringement by authorized acquirers of a licensed device and
those who contribute to or induce such persons' infringement.3 8
And so, despite the limitations on the holding of the Helferich deci-
sion, the opinion represents a foundational shift in the orientation of pa-
tent exhaustion. Does patent exhaustion adhere in the patented device,
liberating that product and its intended uses from claims of patent in-
fringement no matter who uses the product? Or does patent exhaustion
operate as a defense that only benefits particular classes of persons who
interact with the licensed device? Setting aside valid contractual re-
strictions, if a patent holder authorizes the sale of a patented device, are
the patent rights in the device exhausted as to all persons, or only as to
some particular class of persons? And what should the law be?
33. Id at 1302.
34. Id. at 1299-1301.
35. Id. at 1300.
36. Id at 1299 ("And we will proceed on the premise, accepted by defendants, that only
handset owners/possessors, not those who practice the asserted content claims, 'use' the handsets.").
37. Id. at 1296 ("Helferich licensed its portfolio to what, at least at one time, constituted
most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile handsets for sale in the United States.").
38. Id. at 1301-02 ("Exhaustion protects an authorized acquirer's freedom from the legal
restrictions imposed by the patent statute.").
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Part II of this Article begins to explore these questions by first ask-
ing what, in fact, the Supreme Court has said on the matter. Part II close-
ly examines Supreme Court precedent to conclude that the Court has
always framed patent exhaustion as adhering in the accused device, and
not as applying to protect particular persons from claims of infringement.
Where the Court has expressed policy in support of the doctrine, it is
policy focused on the incentive provided to the patent holder, the proper
scope of the Patent Act, and the alienability of goods in commerce-not
policy regarding which actors should be held liable for patent infringe-
ment. Once patent rights are exhausted in a product, that product is free
from claims of patent infringement, no matter who is the defendant.39
Part III of the Article asks whether patent exhaustion should adhere
in the licensed or sold article, or if the Federal Circuit panel was correct
to limit the defense to particular classes of defendants. Which is the bet-
ter policy? Part III begins by examining Supreme Court precedent to
determine what policies the Court has articulated in support of the ex-
haustion doctrine. Traditionally, commentators have grounded patent
exhaustion in one of two theories. First, patent exhaustion prevents over-
compensation for the patent holder for the use of its patented product,
which is necessary to preserve the balance the patent laws must strike
between the incentive to invent and the freedom required for innovation,
industry, and a free market.0 Second, patent exhaustion prevents the
Patent Act from interfering with the common law's policy of abhorring
servitudes running with personal property.4' Recently, scholars have
opined that patent exhaustion is justified by the need to define the do-
main of the Patent Act, such that it does not interfere with general com-
mercial law.42 Once all patent rights in a particular product have been
exhausted, the law of contracts, property, and commercial law govern the
use of the property in commerce.43 Part III demonstrates that, in fact, the
Supreme Court has relied on all three theories in support of the exhaus-
tion doctrine since the nineteenth century. The Court has sought to en-
force all three policies in its exercise of the exhaustion doctrine and,
therefore, all three policies must be considered in determining whether
exhaustion should adhere in the patented device or only as to particular
classes of persons. Accordingly, Part III argues that all three policy justi-
fications for the exhaustion doctrine support a conception of patent ex-
haustion as adhering in the sold or licensed device.
First, the best way to ensure that the patent holder does not receive
double compensation for the use of its patented device is by exhausting
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Section III.A.
41. See infra Section III.B.
42. See generally John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial
Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV., Mar. 2016, at 1, 1-2, 7-8.
43. See infra Section III.C.
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all rights in the device, not only as to particular users. If the first sale or
license of a device only triggers patent exhaustion as to particular parties,
then it allows the patent holder to receive full compensation for the use
of a patented device and then receive additional compensation for that
use from third parties who facilitate the use.44
Second, further patent-right interference with an item after it is sold
or licensed under a patent allows the Patent Act to exceed its statutory
domain and invade the province of general contract, commercial, and
property law, which should now govern the use of the item in a free mar-
ket. These areas of law reflect policies, such as consumer protection and
freedom of contract, with which the federal law should not interfere.45
Third, among those common law policies the exhaustion doctrine is
meant to shield from the Patent Act is the policy against restraints on
alienation of personal property. Patent exhaustion must adhere in the
patented goods, rather than with respect to particular persons, to prevent
annoyance and inefficiencies as goods pass through commerce, such that
"competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of
the consumer."
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REVEALS THAT EXHAUSTION ADHERES
IN PRODUCTS AND NOT AS TO PARTICULAR PERSONS
The Federal Circuit in Helferich reviewed some of the Supreme
Court opinions on exhaustion and noted a common feature in the fact
patterns: the doctrine had, thus far, always been applied to shield from
infringement liability either persons who had acquired the accused de-
vice or persons who were accused of inducing or contributing to the in-
fringement of such authorized acquirers.47 Thus far, according to the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court's cases had not excused infringement
under the exhaustion doctrine by persons who did not cause authorized
acquirers to infringe, but who practiced other patent claims under which
the devices were also licensed.
The Federal Circuit's reasoning in Helferich consists of turning this
coincidence in the fact patterns into a rule: "Exhaustion [only] protects
an authorized acquirer's freedom from the legal restrictions imposed by
the patent statute."48 The court announced a new limit on exhaustion that
focuses on the identity of the accused defendant rather than on the patent
holder's relationship to the patented article.
44. See infra Section III.A.
45. See infra Section III.C.
46. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013); see also infra Sec-
tion III.B.
47. Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
48. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
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But what do the Supreme Court cases actually say? Has this feature
of the fact patterns been the basis for the Court's decision in any case
finding exhaustion? Close scrutiny of each Supreme Court case on ex-
haustion reveals that the Court has never suggested any restriction on
patent exhaustion based on the identity of the accused defendant. Rather,
the Court has consistently conceived of exhaustion as adhering in the
patented article. This Part provides a close analysis of Supreme Court
precedent to conclude that he Court determines exhaustion based solely
on an assessment of the patent holder's relationship to the patented item.
If the patent holder has relinquished all rights in the patented item, he has
"exhaust[ed] the monopoly in that article" and "has thus parted with his
right to assert the patent monopoly with respect to it."49
The Federal Circuit justifies its reorientation of the exhaustion doc-
trine in Helferich by referring to the provision in the Patent Act that de-
fines infringement:
The statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from, e.g.,
making or using or selling a patented invention, 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1), and it then imposes concomitant legal restrictions on acts
that violate the exclusivity right by defining, in closely related terms,
what it means for a person to "infringe" the right, § 271. Patent ex-
haustion removes those legal restrictions on certain persons in certain
circumstances .... 50
It is true that Section 271 of the Patent Act defines infringement as
particular actions that violate the exclusionary right-for example, the
unauthorized "mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing]" of a pa-
tented invention.5 ' But it does not therefore follow that "[p]atent exhaus-
tion removes those legal restrictions on certain persons in certain circum-
,,52stances. The Patent Act also defines the patent holder's "right to ex-
clude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the inven-
tion."5 And in addressing exhaustion, the Supreme Court has focused on
the patent holder's relationship to this exclusionary right and whether or
not she has exhausted it with respect to particular goods. The identity of
the accused user of the patented device is not relevant to determining
whether there are any patent rights remaining in the device.
The Court established this conception of exhaustion adhering in the
patented device as early as 1852. In the case of Bloomer v. McQuewan,54
the defendant purchased the right to construct and use patented planing
49. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942).
50. Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
51. Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (PATENT Act), 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (2012).
52. Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
54. 55 U.S. 539 (1852).
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machines during the term of the patent.5 The question for the Court was
whether the patent holder could sue for infringement based on use of the
machines during an extension of the patent term.56 The Court concluded
that there was no cause of action for infringement because the patent
holder, by authorizing the manufacture of the patented machine, had ex-
hausted his patent rights in that particular machine: "And when the ma-
chine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the lim-
its of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the
protection of the act of Congress."57 It is the patent rights in the device
that are exhausted, not the right to enforce those rights against particular
persons.
In fact, particular persons may still be liable under causes of action
other than for patent infringement, because by sending the sold device
outside the domain of the Patent Act, the Court allows the general com-
mercial law to govern use of the device: "[I]f [the patent holder's] right
to the implement or machine is infringed, he must seek redress in the
courts of the State, according to the laws of the State, and not in the
courts of the United States, nor under the law of Congress granting the
patent.",5 Patent exhaustion adhered in the patented planing machine; the
question of who could interact with the machine subsequent to patent
exhaustion was properly governed solely by the state law of personal
property and contracts.
Indeed, every single Supreme Court case on patent exhaustion that
this author has reviewed conceptualizes patent exhaustion as adhering in
the sold or licensed device and not as to particular parties.
In Mitchell v. Hawley59 the patent holder avoided patent exhaustion
by placing valid contractual restrictions on the use of its machines.0 But
contractual restrictions aside, in describing the operation of the exhaus-
tion doctrine, the Court plainly considered it a question of whether ex-
haustion had adhered in the patented device, and not as to particular per-
sons:
[W]hen [the patent holder] has himself constructed a machine and
sold it without any conditions, or authorized another to construct,
sell, and deliver it, or to construct and use and operate it, without any
conditions, and the consideration has been paid to him for the thing
patented, the rule is well established that the patentee must be under-
stood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and
55. Id. at 548.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 549.
58. Id. at 549-50.
59. 83 U.S. 544 (1872).
60. Id. at 550. The Court's treatment of attempts to contract around exhaustion are not the
topic of this Article. For a full analysis of this question, see Ernst, supra note 7, at 451-59.
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that he ceases to have any interest whatever in the patented machine
so sold and delivered or authorized to be constructed and operated.61
Absent an effective contractual provision, patent exhaustion acts to
drain all patent rights out of a sold or licensed device. The identity of any
particular person accused of infringement by using that device does not
enter into consideration. This is because the patent holder "ceases to have
any interest whatever in the patented machine."62 The machine has
passed outside of the patent monopoly.
In Adams v. Burke,63 the plaintiff exhausted his rights in patented
coffin lids by licensing a third party to make and sell the lids for use
within a ten-mile radius of Boston.4 The patent holder could not sue the
defendant for patent infringement when he purchased the lids and in-
terred them in Natick, Massachusetts, seventeen miles outside of Bos-
ton.65 This had nothing to do with whether the defendant was an author-
ized acquirer of the lids. There was no suit for infringement because the
coffin lids had "passe[d] without the limit of the monopoly."66 The Court
held that after the coffin lid was sold, "so far as the use of it was con-
cerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it was no longer
within the monopoly of the patent."67 Patent exhaustion again liberated
the device from patent rights, not particular classes of persons.
The Court again articulated exhaustion as adhering in the patented
device in Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co. 68 There, the defendant
purchased patented beds from a Michigan licensee under the patent and
resold them in Massachusetts. The Court held that patent exhaustion pro-
hibited the Massachusetts licensee under the patent from suing for in-
fringement based on the resale of the beds.69 The case did not turn on
whether the defendant was an authorized acquirer of the beds, however.
Rather, the sale of the beds to the defendant exhausted all patent rights in
those beds: "[T]he purchase of the article from one authorized by the
patentee to sell it, emancipates uch article from any further subjection
to the patent throughout he entire life of the patent . . . . It does not
matter who is accused of committing patent infringement with respect to
the article; the article is emancipated from any further subjection to the
patent.
61. Mitchell, 83 U.S. at 547.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
64. Id. at 454.
65. Id. at 454-56.
66. Id at 456.
67. Id.
68. 157 U.S. 659, 663-66 (1895).
69. Id. at 666.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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Because exhaustion adheres in the patented device, rather than op-
erating as a defense reserved for particular defendants, the Court early on
decided that post-sale restrictions are ineffective to prevent patent ex-
haustion. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufactur-
ing Co.,71 the plaintiff held a patent on film projectors and granted a li-
72cense to a third party to manufacture and sell the projectors. The license
agreement contained a clause purporting to place restrictions on the use
of the devices after they were sold-a "post-sale restriction." Specifical-
ly, the license provided that the machines were to be sold "under the re-
striction and condition that such exhibiting or projecting machine shall
be used solely for exhibiting or projecting motion pictures containing the
inventions of reissued letters patent No. 12,192, [another patent owned
by the plaintiff] . . . . When Universal Film supplied to the purchaser
of the patented projector with films that were not covered by that patent,
Motion Picture Patents Company sued for infringement.4
The Court ruled that the post-sale restriction could not prevent pa-
tent exhaustion because it purported to exercise the patent monopoly
over devices that had left the domain of the Patent Act. "[T]he right to
vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being
thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free
of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it."75 It did
not matter that Universal Film was accused of contributing to the in-
fringement of an authorized acquirer of the machines. All that mattered
was the patent holder's relation to the machines; the patent holder had
exhausted all patent rights in the machines as to all uses of the device by
76
anyone.
When the Court reaffirmed the ineffectiveness of post-sale re-
strictions to avoid exhaustion in Quanta, it relied on the same logic: post-
sale restrictions fail to prevent patent exhaustion because the device has
already been carried outside of the patent monopoly. In Quanta, the
Court held that LGE's patents on the methods of operation of its circuits
were exhausted when it authorized Intel to make circuits that substantial-
ly embodied the claimed methods.77 LGE could not sue Quanta for in-
fringing its method patents when Quanta purchased the circuits from
Intel and put them to their intended use because "patent exhaustion pro-
71. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
72. Id at 505-06.
73. Id. at 506.
74. Id at 507-08.
75. Id. at 516.
76. In arriving at this decision, the Court overruled its opinion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1912), which held that post-sale restrictions could prevent patent exhaustion. Id. at 518.
Notably, in committing this legal error, the Henry opinion misstated patent exhaustion as protecting
the rights of purchasers of the device, rather than as relating to the exhaustion of patent rights in the
device. 224 U.S. at 19 ("By a sale of a patented article subject to no conditions, the purchaser unde-
niably acquires the right to use the article for all the purposes of the patent, so long as it endures.").
77. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
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vides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all pa-
tent rights to that item."7 8 LGE argued that patent exhaustion was avoid-
ed by a post-sale restriction in one of its agreements with Intel providing
that no license was granted to any third party, such as Quanta, to use the
patented circuits in combination with non-Intel parts.79 The Court reject-
ed this argument on the basis that LGE could not assert patent rights over
an item in which all patent rights were exhausted. "[T]he question
whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because
Quanta asserts its right to practice the patents based not on implied li-
cense but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel's own li-
cense to sell products practicing the LGE Patents."80 In other words, ex-
haustion does not turn on the identity of accused infringers. Rather, ex-
haustion turns only on the question of whether the patent holder has dis-
posed of its patent rights in a particular item. "The authorized sale of an
article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's.
rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control
postsale use of the article."81 Patent exhaustion adheres in the sold or
licensed article, and not as to particular parties who later interact with the
article.
The Supreme Court's steadfast adherence to the principle that patent
exhaustion adheres in the patented article has also redounded to the bene-
fit of the patentee. In Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,82 the question was
whether the patent holder, Monsanto, could sue a farmer who used pa-
tented soybeans not only to grow soybean crops, as was permitted, but
83also to create new soybeans for replanting the following season. The
Court held that patent exhaustion did not shield the farmer from in-
fringement liability because the sale of a patented article "does not allow
the purchaser to make new copies of the patented invention."8 This is
because "[tjhe doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee's right to
control what others can do with an article embodying or containing an
invention."85 Because patent exhaustion adheres in a licensed or sold
item, and not as to particular persons, "the doctrine restricts a patentee's
rights only as to the 'particular article' sold it leaves untouched the pa-
tentee's ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patent-
ed item."86 Hence, the Bowman Court is consistent with all of the other
Supreme Court precedent finding that patent exhaustion removes the
78. Id. at 625, 638.
79. Id. at 623.
80. Id. at 637.
81. Id. at 638.
82. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
83. Id. at 1764.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1766 (emphasis added).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
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licensed or sold article from the patent monopoly; it does not act merely
to shield particular persons from infringement liability.
Indeed, every Supreme Court opinion this author has identified-
too many to describe in detail here-frames the exhaustion doctrine in
this way.8 The Court explains the operation of patent exhaustion in ex-
ceptionally clear terms in United States v. Univis Lens Co. 88 :
The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his
patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention.
His monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of the pa-
tented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and
the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the
use or disposition of the article.89
Hence, the Supreme Court has always conceived of patent exhaus-
tion as adhering in the article sold or licensed by the patent holder. Ex-
haustion removes the sold article from the patent monopoly and the pa-
tent holder cannot sue anyone for patent infringement based on an inter-
action with that article.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's decision in Helferich, announc-
ing that patent exhaustion only adheres to the benefit of a particular class
of persons, is a new limit on patent exhaustion. The Federal Circuit may
be correct that the Supreme Court has never decided a case in which the
party obtaining protection from the exhaustion doctrine was neither an
authorized acquirer of the patented device or someone who induced or
contributed to an authorized acquirer's infringement.90 But this has never
been the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions finding patent exhaus-
tion. The question has, rather, always turned on the extent to which the
patent holder has parted with her rights in the patented article. Absent an
effective contractual restriction to prevent exhaustion, once patent ex-
haustion occurs, it occurs in the patented item, allowing for its intended
use free from restriction by the Patent Act. Under this conception of pa-
tent exhaustion, one would assume the doctrine would shield third parties
from claims of infringement as well-parties such as content providers to
a licensed device, who interact with the device using a method the device
87. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457 (1940) ("And by the
authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and after
the sale neither appellant nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents to exercise any control over
the price at which the fuel may be resold."); Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8,
25 (1918) ("[O]ne who had sold a patented machine and received the price and had thus placed the
machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent law, could not by qualifying restrictions as to use
keep under the patent monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied."); Bauer & Cie
v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913) ("[T]his court from the beginning has held that a patentee who
has parted with a patented machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the
limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act.").
88. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
89. Id. at 250.
90. Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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is licensed to perform. The Federal Circuit's pronouncement to the con-
trary is new law, even taking into account the many limitations on the
court's holding.91
III. ALL THREE THEORIES OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
ARTICULATED BY CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS SUPPORT EXHAUSTION
ADHERING IN THE PATENTED DEVICE, AND NOT AS TO PARTICULAR
PERSONS
Given that the Supreme Court has never imposed an authorized ac-
quirer restriction on the patent exhaustion doctrine, and given that the
restriction was only imposed by a panel of the Federal Circuit, it is fair
game to inquire into whether such a limitation is good policy. Should
patent exhaustion only apply to protect from infringement liability "au-
thorized acquirers" of the accused device or those who induce or con-
tribute to their infringement? Or, should patent exhaustion adhere in the
licensed or sold product, freeing it from claims of infringement against
all parties who come to interact with that product?
Answering these question requires consideration of the three major
policy arguments that have been advanced in favor of the patent exhaus-
tion doctrine. Scholars have long theorized that exhaustion is justified
either by a policy to prevent patent holders from obtaining overcompen-
sation for the value of their patented inventions, the policy against "dou-
ble-recovery," or by the common law policy against servitudes running
with personal property.92 Recently, scholars have posited a third justifica-
tion for patent exhaustion: the exhaustion doctrine serves to police the
domain of intellectual property law, such that it does not displace the
general commercial law of contracts, property, and antitrust (hereafter,
"the domain theory" of patent exhaustion).93
Adherents to the domain theory of patent exhaustion have suggested
that it has been the only theory animating the Supreme Court in applying
the exhaustion doctrine.9 4 Professors John F. Duffy and Richard Hynes
have argued that "[t]he legal doctrine in the area pursues not common
law policies disfavoring encumbrances or restraints on alienation, but
instead the more nuanced goal of limiting the scope or domain of IP stat-
utes to avoid displacing the law in other fields, such as general contract,
property, and antitrust law."95
In fact, as explained in this Section, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly invoked all three policy justifications for patent exhaustion in de-
veloping the doctrine. The Supreme Court has at times grounded patent
91. See id. at 1299-1301.
92. See Ernst, supra note 7, at 465-75.
93. See Duffy & Hynes, supra note 42, at 1-2, 7.
94. See id. at 6-7.
95. Id. at 7.
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exhaustion in a policy to ensure that the patent holder receives no more
compensation for the value of her patented invention than is commensu-
rate with the scope of the invention and as is necessary to encourage in-
novation.96 The Supreme Court has also repeatedly justified the exhaus-
tion doctrine in the common law policy against servitudes running with
personal property.97 And the Court has often emphasized the need to
police the boundaries of the Patent Act, such that it does not interfere
with general commercial law.98 These policies are not incompatible with
one another; in fact, they are complementary policies. As argued below,
all three policies favor, even require, that patent exhaustion adhere in the
patented device and not only as to particular parties.
A. The Policy Against Double Recovery Supports Exhaustion Adhering
in the Patented Device
The policy against double recovery proceeds on the premise that
"[t]he patent holder should be rewarded for [her] original contribution to
the art with a [reward] that is commensurate with the [value] of [the]
invention as determined by the free market," and no more than is neces-
sary to spur innovation." The Supreme Court has invoked this policy in
justifying patent exhaustion because patent exhaustion ensures that the
patent holder does not charge duplicative royalties on a device from mul-
tiple parties as the device passes through the stream of commerce.
Hence, for example, in Motion Picture Patents Co., the Court in-
voked exhaustion with the remonstrance that "this court has consistently
held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of
private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is 'to promote the progress
of science and the [sic] useful arts.'"100 Accordingly, the inventor should
receive a royalty for his invention that is determined by the value of the
invention on the free market:
If his discovery is an important one, his reward under such a con-
struction of the law will be large, as experience has abundantly
proved; and if it be unimportant, he should not be permitted by legal
devices to impose an unjust charge upon the public in return for the
use of it. 101
The exhaustion doctrine serves as a check on such "legal devices,"
such as the post-sale restriction at issue in the Motion Picture Patents
Co. case, ensuring that the patent holder does not receive overcompensa-
tion for the patented invention. Patent exhaustion asks if there has been
96. See infra Section III.A.
97. See infra Section III.B.
98. See infro Section III.C.
99. See Ernst, supra note 7, at 465.
100. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
101. Id.at513.
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an authorized first sale because "[t]he test has been whether or not there
has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the
patentee has received his reward for the use of the article."'02
The Court has invoked the policy against double recovery in patent
exhaustion opinions going back to the very beginning of the doctrine. In
Mitchell the Court wrote that patent holders
are never entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and con-
sequently a patentee, when he has himself constructed a machine and
sold it without any conditions, . . . and the consideration has been
paid to him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the
patentee must be understood to have parted to that extent with all his
exclusive right .... 103
The Court relied on the policy against double recovery in Adams as
well, writing that patent exhaustion occurs because "the patentee or his
assignee ha[s] in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration
which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or
instrument." 1 04 In Univis Lens Co., the Court explained that patent ex-
haustion applies because, in selling the patented device, the patent holder
"has received in the purchase price every benefit of that monopoly which
the patent law secures to him."105 Exhaustion ensures that the patent
holder receives no additional reward, which would improperly "extend
his monopoly."'a Hence, the policy against double recovery has been
consistently articulated by the Supreme Court as a policy that animates
patent exhaustion.
Scholars have debated whether patent exhaustion is necessary to
prevent double recovery. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp describes an
argument made by the "Chicago school writers" that "in any multi-stage
distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be earned."07
Hence, according to these scholars, patent holders will be prevented from
charging duplicative or excessive royalties at multiple stages as a product
passes through the stream of commerce because the price of the patented
product will be too high, and sales will be lost.08
Other scholars have countered these arguments by pointing out that
the market can fail to check double recovery in a world without patent
exhaustion because purchasers of patented products may have insuffi-
102. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
103. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1872).
104. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
105. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942).
106. Id.
107. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doc-
trine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 487, 514-15 (2011).
108. Id. at 515.
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cient notice of the patent rights that encumber their purchase.'0 For ex-
ample, a consumer may pay a market-determined price for a cell phone
with the expectation that it is licensed to perform its intended core func-
tion of requesting and receiving content from content providers. Indeed,
in the Helferich opinion itself, Helferich had obtained a royalty from cell
phone manufacturers for all of its patents: compensation for the handset
claims practiced by consumers and compensation for the content claims
practiced by content providers."i0 The market had determined a price for
that intellectual property and this price had presumably been passed
through to the consumer. But if patent holders can then charge an addi-
tional royalty to those very content providers for interacting with the
device in this way, this royalty will also presumably be passed through to
consumers in the higher expense of obtaining content for devices. This
royalty has not been checked by the market price of the device because
the consumer has had no notice of it.' The device is now charged with
the same royalty to the same intellectual property twice... unless the
patent exhaustion doctrine solves the problem.
Hence, the policy against double recovery calls for a vigorous pa-
tent exhaustion doctrine to prevent supra-market compensation to the
patent holder for the value of the patented invention. It is essential to the
operation of the policy against double recovery that patent exhaustion
adhere in the patented device and not only to protect particular defend-
ants. This is because the doctrine prevents overcompensation that occurs
when a patent holder charges a royalty on the same device for the same
intellectual property as it passes through the stream of commerce. In the
scenario described above, because the Federal Circuit decided in Helfer-
ich that patent exhaustion only excuses infringement by authorized ac-
quirers,"l2 the patent holder was able to charge two royalties for the same
intellectual property in the reception of content for mobile devices: one
royalty to handset manufacturers and an additional royalty to content
providers.
As properly framed, the exhaustion doctrine would prevent this
double recovery because it operates on the patented device. Hence, as the
Supreme Court stated in Univis Lens Co.:
[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any partic-
ular article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of
109. Ernst, supra note 7, at 471-72.
110. Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Helferich licensed its portfolio to
what, at least at one time, constituted most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile
handsets for sale in the United States.").
Ill. For a discussion of the difficulties with notice in intellectual property regimes, see Mark
R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 105, 149 (2012). See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO.
L.J. 885, 935 (2008).
112. Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
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his invention by the sale of the article, and that once that purpose is
realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and en-
joyment of the thing sold.'13
The only way to ensure that multiple royalties are not charged for
the same intellectual property is for patent exhaustion to adhere in the
patented device and not as to particular classes of individuals.
B. The Policy Against Servitudes Supports Exhaustion Adhering in the
Patented Device
An additional, related policy supporting patent exhaustion is the
traditional common law policy against servitudes running with personal
property. This policy holds that goods should pass through commerce
unencumbered by retained rights, easements, and servitudes that restrict
and tax further alienation and result in unnecessary notice and research.
costs.114 Patent exhaustion prevents servitudes in the form of retained
patent rights by exhausting all patent rights in an article that is sold or
licensed under the patent. 15
The Supreme Court has consistently invoked the policy against per-
sonal property servitudes to support its decisions applying patent exhaus-
tion. In Motion Picture Patents Co. the Court found that the patent holder
had exhausted all rights in its patented film projectors because it could
not be allowed "to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of
the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be
imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner."116 All rights.
were exhausted by the sale of the projectors because "[t]he patent law
furnishes no warrant for such a practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and
annoyance to the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion
forbid it." 117
The Court was similarly animated by its abhorrence of personal
property servitudes in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.1 '8 The Court
held that the patent holder's post-sale restriction attached to its patented
phonographs providing that they could only be used with the patent
holder's products was insufficient to prevent patent exhaustion.119 The
Court's reasoning was based almost entirely in the common law policy
against servitudes:
Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such
an attempt as this "License Notice" thus plainly is to sell property for
113. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (emphasis added).
114. Ernst, supra note 7, at 473-75.
115. Id.
116. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
117. Id.
118. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
119. Id. at 500-01.
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a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation,
such as have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke's day to ours,
because obnoxious to the public interest.120
The Court enforced this policy by holding that all patent rights in
the patented projectors were exhausted "after the plaintiff had been paid
for them."121
Indeed, even in these modem times, courts cite to the policy against
personal property servitudes in justifying exhaustion. The Supreme Court
recently relied upon the policy in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.122
in holding that the authorized reproduction of a copyrighted book over-
seas exhausts all rights in that copy.123 The Court stated that its holding
was supported by "the common law's refusal to permit restraints on the
alienation of chattels."124 The Federal Circuit recently extended this poli-
cy to the realm of patent exhaustion in holding that giving away a patent-
ed product for no consideration triggers patent exhaustion.125 The court
discussed the Supreme Court's reliance on the policy against personal
property servitudes and then stated that, absent patent exhaustion, "con-
sumers' reasonable expectations regarding their private property would
be significantly eroded." 26
Hence, the common law policy against servitudes running with per-
sonal property is a major policy animating the exhaustion doctrine. Pro-
fessor Hovenkamp has observed that in antitrust opinions, the Supreme
Court has rejected reliance on the policy against servitudes because it
"reflected ""formalistic line drawing' rather than 'demonstrable eco-
nomic effect."'127 However, in the realm of intellectual property, the pol-
icy against servitudes continues to have significant justifications. Profes-
sor Molly Shaffer Van Houweling has identified three ways in which
personal property servitudes are harmful even in the absence of the anti-
competitive effects that are the target of the antitrust laws.
First, personal property servitudes impose notice and information
costs on patented goods as they pass through commerce.128 At every
stage, persons who acquire or interact with the patented device must ei-
ther expend resources to determine what patent restrictions remain in the
device or be subject to infringement liability. For example, under the rule
of the Helferich opinion, content providers seeking to transmit content to
a device owned by an end user must investigate whether the device re-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 501.
122. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
123. Id. at 1363.
124. Id.
125. LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
126. Id. at 1377.
127. Hovenkamp, supra note 107, at 506.
128. Van Houweling, supra note I11, at 932-39.
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tains patent restrictions to prevent such broadcasting, even though the
device has been the subject of a first sale.1 2 9
Second, personal property servitudes may result in "underuse or in-
efficient use of the resources subject to the restriction."1 30 For example, if
content providers must pay an additional royalty to patent holders for
broadcasting content to devices that are already fully licensed under the
patents, it may result in less content being broadcasted or content being
broadcasted at a higher price.
Third, personal property servitudes can "waive public-regarding
limitations built into intellectual property law." 131 By defining the exclu-
sive right and the patent term, Congress has struck a balance between
encouraging innovation and allowing the public to incur the harm of a
limited monopoly. Once the patent holder receives its market-determined
compensation for the invention, allowing the patent holder to use con-
tractual devices to obtain additional compensation from subsequent par-
ties thwarts this balance.132 This justification for the policy against servi-
tudes intersects that heory with the theory against double recovery and
the domain theory described below.
Hence, the common law policy against servitudes running with per-
sonal property is a policy that animates patent exhaustion, both in Su-
preme Court precedent and among scholars. Plainly, this policy requires
that patent exhaustion adhere in the patented article that has been sold or
licensed and not as to particular persons. The policy requires that once an
article has been sold for full price, there can be no further restraints upon
its use and alienation.'33 Further patent restraints on the use or resale of
the device result in "inconvenience and annoyance to the public." 34 For
example, once a cell phone is sold for full compensation and licensed
under patents related to its core function of receiving content, further
patent-based restraints on the device's ability to receive content from
particular providers represents a servitude running with personal property
in violation of the common law policy against such servitudes. Full ef-
fectuation of the policy against servitudes requires that the sold or li-
censed item be free from claims of infringement as to all parties that
come to interact with the device.
129. See Helferich 11, 778 F.3d 1293, 1301-03 (Fed Cir. 2015) (holding that the authorized first
sale of cell phones did not exhaust claims against content providers on the basis that they were not
"authorized acquirers" of the device).
130. Van Houweling, supra note 111, at 939.
131. Id. at 946.
132. Id. at 939.
133. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917).
134. Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 667 (1895).
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C. The Domain Theory Supports Patent Exhaustion Adhering in the Pa-
tented Device
The third policy supporting the exhaustion doctrine that scholars
have recently written about is what may be called domain theory. Under
this theory, patent exhaustion serves to limit the scope of the Patent Act
so that it does not interfere with generally applicable commercial law,
specifically contract law and antitrust law.1 35 Patent rights are exhausted
to allow the contract law policies related to such things as privity of con-
tract and unconscionability to be enforced. Patent rights are exhausted to
prevent the Patent Act from interfering with antitrust law's maintenance
of free competition.
The domain theory of patent exhaustion, like the other two theories
discussed above, has long been a theme relied upon by the Supreme
Court in finding patent exhaustion. The Court found patent exhaustion in
Bloomer because after the sale of a patented machine, the machine was
"not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the
State in which it is situated. Contracts in relation to it are regulated by
the laws of the State, and are subject to State jurisdiction."' 36 Hence, if
there were any restriction on the ability of the owners of the machines to
use the machines for their intended purpose, such restrictions would have
to be consistent with the law of contracts.
The Court used patent exhaustion to police the domain of the Patent
Act again in Keeler. In finding that there was no cause of action for in-
fringement based on the resale of beds in Massachusetts that had been
lawfully purchased in Michigan, the Court made clear that it was avoid-
ing treading into the territory of contract law:
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us,
and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one
under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.137
The law of contracts would likely not have provided a remedy for
the plaintiff in Keeler either, because the defendant was not a party to the
contract prohibiting the sale of the beds in Massachusetts.'38 In this way,
the Court's use of patent exhaustion to place a limitation on the domain
of the Patent Act prevents the federal law from interfering with the
common law policies surrounding privity of contract.
The current Supreme Court is similarly conscious of the need to ap-
ply patent exhaustion in a way that permits the policies of contract law to
135. Duffy & Hynes, supra note 42, at 1-6.
136. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 550 (1852).
137. Keeler, 157 U.S. at 666.
138. Id. at 661-62.
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be effected free from the interference of the Patent Act. In Quanta, the
Court took pains to note that its ruling that patent exhaustion precluded a
claim for infringement "does not necessarily limit LGE's other contract
rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and
we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available
even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages."l39 The
Court's drawing of boundaries between the Patent Act and the general
commercial law allows for the enforcement of restrictions imposed by
the law of contracts that may not be reflected in the Patent Act-in par-
ticular, the restriction requiring privity of contract. Hence, the Court
wrote in Motion Picture Patents Co. of the need
to distinguish between the rights which are given to the inventor by
the patent law and which he may assert against all the world through
an infringement proceeding, and rights which he may create for him-
self by private contract, which, however, are subject to the rules of
general, as distinguished from those of the patent, law.140
The Court has also used patent exhaustion to prevent patent law
from interfering with antitrust law and policy. In Boston Store of Chica-
go v. American Graphophone Co.,14 1 the Court held that the patent hold-
er's post-sale restrictions on price were ineffective to prevent patent ex-
haustion in part because a contrary conclusion would interfere with the
policies of antitrust law:
[T]here can be no doubt that the alleged price-fixing contract dis-
closed in the certificate was contrary to the general law and void.
There can be equally no doubt that the power to make it in derogation
of the general law was not within the monopoly conferred by the pa-
tent law and that the attempt to enforce its apparent obligations under
the guise of a patent infringement was not embraced within the rem-
edies given for the protection of the rights which the patent law con-
ferred.142
Hence, patent exhaustion occurred because the sale of the patented
machine "placed the machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent
law." 143 And beyond the confines of patent law lies antitrust law, under
which the price restrictions were unenforceable based on the policies of
that body of law.
The Court used patent exhaustion to avoid interference by the Pa-
tent Act with the domain of antitrust law again in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States.'" After finding patent exhaustion rendered unenforceable
139. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008).
140. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917).
141. 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id.
144. 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
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post-sale restraints on the price of patented fuel additives, the Court held
that "[s]uch contracts or combinations which are used to obstruct the free
and natural flow in the channels of interstate commerce of trade even in a
patented article, after it is sold by the patentee or his licensee, are a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."1 45
Hence, patent exhaustion liberates a patented product from regula-
tion under the Patent Act and allows the generally applicable law of con-
tracts and antitrust to govern whether further restraints on the product are
enforceable. This domain theory of patent exhaustion is consistent with
the other two policies of patent exhaustion , not opposed to those theo-
ries. By preventing the Patent Act from interfering with general commer-
cial law, patent exhaustion preserves the common law's policy against
servitudes running with personal property. By preventing the duplicative
collection of royalties for the use of patented products, patent exhaustion
allows for the availability of this double recovery to be determined by the
general law of contracts, including the rule requiring privity of contract.
The domain theory of patent exhaustion, like the other theories dis-
cussed above, requires exhaustion to adhere in the patented article, and
not to protect only particular classes of defendants. Such an understand-
ing of patent exhaustion has always been central to an articulation of
domain theory. Once a patented article is sold or licensed, "it is no longer
within the limits of the [patent] monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is
no longer under the protection of the act of Congress."l4 6 This passage of
the accused product outside of the domain of the Patent Act is what al-
lows other areas of generally applicable commercial law to govern fur-
ther use of the article.
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that once a patented
product is sold or licensed, patent rights in that article are exhausted,
such that patent holders cannot pursue the article down the stream of
commerce to obtain double recovery, place further restraints on aliena-
tion, or otherwise use the Patent Act to interfere with generally applica-
ble commercial law. In order to effectuate these policies, patent exhaus-
tion must be conceived as adhering in the patented product, and not ap-
plying only to protect particular classes of defendants who interact with
the patented product. Patent exhaustion must liberate the patented prod-
uct, and not just people, so that it may navigate the stream of commerce
free and clear of the patent thicket.
145. Id. at 458.
146. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
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WHEN THE DEFAULT Is No PENALTY: NEGOTIATING
PRIVACY AT THE NTIA
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ABSTRACT
Consumer privacy protection is largely within the purview of the
Federal Trade Commission. In recent years, however, the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the Depart-
ment of Commerce has hosted multistakeholder negotiations on consum-
er privacy issues. The NTIA process has addressed mobile apps, facial
recognition, and most recently, drones. It is meant to serve as a venue for
industry self-regulation. Drawing on the literature on co-regulation and
on penalty defaults, I suggest that the NTIA process struggles to success-
fully extract industry expertise and participation against a dearth of fed-
eral data privacy law and enforcement. This problem is most exacerbated
in precisely the areas the NTIA currently addresses: consumer privacy
protection around new technologies and practices. In fact, industry may
be more likely to see the NTIA process as itself penalty-producing and,
thus, be disincentivized from meaningful participation or adoption.
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The United States famously does not have omnibus federal data pri-
vacy law.' Instead, existing federal privacy law regulates the market or
2technologies by sector. One law governs children's privacy; another
governs health privacy;3 another governs the use of information about
videos that you watch.4 New technologies and practices-ranging from
mobile phones apps to facial recognition to drones-create significant
data privacy issues that federal privacy law does not explicitly cover. The
federal government's current approach to data privacy concerns raised by
these technologies is the under-examined multistakeholder process at the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). 5
The NTIA is not the federal agency that springs to mind when dis-
cussing consumer privacy. Most think of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) as the consumer privacy agency because the FTC has used its Sec-
tion 5 authority to govern both consumer privacy and data security.6 Per-
haps the NTIA's relative obscurity is due to the fact that while the De-
partment of Commerce has long been involved in setting privacy policy,
the NTIA's current efforts are relatively new. The NTIA has been in-
volved in this particular multistakeholder process since only 2012.7 Or
perhaps this obscurity stems from the fact that the NTIA does not enforce
these best practices; it serves as a neutral negotiating forum for private
stakeholders to arrive at these "voluntary, enforceable" best practices.8
Whatever the reason, the lack of discussion of the NTIA multi-
stakeholder process in the literature is a significant oversight. The NTIA
multistakeholder process is a key component of the White House's tout-
1. Paul M. Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
324, 324-27 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).
2. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2012).
3. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 § 1177, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
4. See Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
5. The NTIA multistakeholder process was mentioned in passing by Justin Brookman. Justin
Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 355,
363, 363 nn.49-50 (2015).
6. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598-606 (2014).
7. Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application Transparency, NAT'L TELECOMM.
& INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Mobile Application Transparency],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-process-mobile-
application-transparency.
8. Id. (stating the NTIA's role in the process is "to provide a forum for discussion and con-
sensus-building among stakeholders"); see also Privacy Multistakeholder Meetings Regarding
Facial Recognition Techonology: February-June 2014, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 3,
2013) [hereinafter Facial Recognition Technology], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-meetings-regarding-facial-recognition-technology-feb.
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ed approach to data privacy.9 The success or failure of this process has
significant implications for how we regulate data privacy going forward.
Moreover, what's happening at the NTIA has broader implications
for discussions of delegating regulation to private actors or incorporating
standards that private actors have devised. Good governance likely needs
the industry and technological expertise that private actors possess. The
story of the NTIA's multistakeholder process shows, however, that cer-
tain regulatory conditions may be necessary to get private actors to put
that expertise towards governing themselves.
I begin by describing the current multistakeholder process at the
NTIA and explaining its origins. I then ask the necessary question: Is the
process actually working? Answering that largely in the negative, I bring
together literature on co-regulation with literature on penalty defaults to
suggest that while private expertise may be necessary for effective gov-
ernance in this realm, private actors will not co-regulate in the desired
way unless the government sets a regulatory default that is worse than
enforcement of best practices. I close with some important lessons
learned.
I. WHAT IS THE NTIA DOING IN CONSUMER PRIVACY REGULATION?
Because regulating data privacy entails regulating fast-developing
technologies, many have suggested that private industry is best equipped
to self-regulate.o The government faces an expertise problem: it inevita-
bly cannot gather expertise fast enough to keep up with technological
development." The obvious concern, however, is that private industry
9. Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, H.R.
1053, 114th Cong. § 301 (2015) [hereinafter Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-
draft.pdf (listing the multistakeholder process as the first step the Secretary of Commerce may make
when deciding if a certain code of conduct should be considered a safe harbor); see also WHITE
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 23-27 (2012) [herein-
after PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012], https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
("The Administration encourages [all] relevant groups to participate in multistakeholder processes to
develop codes of conduct that implement [the general principles in the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2015]. . . . [The] NTIA will lead the Department of Commerce's convening of stake-
holders.").
10. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND
INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 5 (2010),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf privacygreenpaper 12162010.pdf; see also
David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 370-77 (2014) (describing
how the expertise of private industry actors in the area of regulating data privacy can be borrowed to
assist government in its regulation of the same); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 457-59
(2011).
I1. Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Les-
sons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 98-99 (2013) (footnote omitted)
(explaining one reason the government adopted the multistakeholder process was its fear that
"[s]low-moving, notice-and-comment rulemaking [would] not be able to keep up with rapidly
changing technologies, business practices, and consumer expectations. Moreover, the regulators
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will self-regulate with its own best interests in mind.12 Thus the crucial
question is: How do we spur private industry involvement in data privacy
regulation without allowing it to capture the process at the expense of the
general public?
The White House's recent answer to this question is the proposed
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act (the Act), based on an earlier blue-
print announced in a 2012 policy document.13 The Act would create
backstop federal privacy legislation consisting of a Privacy Bill of Rights
(Title I), enforceable by states' attorneys general and the FTC (Title II).
Against this backstop, private stakeholders could negotiate their own
industry-specific codes of conduct at the Department of Commerce (Title
III).14 Upon approval by the FTC, these negotiated codes of conduct
would serve as a safe harbor from liability for violating the Act.15
The White House has touted this approach in a number of policy
documents addressing Big Data.16 The problem for the White House is
that Congress has not enacted the Act-not even close. With criticisms
from both privacy advocates and regulatory skeptics, the administration
could not find Congressional sponsors for the bill.1 7 In the meantime, the
Executive Branch decided to attempt this approach alone.
Starting in 2012, the White House directed the NTIA, which is
housed in the Department of Commerce, to begin convening meetings
between privacy stakeholders to negotiate sector-specific "legally en-
forceable" codes of conduct.'8 The White House explained that the NTIA
"has the necessary authority and expertise" to conduct these meetings,
based on its past participation in "other areas of Internet policy." 9 While
themselves [would] not be able to learn enough about quickly evolving industries to design intelli-
gent rules for them").
12. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 458-59; Thaw, supra note 10, at 331.
13. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at I (originally pro-
posed in Feb. 2012; Act proposed in Feb. 2015); see also PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note
9, at 1.
14. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at 17; see also
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA
AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 38, 40-41 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA AND
PRIVACY],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast big data and privacy
-_may_2014.pdf.
15. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at 17.
16. See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 14, at 40-41; WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 8-9 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_BigData-SeizingOpportunitiesPr
eserving Values Memo.pdf; PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 6.
17. Alex Wilhelm, White House Drops 'Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act' Draft,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/white-house-drops-consumer-
privacy-bill-of-rights-act-draft/.
1 8. Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
19. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 26. As statutory authority, the White
House states "[the] NTIA is designated by statute as the 'President's principal adviser on telecom-
munications policies pertaining to the Nation's economic and technological advancement .... " Id.
at 26 n.29 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)(D) (2012)).
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the NTIA is no stranger to privacy questions-a 1995 report discusses
telecommunications privacy issues, for example20-it has been delegated
an increasingly active role in privacy policy in recent years. The Depart-
ment of Commerce established the Internet Policy Task Force in 2010,
coordinating efforts at the NTIA with policy efforts at other agencies
such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. One of the Task Force's
initiatives is to address Internet privacy.21 The NTIA's multistakeholder
meetings fall under the domain of this Internet Policy Task Force. The
White House's recent placement of privacy multistakeholder meetings at
the NTIA involves the agency in consumer privacy policy.
The White House explained in its 2012 Privacy Blueprint that, ide-
ally, companies would voluntarily adopt the privacy codes of conduct
developed at the NTIA. Once adopted, the code would become enforcea-
ble by the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act, "just as a company is
bound today to follow its privacy statements."22 On its face, this policy
sounds relatively nonthreatening to companies. They may negotiate
codes of conduct at the NTIA if they feel like it, and they will be subject
to FTC enforcement only if they choose to adopt a particular code of
conduct. Thus the model of how the NTIA process will work is that it
should produce voluntary codes of conduct, signed by industry actors,
and enforceable by the FTC only against those who sign on.
Even within the Privacy Blueprint, however, the White House ap-
23pears to suggest broader enforcement potential. On the one hand, codes
of conduct might operate as a de facto safe harbor from FTC enforce-
ment. On the other hand, the FTC might look to codes of conduct to es-
tablish the industry standards undergirding a Section 5 enforcement ac-
tion. In other words, stakeholders may fear engaging in the NTIA pro-
cess because the resulting industry code of conduct could trigger, rather
than prevent, FTC enforcement action.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
21. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, CYBERSECURITY, INNOVATION
AND THE INTERNET ECONOMY iv (2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/CybersecurityGreen-
Paper FinalVersion.pdf ("In April 2010, Commerce Secretary Gary Locke established a Depart-
ment-wide Internet Policy Task Force to address key Internet policy challenges.").
22. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 27; see also Brookman, supra note 5, at
363 n.49 ("The FTC would have jurisdiction over such codes because a statement of adherence to a
code would be a consumer representation; if a company ended up violating such a statement, that
would constitute a deceptive business practice under the law."); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC Settles with Twelve Companies Falsely Claiming to Comply with International Safe Harbor
Privacy Framework (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-
settles-twelve-companies-falsely-claiming-comply (discussing how the FTC has enforced voluntary
industry codes in the past); FTC v. Google 2012 - Misrepresentation of Compliance with NAI Code
a Key Element, IT LAw GROUP (2014), http://www.itlawgroup.com/resources/articles/69-ftc-v-
google-2012-misrepresentation-of-compliance-with-nai-code-a-key-element.
23. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 30 ("In any investigation or enforcement
action related to the subject matter of one or more codes, the FTC should consider the company's
adherence to the codes favorably.").
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Is this fear that codes of conduct will be enforced as industry stand-
ards against non-signatories reasonable? The FTC's privacy orders have
been described by leading scholars in the area as creating "codified
... best practices."24 These scholars in fact characterize the ideal version
of the FTC's enforcement process as waiting for an industry standard to
emerge and then codifying it through FTC privacy orders.25 In enforce-
ment actions, the FTC usually compares a particular company's conduct
to actual "industry standards writ large."26 For example, in recent litiga-
tion challenging the FTC's authority to regulate data security under Sec-
tion 5's unfairness prong, the FTC explained that to determine what con-
stitutes "reasonable" data security, companies may look to, among other
27things, actual industry best practices. The FTC also issues best practic-
es as guidance, but tends not to rely on its own best practices for en-
28forcement purposes.
The question then is whether NTIA codes of conduct will be treated
more like the FTC's own guidance in the area-that is to say, not gener-
ally used for determining the industry standard for enforcement purpos-
es-or treated more like actual industry standards, which are frequently
referred to in enforcement actions. At least initially, the FTC would be
unlikely to look to NTIA best practices alone to determine reasonable-
ness. However, if the NTIA process works the way the White House
envisions, it will result in standards widely adopted by industry leaders,
which would consequently nudge or dictate the industry standards on
which FTC enforcement relies. If the NTIA system works as the White
House envisions-creating industry codes of conduct that are then actu-
ally adopted by the majority of players in an industry-it is hard to imag-
me the FTC will not eventually look to the codes for guidance as to the
industry standard in a sector in determining which enforcement actions to
pursue.
24. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 586. Solove and Hartzog acknowledge, however, that
currently, privacy best practices are more amorphous than their cybersecurity equivalents. Id at 657
("With regard to privacy, what constitutes good practice is more in dispute, although there are cer-
tainly some practices about which consensus has developed.").
25. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential ofFTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2265 (2015) ("The FTC can wait until a consensus around specific
standards develops in the industry and then codify them as this happens.").
26. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 626-27 (quoting E-mail from David Vladeck, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., to authors (Oct. 3, 2013, 1:12 PM) (on file with the Columbia Law Re-
view)).
27. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616-17 (D.N.J. 2014) (noting
that Wyndham could look to "industry guidance sources that [Wyndham] . . . itself seems to measure
its own data-security practices against").
28. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 626-27 (citing E-mail from David Vladeck, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., to authors (Oct. 3, 2013, 1:12 PM) (on file with the Columbia Law Re-
view)).
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II. IS THE NTIA MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESS WORKING?
The White House has directed the NTIA to convene multistake-
holder discussions on consumer privacy in three sectors: mobile applica-
tions;29 facial recognition technology;30 and most recently, drones.31 The
NTIA has convened discussions in these areas, concluding the code of
conduct for transparency in mobile applications in 2013.32 Discussions of
the facial recognition code stalled in June 2015, when consumer advo-
cate groups walked out of the process in protest.33 Discussions of drones
concluded in 2016; this author participated in them.34
The important question, for purposes of evaluating both how the
White House currently handles data privacy and the viability of any fu-
ture version of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, is whether the
NTIA multistakeholder process is working. In three words: it is not.
The success of the efforts can be judged along several axes.5 First,
how wide is participation in the process? Does it bring in meaningful
representation from both industry and public interest groups, as intend-
ed? Second, how successful are the efforts at reaching consensus? Does
the final code reflect influence by diverse participants? And third: How
widely is the code actually adopted? We have evidence on the third ques-
tion only with respect to the NTIA's mobile app work, but there is initial
evidence as to participation in the other two processes. As charted below,
for all three questions, in all three sets of negotiations, the answers are
not encouraging.
A. Mobile Apps
The NTIA's first efforts focused on driving transparency in the pri-
vacy practices of mobile applications. The central issue was how to
meaningfully alert mobile phone users to what kinds of information mo-
bile phone applications collected and shared. This conversation was
29. See Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
30. See Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 8.
31. See Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMIN. (June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Unmanned Aircraft Systems], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2015/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems.
32. Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7; Angelique Carson, Did NTIA's Multi-
Stakeholder Process Work? Depends on Whom You Ask, IAAP: PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sep. 3, 2013),
https://iapp.org/news/a/did-ntias-multi-stakeholder-process-work-depends-whom-you-ask/.
33. Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back Out of Federal Talks on Face Recognition, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (June 16, 2015, 12:10 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/consumer-
groups-back-out-of-federal-talks-on-face-recognition/.
34. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 31.
35. Ira Rubinstein suggested a six-factor normative framework for evaluating the efficacy of
co-regulation: efficiency, openness and transparency, completeness when compared to FIPPs, strate-
gies to address free rider problems, oversight and enforcement, and use of second-generation design
features. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6
ISJLP 355, 380 (2011). My normative framework roughly maps on to a subset of these factors:
openness and transparency (who are the actors?); completeness when compared to other codes of
conduct; and free rider problems. See id.
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largely about what constitutes meaningful notice in the smartphone
space. Since U.S. privacy largely centers around the idea of notice and
consent, figuring out how to apply that model to small, mobile, ubiqui-
tous screens is a central policy question in data privacy law.36
The initial meeting resulted in relatively high participation and sixty
separate proposals; over time, however, fewer participants were willing
to remain involved.37 The drafting ended in the summer of 2013.38 A
number of civil liberties organizations supported the draft, but the Center
for Digital Democracy (CDD) abstained and called instead for broad
consumer privacy legislation and FTC regulation.39 The CDD explained
that the stakeholder process relied too heavily on voluntary and thus in-
adequate revelations by industry members about their practices.40
In terms of substance, the NTIA code can be compared to the FTC's
February 2013 recommended best practices for mobile app transparen-
cy.4 1 The FTC recommends that apps should provide just-in-time disclo-
sures and obtain affirmative express consent when (a) collecting sensi-
tive information outside the platform's API, or (b) sharing sensitive data
with third parties.4 2 The NTIA code, by contrast, suggests use of a single
"short form notice"-that is, a notice that is easy to read and under-
stand-that is "readily available from the application," but crucially only
"encourages but does not require presentation of [the] short form notice
prior to installation or use of the application."43
These are significantly different notice mechanisms. One (the
FTC's approach) actively alerts a user to the collection or sharing of sen-
sitive information at the moment the information is collected or shared.
The other (the code of conduct's approach) is potentially hidden within
the application, and need not be actively shown to the user at all. To be
fair, many mobile applications at the time of negotiations had no privacy
policies; the NTIA's modest proposal of adoption of a short-form policy
looks like an improvement in that context. The disparity between the
NTIA's suggested form of notice and the FTC's guidance on the issue,
however, suggests limits on the idea that the NTIA process will arrive at
36. See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 787-89 (2014).
37. Brookman, supra note 5, at 363-64.
38. See Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
39. Jeff Chester, CDD Urges FTC to Review Proposed NTIA Code of Conduct, CTR. FOR
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (July 26, 2013), https://www.democraticmedia.org/cdd-urges-ftc-review-
proposed-ntia-code-conduct; see also Carson, supra note 32.
40. Chester, supra note 39 ("The stakeholder process is intrinsically flawed. It principally
relies on industry to provide accurate information on the practices they actually engage in.").
41. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES i-iii, 12 (2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-
through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/1 30201 mobileprivacyreport.pdf
42. Id. at 23.
43. SHORT FORM NOTICE CODE OF CONDUCT TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY IN MOBILE APP
PURCHASES 2, 5 (NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., Redline Draft 2013),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/july_25_code draft.pdf.
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"best" practices, versus constitute a race to the bottom. Clarity is also a
concern. A study of the NTIA proposal conducted by researchers at Car-
negie Mellon concluded that "the current set of NTIA categories does not
appear to offer a high level of transparency for users.""
Perhaps the most damning observation about the mobile apps pro-
cess is that it did not result in widespread industry adoption. Consumer
Watchdog pointed out that, while twenty industry participants "support-
ed" the code, only two "endorsed" it-meaning, only two industry partic-
ipants were willing to publicly commit to putting the code into practice,
thus making it clearly legally enforceable. 5 On the other side of the is-
sue, industry representatives raised usability concerns, explaining that the
data gathering practices discussed at the meetings were not representa-
tive of practices in real life.46 According to one commentator, "by and
large the principles have been ignored by industry."47 The NTIA process
thus faces a significant free rider problem: industry may profit from the
goodwill associated with the process, without taking on the costs of actu-
ally implementing even the lenient code.48
B. Facial Recognition
Next, the NTIA convened stakeholder discussions on facial recogni-
tion technologies.49 Facial recognition technologies come in many forms.
They can involve analysis of existing social media imagery, or they can
involve surveillance of individuals in real and unexpected physical spac-
es. In the second context, facial recognition technologies raise many of
the same policy questions as the Internet of Things: companies can use
the technologies on individuals without a user agreement, and even with-
out notice to the individual.50 The issues raised are complex and entail
discussing whether our approach to data privacy online is appropriate for
data privacy entwined with the real physical world.
The NTIA process around facial recognition stalled in the summer
of 2015, when consumer protection groups walked out of the negotia-
44. REBECCA BALEBAKO, RICHARD SHAY & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, IS YOUR INSEAM A
BIOMETRIC? EVALUATING THE UNDERSTANDABILITY OF MOBILE PRIVACY NOTICE CATEGORIES 10
(2013), https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech reports/CMUCyLabl3011 .pdf.
45. John M. Simpson, Effort to Craft Apps "Transparency Code" Shows Futility of Multi-
Stakeholder Process, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (July 25, 2013),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/effort-craft-apps-%E2%80%9Ctransparency-
code%E2%80%9D-shows-futility-multi-stakeholder-process
46. Grant Gross, A Federal Push for Mobile Privacy Has Failed, Critics Say, PCWORLD
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2047775/critic-ntias-mobile-privacy-push-has-
failed.html.
47. Brookman, supra note 5, at 363.
48. Rubinstein, supra note 35, 379-80.
49. Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Facial Recognition Technology, NAT'L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN. (June 11, 2015) [hereinafter NTIA, Privacy], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/201 5/privacy-multistakeholder-process-facial-recognition-technology.
50. See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People's Things, 51
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 647 (2015).
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tions.51 The groups explained in a letter that they chose to walk out of the
process because companies refused to even engage with the idea of opt-
in consent to facial recognition.52 Opt-in consent has been the basis of
state legislation, and consumer protection and privacy organizations
raised serious objections to the fact that it was not on the table at the
NTIA. 53 It is unclear from the NTIA website whether the process has
continued beyond July 28, 2015.54
The latest discussion draft of the code, evidently proposed by the
International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA), dates from July 22,
2015. 5 The draft focuses on transparency and data security, with trans-
parency constituting a dual approach of (i) available privacy policies, and
(ii) notice that the technology is being used.56 The draft language is
sparse, largely repeating the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),
such as collection limitation, the purpose specification principle, the use
limitation principle, etc.
What little specific information the draft proposes, however, shows
the limitations that frustrated privacy advocates.57 While the draft advo-
cates notice, it explains that such notice will be highly context-
dependent. The draft states that notice should depend on the type of per-
sonal data used, how that data will be stored and used, and reasonable
expectations of use of that data.58 In other words, companies may t their
own discretion, using vague factors, determine whether and when indi-
viduals might even receive notice of the use of individually-identifying
facial recognition technologies.
The similarly sparse draft of NTIA's stakeholder guidelines also re-
lies on notice and transparency.59 The guidelines explain that entities
using facial recognition technologies should "make available to subjects"
their policies regarding biometric collection and use.60 They explain that
51. Singer, supra note 33.
52. Andrea Peterson, The Government's Plan to Regulate Facial Recognition Tech Is Falling
Apart, WASH. POST: SWITCH (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/06/16/the-govemments-plan-to-regulate-facial-recognition-tech-is-falling-apart/.
53. See id. (citing Illinois and Texas as examples).
54. NTIA, Privacy, supra note 49 (announcing the most recent meeting as occurring July 28,
2015).
55. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
COMMERCIAL BIOMETRIC USE (2014) [hereinafter NTIA, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ibia-ntia-7-22-15 discussion_draft.pdf.
56. Id. at 2.
57. See Alvaro M. Bedoya, Why I Walked Out of Facial Recognition Negotiations, SLATE
(June 30, 2015, 11:56 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2015/06/facial recognitionprivacy talks wh
y_i_walkedout.html;%20https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-withdraws-from-the-ntia-facial-recognition-
process/.
58. Id at 2; NTIA, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE, supra note 55, at 2.
59. GUIDELINES FOR THE COLLECTION AND USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION § 3 (NAT'L
TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., Stakeholder Draft 2015).
60. Id.
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notice should be given before the technology is employed, or alternative-
ly may be given after employment if the subject can control use of the
data.6 ' Like the discussion draft, the stakeholder guidelines rely ies on a
number of the FIPPs; and like the discussion draft, they nowhere con-
template that subjects might justifiably opt out of facial recognition-or
be given the option to opt in, to begin with.
The FTC, by contrast, in October 2012 recommended best practices
for facial recognition technologies that included an opt-out mechanism,
and even more stringent opt-in consent in some cases.62 The FTC de-
scribed a "sliding scale approach to notice and choice," including choice
mechanisms such as an ability to "walk away."63 The FTC also contem-
plated more active choice mechanisms, such as "requir[ing] consumer
interaction prior to processing the consumer's image."6 As a second
point of reference, the EU Article 29 Working Group report on facial
recognition from March 2012 explicitly requires opt-in, requiring "valid
consent . .. prior to acquisition" and notice constituting "sufficient in-
formation relating to when a camera is operating for the purpose of facial
recognition."6 5
This is not to suggest that the NTIA process must or even should ar-
rive at best practices in compliance with EU standards, or even identical
to FTC recommendations. The process of producing NTIA codes of con-
duct is different, and perhaps the goal is different as well. But it is nota-
ble that both with respect to mobile applications and with respect to faci-
al recognition, the NTIA's process arrived at notably lower standards of
consumer privacy protection than those recommended by the FTC.
Again, even those standards face a free rider problem: nobody appears to
have adopted them as a working code.
C. Drones
In February 2015, the President instructed the NTIA to convene dis-
cussions about privacy and drones.6 6 In May 2016, the NTIA announced
the completion of the process.67
61. Id.






65. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 02/2012 on Facial Recognition in
Online and Mobile Services, at 7 (Mar. 22, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wpl92_en.pdf.
66. See Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguard-
ing Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,





Drones, or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), pose similar but not
identical privacy concerns to facial recognition technologies. Again,
drones involve the surveillance of nonconsenting and often unknowing
individuals in physical spaces. Unlike facial recognition, however,
drones also enable surveillance from new and unexpected vantage points,
reducing the efficacy of physical barriers.68
Participation by civil society in the NTIA drone process was mark-
edly lower than the original level of participation in facial recognition
discussions. Many of the civil liberties groups that participated in and
withdrew from facial recognition discussions were largely absent from
the discussions on drones, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and CDD. 69 After the
best practices were completed and released in May 2016, the ACLU,
EFF, and Access Now released a letter criticizing the substance of the
final agreement, noting that the document does not represent "best prac-
tices."70 The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), by contrast,
issued a statement of support for the process and results.71
Conversations during the process were derailed on several occa-
sions with discussions of whether it was fair for the NTIA to single out
drones for technology-specific regulation-a valid policy point that was
nonetheless moot in light of the President's express Memorandum to the
NTIA to focus on drones. One group of stakeholders took it upon them-
selves to come up with a document listing the positive social benefits of
drones.72 Another meeting devoted significant time to discussing First
Amendment concerns with regulating drone newsgatherers and videog-
raphers.73 These concerns are legitimate, but were perhaps overstated in
67. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR UAS PRIVACY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY § 2(a) [hereinafter FINAL BEST PRACTICES],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/voluntarybestpracticesfor uasprivacytranspar
encyand accountability_0.pdf; see also Natasha Lomas, US Agency Issues Privacy Guidance for
Drone Operators, TECHCRUNCH (May 20, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/20/privacy-
guidance-for-drone-operators-issued-by-us-agency/.
68. See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113,
1148 (2015).
69. See Peterson, supra note 52.
70. Letter from Access Now et al., to John Morris, Assoc. Adm'r & Dir. of Internet Policy,
Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (May 24, 2016) [hereinafter Access Now Letter],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/aclu access now eff 5-
23_letter on_uasbestpractices.pdf.
71. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection at Heart of NTIA Best Practices for Drones, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 18, 2016) [hereinafter Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection],
https://cdt.org/press/privacy-and-civil-liberties-protections-at-heart-of-ntia-best-practices-for-
drones/.
72. NTIA Working Grp. on UAS: Positive Societal Benefits 1-8 (Nov. 19, 2015) (Nat'1 Tele-
comm. & Info. Admin., Working Draft), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2015-ll -
19_compilation of positive societal benefits -_ntia workinggrou.pdf.
73. Letter from Charles D. Tobin, Partner, Holland & Knight LLP, to Nat'l Telecomms. &
Info. Admin. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia best-practices -
11.17.2015_news media coalition.pdf.
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the context of attempts to develop voluntary industry privacy best prac-
tices rather than direct government regulation.
The group worked off of a Combined Draft74 containing elements
from an earlier draft proposed by civil liberties organization, the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT), and elements from an earlier
draft proposed by the law firm Hogan Lovells.76 The two proposals con-
verged on the basic structure of the issues, including provisions on no-
tice, collection, sharing, and data security policies. Both agreed, for ex-
ample, that best practices involve informing others about the use of
drones to gather data. Both agreed, as well, that best practices for
commercial drone use should entail avoiding the use of drones "for the
specific purpose of persistent and continuous collection of personal or
private data about specific individuals."78
The two proposals differed significantly, however, on important de-
tails. Some of the most marked differences between the two proposals
are as follows. One major difference concerned using drones to gather
data without consent. The CDT proposal suggested that in the absence of
a compelling need or informed consent, commercial UAS operators
should avoid using UAS "for the specific purpose of intentionally col-
lecting personal data . . . [w]here the operator knows the data subject has
a reasonable expectation of privacy."79 The Hogan Lovells proposal,
while suggesting that companies should as a general matter aim to mini-
mize data collection,80 allowed drones to be used to purposefully collect
personal data without consent. The final version adopted the CDT lan-
guage, but the final language includes a loophole for drone operators to
collect personal data without consent if they can demonstrate a "compel-
ling need" to do so. 82
Instead of addressing the gathering of information, the Hogan
Lovells proposal largely targeted misuse of the data collected. The draft
stated that personal data gathered without consent or not pursuant to a
contract should not be used "in an adverse manner" for employment,
74. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., UAS PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES (2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cdtuasbestpractices draftv2_111615_clean.pdf.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See HOGAN LOVELLS, PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY-VOLUNTARY
BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMERCIAL AND PRIVATE USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/bestpracticesdraftl 1_19_hoganlovells.pdf.
77. Id. at 4; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, supra note 74, at 4.
78. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, supra note 74, at 6; HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 76, at
4.
79. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 76, at 6.
80. HOGAN LOVELLS & CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR
COMMERCIAL AND PRIVATE USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2015) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/combined-draft workinggroup_12_22_2015.pdf.
81. Id. at 7 (noting that unlike the CDT proposal, the Hogan Lovell's proposal contains no
consent requirement).
82. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4.
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credit, or health care-related decisions.83 The Hogan Lovells draft envi-
sioned permitting other commercial uses of the data.4 The final version
of the best practices, while adopting more restrictions on gathering in-
formation than envisioned in the Hogan Lovells draft, mirrors the Hogan
Lovells draft in listing only several specific prohibited information uses,
such as determining employment eligibility or credit eligibility.85
A third significant difference involved the treatment of the airspace
above private property. The CDT proposal was adamant on this issue,
suggesting that UAS operators should make a reasonable effort (a) not to
enter private property or airspace without informed prior consent, and (b)
to minimize operations even in public airspace over private property
without informed prior consent.86 The Hogan Lovells draft took a differ-
ent approach. It suggested that drone operators should make a reasonable
effort to prevent drones that collect personal data from entering public
airspace over private property "if the UAS operation will substantially
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the property."87 This, it should be
noted, effectively just restates state nuisance law. The final version of the
best practices suggests that drone operators should make a reasonable
effort to minimize operations over or within private property without
consent or legal authority, but creates a significant loophole where such
flight impedes the purpose for which the UAS is used (which could be
anything) or conflicts with FAA guidelines.88
A fourth significant difference involves the use of drone-gathered
information for targeted marketing. While the Hogan Lovells proposal
suggested that Commercial UAS operators should avoid using or sharing
personal data for use in targeted marketing, they restrict that suggestion
to situations "[w]here the operator has actual knowledge that the data
subject has an expectation of privacy."89 In other words, when a drone
operator lacks actual knowledge of an expectation of privacy, it can use
personal data for use in targeted marketing. By contrast, the CDT version
suggested that UAS operators should make a reasonable effort to avoid
using or sharing personal data for marketing purposes, unless it has been
obfuscated or deidentified, or the data subject provides informed prior
consent to disclosure.9 The Hogan Lovells system envisioned a default
of allowing use of drone surveillance as an input for individually targeted
marketing; the CDT version envisioned a default of disallowing it, unless
the data subject consents or has been deidentified.
83. HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 76, at 7-8.
84. Id. at 9.
85. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5.
86. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 8.
87. Id
88. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 3.
89. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 10.
90. Id.
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The final best practices document echoes the CDT proposal, direct-
ing drone operators to make a reasonable effort to avoid sharing personal
data for marketing purposes without consent.91 However, the best prac-
tices expressly contemplate using drone-gathered data for marketing in
the aggregate. This leaves significant incentives in place for gathering
information about individuals, even if that information will later be re-
duced to statistical information.92
A fifth significant difference between the CDT and Hogan Lovells
proposals concerned the extent to which the subject of drone surveillance
can access, correct, or delete the gathered data. The Hogan Lovells pro-
posal suggested allowing data subjects "reasonable means to review"
gathered data, and that UAS operators should take reasonable measures
to maintain data accuracy.93 It did not, however, provide any mechanism
for individuals to request the deletion of data. The CDT proposal sug-
gested that if an individual requests that a UAS operator "correct, de-
stroy, obfuscate, or deidentify personal data about the individual," in the
absence of need for that data to "fulfill a purpose for which the UAS is
used," the UAS operator should honor this request.94 The final version
suggests only that UAS operators establish a process for receiving re-
quests to delete data, without committing to actual deletion.95
During the process, CDT drafted a document detailing the many ad-
ditional differences between the drafts.96 Largely, the differences boiled
down to the difference between envisioning drone use as just another
extension of online surveillance practices, versus distinguishing drone
use as different because it involves gathering information about noncon-
senting individuals in a wide variety of physical locations.
In May 2016, the process was finalized, and the NTIA released a fi-
nal version of the best practices.97 CDT pointed out the positives, noting
that the best practices restrict continuous collection of data about indi-
viduals, require drone operators to minimize both operations and surveil-
lance over private property, and encourage drone operators not o share
information for marketing purposes without consent.9 The ACLU, EFF,
and Access Now, by contrast, presented a strikingly different view. The-
se organizations critiqued the document for allowing drone operators to
collect private data without consent; allowing persistent, continuous ur-
91. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5.
92. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 8.
96. Memorandum from Harley Geiger, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to NTIA Unmanned
Aircraft Sys. Privacy Working Grp. (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/comparison of cdt hogan draft bestpracticesfor
drone privacy.pdf.
97. See FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67.
98. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection, supra note 71.
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veillance without consent, even in traditionally private spaces; and allow-
ing the use of the data for certain purposes without consent.99
The vastly differing readings of the document largely stem from
how skeptically one views the various and numerous potential loopholes
contained within it. If companies wish, they can read these loopholes
(such as exceptions for "compelling purposes," or requirements of just
"reasonable efforts") to largely obviate the good parts of these best prac-
tices. The proof will be in execution and adoption.
In April 2016, the Senate passed a version of FAA reauthorization
that would preempt state drone laws, including drone-specific privacy
laws, and would instruct Congress to build on the NTIA best practices
and recommendations in crafting federal legislation.1" The reactions of
the various civil liberties organizations discussed above, in conjunction
with the more general flaws of the process outlined here, suggest that
over-reliance on the NTIA's output to frame federal drone privacy policy
in the place of state laws would be ill-advised.
III. PLACING THE PROCESS IN THE LITERATURE: CO-REGULATION AND
PENALTY DEFAULTS
Given how laborious the NTIA process is, why is this administra-
tion engaging in it? The NTIA process is founded on the idea that, espe-
cially with regards to evolving technologies, industry is best informed
and best equipped to determine the best way to regulate itself. The gov-
ernment must figure out a way to involve industry in its own regulation;
otherwise, governance risks significant missteps due to lack of
knowledge, or overburdening particular technologies due to lack of ex-
pertise. In this section, I discuss some of the relevant academic literature
that encourages incorporating private expertise into governance, espe-
cially in the data governance space.'ot
If it is a good idea to involve industry in regulation, then why has
this particular method of involvement been relatively unsuccessful?
NTIA negotiations have set weak standards that industry largely has not
adopted, and face dwindling participation by groups on all sides. While
there are multiple potential criticisms of the NTIA process,' 02 the prob-
99. Access Now Letter, supra note 70.
100. Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2658, 114th Cong.
§§ 2104, 2142 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/billl 4th-congress/senate-bill/2658; see also
Malanie Zanona, Senate Send FAA Reauthorization to House, HILL (April 19, 2016, 12:46 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/276828-senate-sends-faa-reauthorization-to-house.
101. See generally Hirsch, supra note 11; Hirsch, supra note 10; Rubinstein, supra note 35;
Thaw, supra note 10.
102. For example, the NTIA subject matter has been technology- or at least sector-specific.
This irritates industry, which feel targeted in the absence of general data privacy law. Another possi-
ble criticism asks whether the NTIA is the right agency for this process. The DOC has a mission to
encourage economic growth. Critics have noted that this mission runs in conflict with consumer
protection, in this space. See Chester, supra note 39.
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lem largely reduces to the current structure of our federal data privacy
regime.
In the second part of this section, I briefly discuss the literature on
"penalty defaults" to provide needed context for the NTIA's struggles.
The idea of a penalty default is that the government can set a baseline
that spurs private parties to negotiate towards a better outcome.'o3 Schol-
ars largely employ this concept to discuss the regulatory backdrop neces-
sary to encourage more efficient private ordering.'" I propose that the
concept of penalty defaults, primarily used to discuss private contracting,
can be useful for discussions of co-regulation like that encountered here.
In the absence of a worse regulatory alternative-that is, enforceable
federal data privacy law-industry has little incentive to meaningfully
participate in the NTIA process.
A. Co-Regulation: Drawing on Industry Expertise
The White House has explained that its primary motive in involving
industry in the privacy space is to harness industry expertise in fast-
moving technological areas.105 The academic literature addressing co-
regulation, also known as collaborative governance, describes the poten-
tial benefits of this approach.1 6 Potential benefits of co-regulation in-
clude obtaining unique knowledge and expertise from industry members;
arriving at more realistic and cost-effective, workable, and innovative
results; creating a stronger sense of industry ownership over rules and
thus higher compliance; and creating more politically practicable and
lower-cost processes.1
While I by no means attempt here to cover the vast literature on col-
laborative governance, the work of three scholars writing about co-
regulation in the data governance space is particularly relevant to discus-
sions of the NTIA. Dennis Hirsch, responding to early versions of the
White House's safe harbor proposal, has studied co-regulation of data
protection in the Netherlands, where industry actors collaborate with the
Dutch government to set sector-specific codes.ios Hirsch noted both
103. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
104. See, e.g., Kristelia A. Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2014) (identifying "penalty default licenses" and penalty defaults in
general as a mechanism for inducing private ordering).
105. See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 466-68.
106. See Hirsch, supra note I1, at 88 ("[P]roponents of collaborative governance claim that it
can combine the flexibility of business savvy of industry self-regulation with the accountability and
public-spiritedness of government rules .... ); see also Hirsch, supra note 10, at 441 (noting that
co-regulation can provide the "flexibility of self-regulation while adding the supervision and rigor of
government rules"); Thaw, supra note 10, at 333 (noting the possibility to "increase both the repre-
sentative legitimacy and the efficacy of the regulatory process").
107. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 466-67 (citing Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26 (1997)); see also Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 379-80.
108. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 120-23.
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strengths and weaknesses in the system. 10 The strengths largely involved
obtaining information from industry that regulators otherwise would not
have accessed, and building productive relationships between industry
and regulators founded on mutual trust.1 10 I discuss the weaknesses fur-
ther below.
David Thaw, writing about the creation of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, similarly
touted the benefits of involving nongovernmental expertise in the setting
of cybersecurity standards, through an informal version of negotiated
rulemaking, also known as "reg neg" or "neg reg.""11 Thaw explained
that in the context of the HIPAA Security Rule, a committee of non-
governmental individuals came up with a rule that departed from its
members' individual interests and in fact served the public good.1 12 In-
dustry buy-in to the rule was high, as a consequence of the collaborative
process.113
Ira Rubinstein, writing more generally about the potential role of
co-regulation in U.S. privacy law, highlighted three examples of various
kinds of existing privacy co-regulation: (1) the Network Advertising
Initiative (NAI); (2) the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement; and (3) the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Safe Harbor.1 14 Ru-
binstein concluded that the COPPA Safe Harbor process produced the
best co-regulatory efforts of the three, covering substantive privacy re-
quirements while facing minimal free rider problems and invoking mean-
ingful government enforcement by the FTC.' 15 He noted, nonetheless,
that the COPPA process itself was not particularly successful, pointing to
too-strict statutory requirements as creating inadequate incentives for
industry to self-regulate.1 6
Co-regulation is not a panacea; there are clear potential downsides.
Potential costs include gaming of the system by industry using its infor-
mational advantage to obtain weaker rules; a reduction in the public's
opportunity to participate; capture; lack of enforcement; and deterring
new entrants through coordination by established firms. 1 7 Many of the
checks on co-regulation involve attempted checks on regulatory cap-
ture. 18 The failures of the NTIA process, however, are not a matter of
109. Id. at 151-55.
110. Id. at l54.
111. Thaw, supra note 10, at 353-55.
112. Id. at 364-65.
113. Id at 363.
114. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 384, 390, 394.
115. Id. at 397-98.
116. Id. at 398-99.
117. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 468 (citing NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS
AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104-05 (2002)).
118. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 152 (suggesting third party audits to increase compliance); id. at
153 (suggesting opening up the process to include additional stakeholders such as consumer or
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capture, or at least not in the traditional sense that a particular industry
controls the outcome of the process. The process is open and collabora-
tive, and the NTIA itself serves as a neutral convener rather than a vocal
party. Something else has gone awry. To understand what, I turn to a
second body of relevant literature: on penalty defaults.
B. Penalty Defaults: Getting Private Actors to the Table
The literature on penalty defaults arises in the context of contract
law.1 19 Penalty defaults are regulations that spur private parties to con-
tract by setting a default that neither party wants.1 20 Penalty defaults
should be used, the reasoning goes, to prompt information exchange be-
tween private parties and encourage private ordering that is more effi-
cient than what the government could devise.121 Thus the rationale for
penalty defaults is similar to the rationale for collaborative governance:
private parties are often better situated with respect to expertise and
knowledge about an area than the government. Both literatures address
attempts to draw private parties into the process of creating more effi-
cient arrangements.
Some discussion of regulatory defaults focuses on trying to set the
best default, based on the behavioral understanding that most people will
not opt out.122 But discussion of penalty defaults focuses instead on wel-
fare maximizing by setting an undesirable default, thus encouraging in-
formation flow and negotiations between private actors.123 Prospect theo-
ry posits that people make decisions based on potential gains and loss-
es.124 Setting a negative default thus pushes even risk-averse players to
engage in negotiations.
The literature on co-regulation or collaborative governance engages,
albeit not explicitly, with the idea of the necessity of penalty defaults.
Hirsch, Thaw, and Rubinstein all identify conditions necessary for priva-
cy co-regulation to succeed. Similarly, Philip Harter, the source of nego-
privacy advocacy groups, but recognizing that this may stall negotiations). Thaw refers to his ap-
proach as "enlightened regulatory capture," but his requirements nonetheless target capture con-
cems. Thaw, supra note 10, at 358-59, 371 (discussing FACA openness requirements and the re-
quirement that process include reduced-bias subject matter experts who are not subject to influence
as a function of their employment).
119. lan Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2044 (2012) (advocating using rules "to encourage contracting parties to choose the default or
non-default options that they jointly prefer").
120. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 103, at 91.
121. Id
122. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2003) ("What [people] choose is strongly influenced by details of the
context in which they make their choice, for example default rules.").
123. See Garcia, supra note 104, at 1131 ("This view focuses on selecting an unpalatable
default.. . . [C]ontracting entities [may] be encouraged to negotiate more efficient deal terms to
avoid an unpalatable default.").
124. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
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tiated rulemaking, listed the conditions necessary for that process to suc-
ceed. Looking to these conditions in conjunction with an understanding
of penalty defaults explains why the NTIA process is not working as the
White House desires.
One of Hirsch's recommendations to the United States, derived
from observation of the Dutch system, is to pass a baseline privacy stat-
ute. The United States should pass the statute "not only for the privacy
protections it will bring, but also to provide a structure for the industry
codes and to give companies a strong incentive to come to the table and
negotiate a code of conduct."1 25 Hirsch noted that one of the Dutch in-
dustries' main motivations for drafting codes of conduct "was that it al-
lowed them to clarify the Data Protection Act and achieve a degree of
regulatory certainty."l26 In other words, the Dutch Data Protection Act
served as a penalty default, creating bounded uncertainty that drove in-
dustry to the negotiating table.
Thaw similarly notes that during the HIPAA Security Rule negotia-
tions, the relevant committee believed "that if they failed to act, other
regulators or legislators would, and that would be a suboptimal out-
come."1 2 7 He lists this as one of his five characteristics of "enlightened
regulatory capture:" a perceived detriment to industry if the process
fails.128 Participants in co-regulation must believe, in other words, that
there will be negative and likely-to-occur consequences if they fail. 129
They must believe that there is a penalty default. Thaw points out that
negative consequences are the other side of the coin of one of Harter's
requirement for negotiated rulemaking: an opportunity for parties to
- 130gain.
Rubinstein calls for careful consideration of industry incentives in
creating baseline privacy legislation.'31 That legislation should include
both carrots and sticks, such as a tiered liability system or a threat of
stricter regulations.132 In fact, Rubinstein observes that "the covenanting
approach in the U.S. arises only when there is a credible threat of federal
privacy regulation and firms sit down with regulators to negotiate a code
of conduct in lieu of regulation."1 33 Self-regulation works best when in-
dustry faces potential or actual negative consequences in the alternative.
125. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 159.
126. Id.
127. Thaw, supra note 8, at 365.
128. Id at 371.
129. Id. at 372.
130. Id at 371; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1,
43 (1982).
131. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 415.
132. Id. at 416.
133. Id at 401.
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Industry actors may gain from co-regulation in a variety of ways.
The gains may be reputational or emotional. In Thaw's example, industry
actors considered service on the relevant committee to be a professional
honor.134 In the context of newer, developing technologies, however, the
"gain" will largely constitute avoiding a worse default. In the absence of
that default, industry actors are unlikely to buy in to the process of nego-
tiating codes of conduct.
IV. LESSONS FOR U.S. DATA PRIVACY LAW
The core concept of penalty defaults is fairly intuitive: people will
negotiate around settings they don't like. For productive co-regulation to
occur, the costs of the default must be higher than the costs of participat-
ing in co-regulation.13 5 This is a fairly intuitive observation, and one
clearly applicable to the failure of the NTIA's multistakeholder process.
The penalty default literature has given thought to the pros and cons
of different kinds of undesirable default settings. One idea might be to
set a punitive default that clearly favors one party over the other.3 6 This
approach, however, risks entrenching negotiating power in the favored
party.137 In the context of data privacy, this could occur in two ways: by
setting a punitive default heavily penalizing privacy violations, or by
setting a default of not penalizing privacy violations (close to the current
situation) thereby "punishing" those whose privacy is violated. Under the
former, privacy advocates and consumer groups would have little incen-
tive to negotiate alternative regimes. Under the latter, which is roughly
descriptive of current U.S. law, industry would have little incentive to
negotiate. Thus under the current U.S. regime, industry's negotiating
position is entrenched. But there are difficulties with setting federal pen-
alties. Swinging the pendulum too far in the other direction will not drive
co-regulation, and government decisions over setting the level of appro-
priate punishment face exactly the kinds of information problems that
collaborative governance seeks to remedy.
Another way to establish a penalty default, however, is to use uncer-
tainty to the government's advantage. This approach could be particular-
ly useful in privacy governance, which is rife with many types of uncer-
tainty. Technological innovation can perpetuate uncertainty.138 Potential
government intervention can introduce uncertainty.1 39 The implementa-
tion of standards, such as those proposed in the Consumer Privacy Bill of
134. Thaw, supra note 10, at 359.
135. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 373 (recognizing this assertion when discussing Coasean
bargaining, but not explicitly identifying it as a penalty default).
136. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1163.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1172.
139. Id.; see also Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 401 (discussing negotiations of privacy cove-
nants at the GNI under uncertainty).
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Rights Act, rather than specific rules, can introduce uncertainty as to
government interpretation.140
Uncertainty influences decisionmaking.141 The literature on penalty
defaults suggests that the government can actively use uncertainty to
nudge desirable decisionmaking. Regulators can use uncertainty, para-
doxically, to increase efficiency by nudging risk-averse private actors
into negotiations.142 There are several important caveats to this claim.
First, uncertainty must affect both parties-not necessarily equally, but
disproportionate uncertainty will reduce efficiency again by entrenching
the interests of one party.143 Second, uncertainty cannot just be general
uncertainty; it should be sufficiently bounded such that parties are moti-
vated to negotiate.144 Unbounded uncertainty often leads to inefficiency
and under-compliance.145 Bounded uncertainty-uncertainty of a rela-
tively small amount and defined kind-leads to negotiations, especially
when the uncertainty is likely to resolve into a penalty default.'1 Thaw's,
Hirsch's, and Rubinstein's examples all support bounded uncertainty as
an effective way of driving co-regulation in the privacy space.
What are the lessons for U.S. data privacy law? Coupled with evi-
dence from the NTIA negotiations thus far, this suggests that both the
current penalties and the current levels and kinds of uncertainty in the
U.S. privacy regime are not enough to drive industry to the table in effi-
ciency-maximizmig ways. In other words, what penalties there are in U.S.
privacy law are not high enough, or likely enough to be enforced against
a particular industry actor, to drive participation by most of the industry
actors with whom the government wants to co-regulate.
The NTIA process teaches that the current backdrop of potential
FTC enforcement is not enough to get industry to the table. Moreover,
the possibility of FTC enforcement of the codes of conduct themselves
140. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1173 (citing Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 605 (1992)).
141. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1518-19 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
142. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1169; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement o Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1035 (1995) (show-
ing "how ambiguity can induce bargainers to act more cooperatively").
143. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1169; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accre-
tion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (explaining how uncertainty in
copyright law combined with "risk aversion that pervades . . . copyright industries" results in unnec-
essary and thus inefficient licensing); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain
Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986).
144. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1132-33 (explaining that "bounded" uncertainty in the statutory
license context in copyright includes knowing that the penalty default will at some point exist, and
knowing the form in which it will eventually exist).
145. Id. at 1176.
146. Id at 1177 (describing "the efficiency-enhancing effects of bounded uncertainty coupled
with an unpalatable fallback").
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actually drives industry to view both the negotiation and adoption of
codes of conduct as leading to more likely enforcement by the FTC. The
current system is precisely backwards: industry views the NTIA codes of
conduct as potentially creating a penalty, not avoiding one. This in-
creased possibility of FTC enforcement discourages industry f om adopt-
ing codes of conduct once they have been created, exacerbating the free
rider problem. And it discourages industry from even negotiating, out of
fear that completed codes might be viewed as actual industry standards
by the FTC, driving FTC enforcement even without explicit adoption of
the codes by particular players.
The faults in the NTIA process further teach that the current state of
unbounded uncertainty over whether Congress might enact federal data
privacy law is not enough, by itself, to drive industry actors to the nego-
tiating table.147 The absence of data privacy legislation certainly leads to
regulatory uncertainty. As John Morris, associate administrator and di-
rector of Internet policy at the NTIA, expressed: "We're trying to work
on facial recognition without legislation.. . . Consumers and companies
need to know what the rules are for this technology and we think stop-
ping the discussion at this point doesn't get clarity that's needed."1 48 But
the failure of the NTIA process shows that the current lack of regulatory
certainty is by itself not enough to drive effective information disclosure
and negotiations.
The failure of the NTIA process, viewed through the lens of penalty
default literature, suggests that a voluntary multistakeholder technique
that has been shown to work in the technical standard space is not appro-
priate when applied to privacy. 149 Thaw argues, in the cybersecurity con-
text, that there is nothing particularly special about technical standards,
since the purpose of administrative law generally is to hone government
expertise and harness private xpertise.o5 0 He does suggest, however, that
the linked nature of industry interests in the cybersecurity space-the
fact that one player's failure will have negative externalities for other
players-incentivizes players to come to the table to self-regulate.1 5 ' The
lens of penalty defaults suggests that in some technologically complex
subject matter areas, a lack of coordination between actors may itself
serve as a penalty default, preventing interoperability or leaving room for
the types of negative externalities Thaw discusses. In data privacy nego-
tiations, by contrast, the players tend not to come into the room seeking
147. Contra id at 1180 (describing uncertainty over federal copyright lawmaking as driving
private ordering in that space).
148. Peterson, supra note 52.
149. Thanks to Dennis Hirsch for this observation. Compare the NTIA stakeholder process to
W3C.
150. Thaw, supra note 10, at 369 ("The idea that a highly technical subject would distinguish
cybersecurity regulation from other regulation overlooks one of the core purposes of administrative
agencies.").
151. Id. at 368.
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consensus, and the subject matter of privacy, at least for now, produces
no natural penalty for failure negotiate.152
To drive productive co-regulation in this space, the U.S. privacy re-
gime must increase penalties, and-or shift from unbounded to bounded
uncertainty. This could be accomplished through the enactment of some-
thing like the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, which describes data
practices in broad standards, backed by FTC enforcement. The Act pro-
poses creating, in other words, a penalty default with more bounded un-
certainty over what, exactly, the standards require. For that system to
work, however, FTC enforcement will have to occur at a high enough
probability, and with high enough penalties, to drive actors to meaning-
fully negotiate more efficient alternatives.15 3 The political will for this
type of legislation does not appear high; perhaps, however, pressure from
the EU over data privacy may spur Congress to more seriously consider
it.154
Federal data privacy legislation that establishes a penalty default us-
ing bounded uncertainty is likely to be the best option for driving the
kind of privacy co-regulation that our government envisions. As we wait
for federal legislation, however, there may be other ways to presently
improve the NTIA process. First, Congress could propose sector-specific
legislation, creating the pending threat of regulation even if it does not
intend to enact it, more obviously bounding the uncertainty under which
the NTIA negotiations happen. Pending legislation has led to industry
self-regulation in the past.155 Second, the NTIA could play an infor-
mation-gathering function in which it highlights for participants the other
regulatory options on the table, including costly state-by-state regulation,
and any Congressional proposals.
Third, the FTC could more visibly play the hammer, or the penalty
default, targeting precisely those industries in which the NTIA wants to
drive negotiations, to provide an unpalatable backstop. The FTC could
either enforce in spaces where NTIA negotiations have failed, or enforce
in spaces before NTIA negotiations really commence. This approach
would better work for more established industries, however, since FTC
regulation in a very new area risks being unattached to industry stand-
ards. The paradox is that if an industry is particularly new, there won't
yet be industry standards for the FTC to enforce. Hence, the FTC may be
152. Harter describes, as a condition for reg neg regulatory negotiations, that parties cannot
come into negotiations with fundamentally opposing values. Harter, supra note 130, at 19.
153. This Article leaves aside, for the moment, discussion of what level of both auditing and
enforcement would ensure the efficacy of those privately negotiated safe harbors.
154. See Aaron Souppouris, The EU-US Privacy Shield Is up, But It's Future Is in Doubt,
ENGADGET (July 12, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-data-
protection/; see also Klint Finley, Privacy Shield Will Let U.S. Tech Giants Grab Europeans' Data,
WIRED (July 12, 2016, 7:03 PM).
155. See Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 401 (describing the GNI covenanting process as occur-
ring in the shadow of proposed regulation).
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ill-equipped to create the penalty default against which the NTIA can
encourage negotiations in these new technological spaces.
So perhaps the bigger lesson is that the NTIA process is, under cur-
rent U.S. privacy law, particularly unsuited to exactly the task to which it
has been assigned: to drive negotiations by private actors and stakehold-
ers in emerging industries, before other government entities are equipped
to contemplate regulations. The NTIA process, paradoxically, may be
better suited to application in areas where the FTC or states have already
created enforcement mechanisms. Its information-drawing and negotia-
tion-driving functions, given the current lack of U.S. federal data privacy
law, are limited. For the NTIA process to work as contemplated-for it
to effectively pull both information and expertise from private actors-
the United States must establish an effective privacy penalty default.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of federal data privacy law, the White House has
employed the NTIA to engage in a version of co-regulation of privacy in
three nascent sectors. That process has largely failed. The government's
motives of wanting to involve private expertise in the process are sound;
the regulatory backdrop to the process, however, is ineffective. If the
United States wants to engage in co-regulation in data governance, we
must create a penalty default that makes it more palatable for private
actors to engage in this type of co-regulation. Among the many reasons
for enacting federal data privacy law, I here add another: well-crafted
federal data privacy law may be essential for exactly the kind of co-
regulation that our government envisions. In the meantime, reliance on
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In this Article I argue that intellectual property (IP) exhaustion
should be understood against the backdrop of a long history of skepti-
cism toward what I call "remote-control" property rights. IP is not the
only field of law that gives remote rights-holders the ability to constrain
the behavior of other people to use things in their rightful possession.
Tangible property law-in particular the law of servitudes-features
similar mechanisms, but hems them in with doctrinal limitations. Look-
ing to this body of law helps us more clearly to recognize remote-control
property's benefits and costs and, thus, to articulate a rationale for IP
exhaustion as a limitation on remote-control IP. At the same time, re-
mote-control IP is special. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity
and invention have implications for the promotion of progress of science
and the useful arts. It is especially important that such restrictions not be
ratcheted up solely at the whim of IP owners attaching labels to embodi-
ments of their works. Nor should such restrictions be left solely to gener-
ally applicable commercial law without regard to IP's special policy con-
cerns. Instead, courts and Congress should continue to absorb the wis-
dom of the common law of tangible property while crafting an IP-
specific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the specific costs and bene-
fits of remote-control IP.
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean for J.D. Curriculum and Teaching, University of
California, Berkeley. Thanks to participants in the Denver Law Review symposium on Future World
IP: Legal Responses to the Tech Revolution, and especially to the student organizers.
Parts of this Article are adapted from and build upon my other work on related topics. See
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Exhaustion and Personal Property Servitudes, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS (Irene Calboli &
Edward Lee eds., 2016); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J.
885 (2008); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Com-
mons, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Con-
cerning Copyright, Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment,
Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1063 (2011); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Technology and Trac-
ing Costs: Lessons from Real Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 385
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); Molly S. Van Houweling, Disciplining the Dead Hand of
Copyright: Durational Limits on Remote Control Property, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2016).
This Article may be reproduced under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International (CC BY 4.0) license, with attribution to me as the author and to the original publication





INTRODUCTION .................................... .......... 952
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY ............. 954
A. The Evolution ofLand Servitudes ...................... 956
B. Notice and Information Costs ................................ 957
C. The Problem of the Future .................. ........ 959
D. Externalities .................................... 962
E. Personal Property Servitudes .................. ...... 964
II. SERVITUDES AND THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY EXHAUSTION .............................. ....... 967
III. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES ..................... ........... 970
CONCLUSION ..................................................... 974
INTRODUCTION
The law of intellectual property (IP) exhaustion is rightly informed
by a long history of skepticism toward what I call "remote-control prop-
erty rights." Property rights that give owners the ability to control how
other people use assets in their rightful possession are potentially confus-
ing, subject to obsolescence, and sometimes burdensome to third parties.
In some cases, these costs can be mitigated in ways that make remote-
control property rights beneficial on balance. The evolution of the law of
land servitudes-which can be very useful tools for long term land-use
planning-demonstrates this possibility. By contrast, longstanding judi-
cial hostility toward personal property servitudes suggests that remote
control is not always reasonable.
So what about remote-control IP? The entire logic of this field of
law is based on the notion that remote-control property rights can be
worthwhile. Every copyright and patent gives its owner some ability to
control the use of objects possessed by other people. It prevents posses-
sors of books from reproducing their pages, for example. The theory of
IP is that the advantages of this control, in the form of incentives for au-
thorship and invention that promote progress, outweigh the disad-
vantages. But IP rights are limited. And one of those limitations, the doc-
trine of exhaustion, operates to constrain the reach of an IP owner's re-
mote control over other people's tangible property.
Generally speaking, exhaustion allows owners of tangible objects
embodying IP to use those objects in ways that do not produce additional
copies or new works; owners may also transfer the objects they own to
others. These activities can benefit tangible property owners, and the
property system as a whole, without cutting to the core of IP owners'
need to limit ruinous competition. IP exhaustion can thus be understood
to maintain IP's balance between remote-control property's benefits and
costs.
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This balance is often described as one between the rights of IP own-
ers and the personal property rights of the owners of tangible things. The
purpose of exhaustion, on this view, is to ensure that IP owners' rights do
not unduly interfere with the freedom from remote control that owners of
personal property would have in the absence of IP. A variation of this
view holds that exhaustion defines the "statutory domain" of IP, ensuring
that this specialized statutory body of law does not interfere unnecessari-
ly with generally applicable commercial law.' Proponents of both of the-
se views typically suggest that owners of objects embodying IP (e.g.,
books) should be treated, to the greatest extent possible, the same as
owners of objects that do not embody IP (e.g., doorstops).
Here I begin to articulate a third view: exhaustion does not merely
ensure that owners of books have most of the same rights as owners of
doorstops. In some important cases, it should ensure that owners of
books have more rights than owners of doorstops. The premise of IP is
that books are more important than doorstops. It is thus more important
that they be used instead of wasted, preserved instead of destroyed, read
with autonomy instead of surveilled, and built upon instead of ignored.
Although my focus here will be on copyright, much the same is true for
objects embodying patented inventions. In both cases, IP exhaustion can
be deployed to give owners of these special objects immunity from the
kind of remote control that would constrain the objects' use and diminish
their value.
I start with an abridged history of the law and policy of servitudes,
explaining how these forms of remote-control property have been some-
what reluctantly enforced when applied to land and largely resisted when
applied to chattels. This section explains how concerns about notice and
information costs, "dead-hand control," and the "problem of the future,"
and negative externalities have shaped this evolving body of law. It then
explains the historical, doctrinal, and theoretical links between resistance
to chattel servitudes and intellectual property exhaustion. Next it reviews
several recent strands of scholarship. One strand claims that resistance to
chattel servitudes was ill-considered in its heyday and is anachronistic
today, and that exhaustion should be revisited in light of this critique.
The second strand of scholarship claims that resistance to chattel servi-
tudes reflected legitimate policy concerns that should continue to shape
exhaustion doctrine today, and even that exhaustion itself is an evolving
common law doctrine. The third, most recent strand argues that exhaus-
tion does not reflect a common law tradition at all but is rather an inde-
pendent doctrine defined and influenced only by the IP statutes them-
selves. I conclude with my own arguments about the continued relevance
of the policy lessons of personal property servitudes to the future of ex-
1. John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellec-
tual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2016).
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haustion, and about how exhaustion might transcend its common law
origins, leading courts to resist remote control over books even if they
enforce remote control over doorstops.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY
Start by considering a classic passage from Justice Holmes's 1908
concurrence in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,2 in
which he considers that nature of copyright as a property right:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed possession
of a tangible object, and consists in the right to exclude others from
interference with the more or less free doing with it as one wills. But
in copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The
right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned,
but is in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where,
but for it, there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as
they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or
tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand
miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the
wrong. It is a right which could not be recognized or endured for
more than a limited time and therefore, I may remark, in passing, it is
one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as
the authorities now agree.3
In drawing the contrast between copyright and paradigmatic posses-
sory property rights in tangible objects, Justice Holmes emphasizes the
non-possessory, "in vacuo" nature of copyright.4 Copyright owners can
control strangers from afar, unconnected to any object possessed by the
copyright owner. Copyright owners are thus unlike owners of possessory
fee simple interests in land, whose rights to exclude generally impact the
limited universe of people who come into contact with the physical
boundaries of the owner's parcel.
Justice Holmes alludes to another apparent copyright anomaly: alt-
hough copyright owners are not necessarily possessors, the people whose
spontaneity is restrained by copyright are typically in possession of tan-
gible objects-books, sheet music, or other manifestations of the copy-
righted work.5 As to these tangible objects, copyright operates not as an
instrument of freedom from interference for the possessor, but rather the
opposite: an instrument of restraint wielded by strangers-copyright
owners-via remote control. Copyright thus strikes Justice Holmes as an
odd sort of property right in that instead of liberating people to use their
2. 209 U.S. 1 (1908), superseded by statute, Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90
Stat. 2541, 2541-42 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
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possessions "[i]t restrains [their] spontaneity . . . where, but for it, there
would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit." 6
Copyright owners' power to control how remote strangers use ob-
jects in their possession is not as extraordinary as this passage suggests,
however. Of course copyright shares this characteristic with patent and
trademark. Beyond IP, copyrights are similar in this regard to a whole set
of remote-control property interests that give their owners the right to
control use of assets possessed by other people.7 Servitudes are the most
prominent example.
A servitude, which can take the form of an easement, real covenant,
or equitable servitude, is a non-possessory property interest that gives
its holder the right to use an asset-typically land-in specified ways, or
to object to specified uses of it, or to insist on specified behavior con-
nected to it. The asset is encumbered by the servitude, such that the ser-
vitude's burdens "run[] with" the asset, "pass[ing] automatically to suc-
cessive owners or occupiers."9 Unlike a mere contractual agreement to
refrain from operating a gas station in a residential neighborhood, for
example, a servitude is enforceable against successors in interest.i0
Therefore, if you grant your neighbor an effective servitude, she will be
able to enforce the restriction against you and subsequent owners of your
land. The benefit of a servitude connected to land typically runs to suc-
cessors as well-from your neighbor to the next owner of her house." As
Carol Rose puts it, "[t]he greatest overall advantage of servitudes is that
they give stability to property arrangements over both time and space."'2
The stability that servitudes produce can be especially valuable for
land-use planning. Land is, of course, immobile and enduring. It is often
important for people who invest in land to be able to predict how sur-
rounding land will be used far into the future in order to make invest-
ments that will coordinate rather than conflict, with adjacent activities.13
6. Id.
7. See generally Gerald Komgold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property
Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REv. 533 passim (1988).
8. The Restatement simplifies this traditional three-part classification into two: affirmative
easements and covenants running with the land (the latter category including servitudes that had
traditionally been classified as negative easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1.1-14 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
9. Id § 1.1(1)(a).
10. Id. §5.1.
11. Id
12. Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 296-97 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
13. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 407 (2002)
("[T]he spatial fixity of individual parcels of real property causes the value of those parcels to be
necessarily dependent on the uses made of neighboring parcels."); Henry Hansmann & Marina
Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 101 (1997) (noting "the potentially large advantages in coordinating the uses of
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In recognition of these benefits, courts have long enforced land ser-
vitudes and some other varieties of remote-control property rights. None-
theless, Justice Holmes's contention that property rights with such fea-
tures could only be the product of statute rings somewhat true. Judges
have greeted most non-possessory property rights with suspicion and
hemmed them in with doctrinal limitations.14 Reviewing some of this
history and doctrine can help us to understand the challenges posed by
intellectual property law's remote-control property rights, as well as the
origins of the exhaustion doctrine as a limitation on that remote-control.
A. The Evolution ofLand Servitudes
The land-use planning needs of the Industrial Revolution triggered
the development of modem Anglo-American servitude law.'5 Increased
urban density and the potential for conflicts between neighboring proper-
ty owners prompted a variety of attempts to coordinate land uses through
durable private arrangements.'6 Nineteenth century English courts react-
ed with ambivalence, however, establishing a complicated scheme of
servitude classifications and accompanying doctrinal limitations.17
Servitudes came to be classified into the three major categories of
easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, with each category
subject to convoluted rules limiting formation, subject matter, and en-
forceability.'8 As I describe in prior work,' 9 tracing the evolution of
modem servitude law reveals several rationales for this type of hostility
and the limiting doctrines that it produced. I have organized these ration-
ales into three broad categories: those related to notice and information
costs; those related to dead-hand control and other aspects of the "prob-
lem of the future";20 and those related to harmful externalities.21
parcels of property that are, by their nature, bound in a spatial relationship to each other regardless of
their separate ownership").
14. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 891-
924 (2008) (documenting pervasive skepticism).
15. Easements existed in Roman law and running covenants were recognized as early as
Spencer's Case, (1583 KB) 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, in 1583, but "[u]ntil the Industrial Revolu-
tion greatly increased the use of servitudes, the common law did not develop a general theory of
easements or servitudes." Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of
Property Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1988); see also Uriel Reichman, Toward a
Unified Concept ofServitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (1982).
16. See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 262 (2d ed. 1986); French,
supra note 15, at 1214; James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1, 13.
17. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 891-905.
18. See generally Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1982) (reviewing the rules governing the three types of
servitudes).
19. See the introductory note for a list of my previous scholarship.
20. 1 borrow this useful terminology from Julia Mahoney. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Re-
strictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
21. Carol Rose offers a similar but not identical categorization identifying the concerns as
involving information or notice, renegotiability, and value (including third party effects). Rose,
supra note 12, at 298-305.
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B. Notice and Information Costs
Servitudes, like other remote-control property rights, raise special
concerns about notice and information costs. Consider the counter-
factual: if the person in possession of land necessarily had all rights to
control its use, then it would be easy for someone else acquiring posses-
sion from that person to understand exactly what they were getting.22
Where, by contrast, the law recognizes servitudes that allow one person
to own and possess the land while someone else has the right to control
its use, the newcomer who acquires possession does not automatically
know what use rights he has acquired. If servitudes could be imposed to
benefit strangers without any doctrines promoting or requiring notice to
people acquiring the burdened land, then transfers of possession would
be plagued by confusion and/or costly investigation to discover hidden
encumbrances. In Keppell v. Bailey,23 one of the seminal nineteenth cen
24tury English servitude cases, Lord Brougham famously expressed his
concern about this possibility.
[G]reat detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties
were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real
property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar
character, which should follow them into all hands, however emote.
Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in a several fashion;
and it would hardly be possible to know what rights the acquisition
of any parcel conferred, or what obligations it imposed.25
This kind of hostility toward the rude surprise of remote-control
property runs throughout the law and scholarship on servitudes. Courts
and commentators agree that servitudes should not generally bind pur-
chasers who acquire land with no notice of the encumbrance and no rea-
sonable opportunity to acquire notice.
The importance of notice is, accordingly, often identified as a ra-
26tionale for the common law's limitations on servitudes. For example,
the "touch and concern" doctrine requires that servitudes have some con-
nection to the land that hey burden, and, typically, to a neighboring ben-
efited parcel. The doctrine thus helps to ensure that servitudes will be
relatively easy to discover upon physical inspection, and that the owner
22. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 384-85 (describing "the rule of
possession" and observing that "[t]he advantages of this system are obvious. It is easy to understand,
cheap to administer, and generally unambiguous").
23. Keppell v. Bailey (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042.
24. See Rose, supra note 12, at 298 & n.7 (citing Keppell as an example of "nineteenth centu-
ry judges sharply criticiz[ing servitudes] for stirring confusion about and tying up real estate").
25. Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049. Keppell was superseded to some extent by the landmark
case of Tulk v. Moxhay discussed below. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143.
26. See, e.g., French, supra note 15, at 1283-86; see also Rose, supra note 12, at 299.
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of the beneficial interest will be relatively easy to identify and locate.27
By limiting the subject matter of servitudes, the doctrine also shapes and
reinforces expectations in a way that limits surprise.28 In their influential
work explaining the role of property standardization in limiting infor-
mation costs, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith point to the touch and
concern requirement as an example of a doctrinal technique that stand-
ardizes servitudes and limits the information costs they impose.29
Other doctrines that emerged from the seminal nineteenth century
English servitudes case law, including the requirements of appurtenance
and horizontal privity, similarly limited servitudes to those that were
relatively easy to discover.30 When the landmark decision of Tulk v.
Moxhay eliminated the horizontal privity requirement for equitable
servitudes, it did so only in cases in which there was actual notice.32
Recording acts, which provide for public recording of interests in
land and protect bona fide purchasers from some unrecorded encum-
brances, represent another notice-facilitating mechanism.33 There was no
comprehensive recording system in England when the seminal nineteenth
century servitude cases were decided.34 There were, however, recording
systems in every U.S. state.35 One might, therefore, have expected courts
in the United States to take a more accommodating and less convoluted
approach to servitudes. To the contrary, they initially adopted the English
categories and many of the corresponding doctrinal limitations. Most of
the limitations made their way into the first Restatement of Property3 6 in
1944 and subsequent case law, despite fierce opposition by those who
saw them as anachronistic solutions to a notice problem that no longer
existed in the United States, if it ever did.37
Criticism of the law's complexity and needless hostility toward cer-
tain types of servitudes persisted. Over the course of the twentieth centu-
27. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 402 ("Servitudes that meet this
[touch and concern] requirement are much easier to verify by physical inspection of the property and
its surroundings . . . .").
28. See generally French, supra note 18, at 1290.
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i  the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2000).
30. See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 299-301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 893-95.
31. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 775.
32. Id. at 1144 ("[T]he question is ... whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a
manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he pur-
chased.").
33. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Land Recording and Copyright Reform, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1497, 1502-03 (2013).
34. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 888 (8th ed. 2014).
35. Id.
36. RESTATEMENT OF PROP. (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
37. Regarding horizontal privity, see CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 117 (2d ed. 1947). See also Lawrence Berger, A
Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 193-95 (1970). On
the persistence of limitations in U.S. servitude law "notwithstanding persistent criticism from the
academic community," see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 16-17.
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ry, courts in the United States gradually relaxed some of the most con-
troversial limitations.38 This evolution was reflected, and perhaps out-
paced, by the 2000 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, which
abandoned the horizontal privity requirement, "touch and concern," and
all limitations on benefits held in gross.39 Restatement Reporter Susan
French explained in advance of the project that alternative mechanisms
for providing notice justified eliminating unnecessary rules: "Servitudes
law may be simplified substantially because particular rules designed to
give notice are no longer needed. The modern technology of record sys-
tems and title search procedures, together with the protection recording
acts afford, have made these rules superfluous."
This evolution of servitude doctrine demonstrates, first, that remote-
control property comes with special notice and information costs; and,
second, that those costs can be addressed with a number of different
mechanisms. Subject matter limitations like touch and concern are one
mechanism, actual notice requirements as in Tulk are another, and re-
cording systems are a third. As we will see when we turn to personal
property, the comparative availability of these mechanisms differs across
the types of resources that might be burdened by remote-control property
rights, and so does the intensity of concerns about notice and information
cost problems.
C. The Problem of the Future
Assuring adequate and meaningful notice and minimizing infor-
mation costs are not the only justifications for standardizing property
rights and restricting servitudes. There is another constellation of con-
cerns for which I have borrowed Julia Mahoney's useful term: "the prob-
lem of the future."41 Within this constellation, I include a number of re-
lated issues regarding the extent to which enforcement of servitudes un-
desirably limits the freedom of future generations to manage resources
38. See Rose, supra note 12, at 301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 906, 908.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.4, 2.6, 3.2, ch. 2, intro. note, ch. 3,
intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
40. French, supra note 15, at 1225; see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of
Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (1982) ("[Wlith notice secured by
recordation, freedom of contract should control."); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407
("[T]he registries developed for verifying ownership of land . .. [avoid] many of the additional
system and nonuser costs that effective verification of these rights would otherwise require."); Mer-
rill & Smith, supra note 29, at 40 ("[R]ecording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice [and are] an
alternative method of lowering information costs."). On recording acts generally, see RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01 (2005) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc. 2015). On marketable title acts, see id. § 82.04.
41. Mahoney, supra note 20; see also Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servi-
tudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2523 (2006); cf Merrill & Smith,
supra note 29, at 4-7 (surveying the literature and observing that "[t]he primary candidate for an
economic explanation [of the numerus clausus principle] has been the suggestion that the numerus
clausus is a device for minimizing the effects of durable property interests on those dealing with
assets in the future").
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wisely and autonomously.42 The theme is excessive control by one gen-
eration over the freedom and flexibility of the next. The specific con-
cerns are that excessive control will limit autonomy and recreate feudal
incidents, impose inefficient land-use choices, and threaten freedom of
alienation. These problems arise not only from manipulation of property
rights by an earlier generation but also from the transaction costs that
make that manipulation difficult to undo. In her classification of con-
cerns about servitudes, Carol Rose groups many of the same problems
under the heading "renegotiability.A3
One feature of servitudes that contributes to these concerns about
the future is the aforementioned remoteness between burdened and bene-
fited parties who may be complete strangers, a remoteness that can con-
tribute to the difficulty of renegotiating an obsolete servitude. Another
important servitude feature that underlies the problem of the future is
durability. Unlike a living party to a contract, a parcel of land that carries
its terms with it can interact with generations of people over time, in-
creasing the likelihood that unforeseen circumstances will render those
terms obsolete." The problem of the future is further compounded when
a servitude arises in a context of rapid and unpredictable change, making
unforeseen obsolescence especially likely.45
Concerns about the problem of the future resonate with the larger
jurisprudence and literature on dead-hand control- in the law of property.
A classic statement on dead-hand control comes from Lewis Simes, who
argued in his lectures on Public Policy and the Dead Hand that "[i]t is
socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living
members and not by the dead."" Simes went on to quote Thomas Jeffer-
son, who insisted in a letter to James Madison that "[t]he earth belongs
always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what pro-
ceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct."47
This preference for the living over the dead is often justified in
terms of autonomy and contrasted with feudal serfdom.4 According to
42. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 112-19 (1993) (discussing
ways in which restraints on alienation and servitudes may "enhance[] or inhibit[] freedom or person-
hood systematically and over time").
43. Rose, supra note 12, at 301-03.
44. See Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
958-59 (1988); see also Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1489 (2004) ("A restriction on the use (or sale) of Blackacre can limit the use of a valuable resource
for a very long time.").
45. Cf Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion ofPerpetuity and the Preservation ofPrivately Owned
Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573, 583-84 (2004).
46. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955).
47. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)).
48. As Uriel Reichman puts it in his discussion of servitudes, "Private property is sanctioned
by society not only to promote efficiency, but also to safeguard individual freedom. Servitudes are a
kind of private legislation affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such 'legislative pow-
ers' . . . eliminates the possibility of creating modem variations of feudal serfdom." Reichman, supra
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this view, controlling people who are distant in time and space-not fam-
ily members or contractual privies-is a power associated with govern-
ment or with undesirable feudal hierarchy. Such control should not be
unilaterally imposed by private parties merely on the basis of their prop-
erty ownership and informed only by their "whim and caprice."4 9
The concern with dead-hand control is also often discussed in utili-
tarian terms: the land-use choices of previous generations may turn out to
be inefficient ones in light of changed circumstances.50 The mechanism
by which dead-hand control limits autonomy or efficiency requires fur-
ther explanation where voluntary termination of servitudes is allowed by
law-as it typically, but not always, is.51 The potential problem is that
transaction costs may block a negotiated solution, even when all affected
parties would, in theory, agree to extinguish the unwanted servitude. The
current holders of the servitude's beneficial interest may be difficult to
identify and locate, and they may be so numerous as to make contact and.
negotiation infeasible. Defenders of limitations on servitudes often point
to this specter of transaction-cost-insulated servitudes as a justification
for policies that either constrain the subject matter of servitudes or enable
judges to terminate the detrimental ones.52
Inefficient but transaction-cost-insulated servitudes represent a spe-
cies of the anti-commons problem described by Michael Heller with re-
gard to fragmentation of property interests more generally. Servitudes
divide rights in a single parcel of land among multiple owners. If it is
later desirable to consolidate those rights in order to put the resource to.
its best use, fragmentation of the property bundle, and the transaction
costs involved in re-bundling, can make consolidation difficult. Heller
cites restrictions on servitudes among "numerous restraints [that] limit an
individual's capacity to break up property bundles too much."54
note 15, at 1233. For a skeptical view, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1258 (1985). See also Gregory S. Alexan-
der, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law ofServitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 890-92 (1988).
49. Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1982).
50. Mahoney, supra note 20, at 744; see also Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 433, 457 (1984) ("The market response of a future property owner to the future needs of socie-
ty is likely to be more effective than a past owner's fixed blueprint.").
51. In some states, statutes make it difficult to terminate a conservation easement even if the
easement holder agrees. But usually conservation easements, like other types of servitudes, can be
voluntarily extinguished by negotiation with the holder of the non-possessory interest. See generally
ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 195-
96 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1233.
53. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, I11 HARV. L. REv. 621, 660-67 (1998).
54. Id. at 664. See generally Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of
Property Rights: A Functional Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS
1, 18-23 (2003); Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 626-29 (2002).
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Heller's concern with fragmentation offers an interesting way to
think about the classic but under-theorized concern with restraints on
alienation, which is also often cited as a rationale for limiting servi-
tudes.55 Many legal mechanisms that are criticized for restraining aliena-
tion do not, in fact, directly restrain transfer. They merely limit the rights
that can be acquired from any single owner. So a subsequent user who
wants to reassemble property rights into a useful bundle must tackle the
transaction costs involved in multiple negotiations. Often the problem is
not so much restraint on alienation as restraint on acquisition: every indi-
vidual stick in the property can be sold; the difficulty is in buying a bun-
dle that is useful to own.
These various concerns associated with the problem of the future
have long motivated common-law restrictions on servitudes.56 And con-
temporary property theorists point to them to justify a variety of doc-
trines that serve to standardize and consolidate property rights.57
As with the problem of notice, however, multiple mechanisms could
be employed to address the problem of the future. The view adopted by
the current Restatement is that concerns with the future are best ad-
dressed in the future by marketable title acts and by doctrines that allow
judicial modification or termination of obsolete servitudes instead of
through doctrines that limit servitude subject matter ex ante." The Re-
statement uses the availability of these alternative approaches to justify
discarding the common law rules, like touch and concern, that addressed
the problem of the future indirectly.59
Although the mechanisms used to address the issue have shifted
over time, it is clear that the problem of the future is a recurring justifica-
tion for servitude skepticism. As with the problems of notice and infor-
mation costs, it is a problem that is endemic to durable remote-control
property rights but one that can be alleviated using a variety of doctrinal
techniques.
D. Externalities
A final set of problems often associated with servitudes involves
their impact on third parties. Restrictions that run with land can impose
55. On the role of restraints on alienation as a rationale for the law's general tendency to
standardize property rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 24. Merrill and Smith also note
the connection to fragmentation, arguing that the theory that the numerus clausus is "a doctrine
designed to prevent undue restraints on alienation ... implicitly rests on concern about fragmenta-
tion." Id. at 52.
56. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 904.
57. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1232-33.
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significant and harmful externalities.0 Both the problem of the future
and the problem of notice can be understood, at least in part, as externali-
ty problems. Inadequate or costly information about the nature of proper-
ty rights in a specific parcel of land can produce confusion about proper-
ty rights more generally. When one landowner's parcel is burdened by a
strange and confusing covenant, the rest of the neighborhood's residents
may become concerned and confused about the nature of their own
rights. They bear an information-cost externality, to use Merrill and
Smith's terminology.6 1 Similarly, the costs imposed by servitudes that
will burden future generations in unpredictable ways may not be ac-
counted for in today's land transactions.
There are additional categories of externalities that have generated
servitude skepticism. A servitude that prohibits land from being used in a
way that subjects a neighboring business to competition, for example,
may harm third-party competitors and consumers.62 A racially-restrictive..
covenant may harm third parties who suffer its discriminatory impact.63
The third-party effects of servitudes are likely to be especially pro-
nounced-compared, for example, to the third-party effects of bilateral
contracts imposing similar estrictions-because of the features of re-
moteness and durability. Servitudes can reach out over time and space in
a way that tends, in general, to expand their impact and to intensify the
externality problem.64
In addition to its other functions, the touch and concern requirement
has sometimes seemed like a catch-all, doctrinal hook used by courts to
weed out servitudes that impose harmful externalities.65 The Restatement
opts to address such harms more directly, by invalidating those servi-
tudes that "violate public policy" because, for example, they are "arbi-
trary, spiteful, or capricious," or "unreasonably burden[] a fundamental
60. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 617 (1985).
61. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 8-9 ("The existence of unusual property rights increas-
es the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring idio-
syncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs
fully into account, making them a true externality.").
62. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 60, at 622; cf Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass.
1885) (using the touch and concern doctrine to invalidate running covenant against competition),
overruled by Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246-49 (Mass. 1979). See gener-
ally Susan F. French, Can Covenants Not to Sue, Covenants Against Competition and Spite Cove-
nants Run with Land? Comparing Results Under the Touch or Concern Doctrine and the Restate-
ment Third, Property (Servitudes), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 267, 280-90 (2003) (reviewing
two cases concerning whether covenants against competition run with the land).
63. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
64. Contracts that happen to affect many third parties might trigger the same level of concern.
Cf Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 917 (1988); Merrill
& Smith, supra note 29, at 57.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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constitutional right," or "impose[] an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition."66
As we will see, the externality problem is one that features promi-
nently in the analysis of whether, and how the law of servitudes, and its
limiting doctrines, should be applied outside of the land context.
E. Personal Property Servitudes
The gradual erosion of traditional limitations on land servitudes can
be explained in part by the development of alternative methods for ensur-
ing notice, by the adoption of ex-post solutions to the problem of the
future, and by the replacement of vague requirements like touch and con-
cern with more focused doctrines addressing specific types of harmful
externalities caused by certain types of servitudes. During the course of
this evolution, property owners, commentators, and occasionally courts
have raised the question whether property doctrines that increasingly
accommodated land servitudes could also be applied to enforce running
restrictions attached to items of personal property.
English equity courts initially extended the equitable servitude rea-
soning of Tulk to personal property, holding in De Mattos v. Gibson,67 in
1859, that the principle applied "alike . . . to movable and immovable
property."68 But in the early twentieth century, English courts stepped
back from this position, holding instead, in Taddy & Co. v. Sterious &
Co., that a manufacturer's resale conditions attached to product packages
"do not run with goods, and cannot be imposed upon them. Subsequent
purchasers, therefore, do not take subject to any conditions which the
Court can enforce."69
In several early twentieth century cases, U.S. courts similarly re-
fused to enforce running restrictions that imposed resale conditions on
chattels. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman70 involved a manufacturer
of unpatented medicine who attempted to fix retail prices by only selling
to wholesalers who agreed to sell only to approved retailers who had
agreed to the manufacturer's minimum prices. The defendant, a retailer
66. Id.
67. (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 108.
68. Id. at 110; see also SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 259; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 953-54 (1928); Andrew Tettenborn, Covenants,
Privity ofContract, and the Purchaser ofPersonal Property, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 58, 58-59 (1982).
69. [1904] 1 Ch 354 at 358 (Eng). In a subsequent case, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams
declared Taddy "perfectly right." McGruther v. Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306, 309 (Eng.). Lord Justice
Romer elaborated that
A vendor cannot ... by printing the so-called condition upon some part of the goods or
on the case containing them, say that every subsequent purchaser of the goods is bound to
comply with the condition, so that if he does not comply with the condition he can be
sued by the original vendor. That is clearly wrong. You cannot in that way make condi-
tions run with goods.
Id. at 311.
70. 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
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who was not on the manufacturer's approved list, nonetheless managed
to acquire a supply of the medicine, which it sold for less than the mini-
mum price despite having knowledge of the minimum price regime.71
The manufacturer apparently cited De Mattos "to support the notion that
a covenant may attach to chattels which pass by delivery from hand to
hand and bring any one who buys with notice under the restrictions
against a resale at less than a dictated price."72 Judge-later Justice-
Lurton rejected that proposition instead citing contrary cases, including
Taddy, and declared sweepingly that:
It is . . . a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting
the use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to
follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of no-
tice. A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run
with or attach to a mere chattel.73
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,74 the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the enforceability of a similar price-fixing
scheme, explaining that "[t]he basis of the argument appears to be that,
as the manufacturer may make and sell, or not, as he chooses, he may
affix conditions as to the use of the article or as to the prices at which
purchasers may dispose of it." 75 Like its predecessors, the Court rejected
this chattel servitude logic: "Whatever right the manufacturer may have
to project his control beyond his own sales must depend not upon an
inherent power incident to production and original ownership, but upon
agreement." 76
These and similar cases are the bases for the conventional wisdom
among academic ommentators that chattel servitudes, while not unheard
of, are much less likely to be enforced than land servitudes.77 Commenta-
tors are less uniform in their assessment of whether, and if so why, this
should be the case.
Contemporary scholarship about personal property servitudes owes
a debt to two foundational articles by Zechariah Chafee.7 ' In 1928,
Chafee provided a comprehensive analysis of the topic in Equitable Ser-
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 40.
73. Id. at 39.
74. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007).
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id at 405.
77. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407 (noting that the law "makes it much sim-
pler to establish partial rights in real property than in personal property"); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 29, at 18 ("[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it... appears that one cannot create servi-
tudes in personal property.").
78. See Chaffee, supra note 68; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956).
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vitudes on Chattels.79 The article surveys the case law, based on which
Chafee observed that "[i]n view of these decisions it might well be main-
tained that the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels has been effec-
tively killed by the courts . . . ."80 But Chafee found the courts' reasoning
conclusory and unpersuasive.8 i Further, he observed that most of the
cases involved restrictions that restrained trade in one way or another by,
for example, fixing prices, tying goods, or dividing territories-leaving
open the question of the validity of restrictions not subject to that objec-
tion.82 In the meantime, manufactures continued to attempt to impose
restrictions, suggesting a live question.83 So Chafee went on to consider
and evaluate normative arguments in favor and against enforcing chattel
servitudes.84
I will describe some of Chafee's specific arguments below. For
now, suffice it to say that he found servitudes attached to personal prop-
erty more likely to be costly and less likely to be necessary than land
servitudes.85 Although he was unwilling to condemn chattel servitudes
across the board, he put the burden on anyone seeking to enforce a run-
ning restriction on a chattel to show that theirs was a special case in
which the benefits outweighed the costs, or that something in the busi-
ness or legal environment had changed so dramatically as to make chattel
servitudes desirable in general.86 Chafee did not think that the time for
enforceable chattel servitudes had come, as a general matter, in 1928, nor
when he revisited the question in 1956.87
Some contemporary commentators argue that the time for chattel
servitudes has now come. Referring to Chafee's 1928 article and his
1956 second thoughts, Glen Robinson argues in his 2004 article Personal
Property Servitudes that: "Nearly a half century later, there is reason to
entertain third thoughts on the matter despite the general disposition of
79. Chafee, supra note 68.
80. Id. at 955.
81. For example, as to the oft-recited policy in favor of free alienation, Chafee observed that
restraints on the alienation of land "were also regarded as objectionable at common law" and yet
cases like Tulk v. Moxhay enforced use restrictions that made land less alienable as a practical mat-
ter. Id. at 982-83. So "[]ust as modem needs have brought equitable restrictions on land, of which
the old common law knew nothing, into existence, they may also call for a limited departure from
the free transfer of chattels for the sake of promoting desirable business practices wholly strange to
Coke's day." Id.
82. Id. at 1007 ("In many situations where manufacturers have endeavored to employ this
device, the courts have refused to allow them to do so because it would unreasonably restrain trade.
However, it seems possible that restrictions on the area and the form of resale may not always be
open to such an objection.").
83. Id. at 956 ("[T]he wide prevalence of these restrictions in business practice indicates that
they embody a strong and definite commercial policy which, despite its previous checkered career,
may eventually succeed in obtaining judicial recognition, perhaps with legislative aid.").
84. Id. at 960-1013.
85. Id. at 1011-13.
86. Id. at 1013.
87. Chafee, supra note 78, at 1263-64.
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courts and commentators to be content with Chafee's judgment."" Rob-
inson suggests that personal property servitudes should be enforceable as
a general matter, with any concerns about restrictions featuring anti-
competitive terms left to be addressed by antitrust law, now more mature
than it was when the early twentieth century chattel servitude cases were
decided.89
In 2007, I took up the question myself, arguing-contra Robinson-
that judicial skepticism is justified by a somewhat different mix of the
concerns with notice and information costs, dead-hand control over the
future, and externalities that motivated skepticism of land servitudes.9
This renewed interest in chattel servitudes is due in part to the his-
torical, doctrinal, and theoretical connections with current controversies
about the scope of IP exhaustion, as the next section explains.
II. SERVITUDES AND THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY EXHAUSTION
In the midst of early twentieth century cases questioning the en-
forceability of chattel servitudes as a general matter, several cases arose
that posed an added complication: the chattels in question embodied
copyrighted works or patented inventions. Against the backdrop of courts
refusing to enforce servitudes on ordinary chattels, IP owners argued that
their exclusive rights should give them extra power to control down-
stream resale and use of the embodiments of their intangible property.
The seminal case taking up this question in the copyright context
was Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,91 in which a book publisher attempted
to enforce this restriction printed inside books: "The price of this book at
retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."92
The Second Circuit understood this as an "attempt of an owner of
an ordinary chattel to impose by contract restrictions upon its use or sale
binding upon third parties, and which, it is claimed, may operate as a sort
of ambulatory covenant annexed to the chattel."93 The court rejected that
attempt, albeit rather timidly in light of the conflicting case law it cited
on the topic, including both De Mattos and Taddy & Co.94
But the plaintiff in Bobbs-Merrill did not rely exclusively on the
equitable servitude notion from De Mattos. It also argued that, as the
88. Robinson, supra note 44, at 1451.
89. Id. at 1494-1515.
90. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 949.
91. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill 1), 147 F. 15 (2d Cir. 1906), affd, 210 U.S.
339 (1908).
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Id. at 25-28.
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copyright holder, it had an exclusive right to "vend" the copyrighted
work embodied in its books.95 By distributing books subject to restrictive
terms, it was granting purchasers only a conditional license to exercise
that vending right; vending outside the terms of that license-that is,
selling books for less than one dollar-therefore amounted to copyright
infringement.9 6 The Copyright Act, according to this logic, provides a
mechanism for imposing running restrictions on chattels that the com-
mon law lacks. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed.97
On this point, both Bobbs-Merrill opinions purport merely to inter-
pret the language of the Copyright Act, concluding that the right to vend
granted in the Act is exhausted as to a given copy of a copyrighted work
once that copy is sold.98 But the reasonableness of that interpretation
gains strength from the notion that to interpret the right to vend beyond
the first sale would do violence to the common law.9 For example, the
Supreme Court's opinion notes with apparent alarm:
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell
the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reserva-
tion of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infring-
er because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the pur-
chaser sells at a price fixed in the notice.ioo
The Court refused to interpret the Copyright Act to include such a
right.o'0 Although-unlike the Second Circuit-it did not cite Taddy &
Co. or any other cases addressing chattel servitudes, the Court's narrow
interpretation of the vending right suggests an undercurrent of hostility
toward running restrictions on chattels that made it difficult to persuade
the Court that Congress intended to part ways with the common law.' 02
Of course, the statutory rights granted to copyright holders super-
sede the hostility to running restrictions to some extent: there are some
95. Id at 17.
96. Id
97. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill l), 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908).
98. See id. at 350 ("It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without re-
striction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it."); Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 22 ("If the
statutory owner desires after publication to control the lawfully published copies, such control can
only be secured by means of positive contract or conditions . . . .").
99. Cf Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 20 ("The law of copyright also gives privileges to authors
and publishers that do not pertain to property which anybody may make and sell if he can; but even
under the law of copyright, when the owner of a copyright and of a particular copy of a book to
which it pertains, has parted with all his title to the book, and has conferred an absolute title to it
upon a purchaser, he cannot restrict the right of alienation, which is one of the incidents of owner-
ship in personal property." (quoting Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 61 N.E. 219, 220 (Mass. 1901)));
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 (2001).
100. Bobbs-Merrill II, 210 U.S. at 351.
101. See id
102. See id See generally Robinson, supra note 44, at 1464-81 (describing links between the
first sale doctrine and common law principles).
[93.4968
2016] THE LIMITS OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY
things that the owner of a copyright-embodying chattel is not permitted
to do with it-for example, reproduce each of its pages-on account of
the non-possessory intellectual property rights created by copyright. But
Bobbs-Merrill and, later, the statutory codification of the "first sale" doc-
trine,103 articulates one limit on even a copyright holder's power to im-
pose running restrictions on personal property.
In the patent context, the Supreme Court initially accepted the idea
that a patent owner's right to control "use" of a chattel embodying his
invention could be leveraged into the type of running restriction that
would not be enforced on a non-patented article. In Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.,'0o the Court held that a patent owner could use an express, condi-
tional license to impose a running restriction on a chattel embodying a
patented invention against a purchaser with notice;'05 specifically, the
Court enforced a restriction stamped on a mimeograph machine that said:
"This machine is sold by the A.B. Dick Company, with the license re-
striction that it may be used only with the stencil, paper, ink, and other
supplies made by A.B. Dick Company."'0
Justice Lurton, who had rejected the notion of a use restriction "an-
nexed to a chattel" in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman,i0 7 explained that
the patent law, unlike the common law of personal property'0 and unlike
copyright, separates ownership of a chattel from the right to use that
chattel, and that the right to use can be granted conditionally so as to
allow use subject to running restrictions. 109 The opinion suggested that
other restrictions, even resale price-fixing restrictions of the type rejected
in Dr. Miles and Bobbs-Merrill, could be enforced via an express re-
striction imposed by a patent holder against a chattel owner with no-
tice."i0 Indeed, Justice Lurton cited an English case,"' Incandescent Gas
Light Co. v. Cantelo,112 which held that a patentee's restrictive terms
were enforceable with notice and that "[i]t does not matter how unrea-
sonable or how absurd the conditions are."ll3
But the distinction that Justice Lurton drew between common law
chattel servitudes and running restrictions imposed via patent law on the
use of chattels embodying patented inventions was short-lived. One year
later, the Court refused to enforce express retail price limitations printed
103. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
104. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
105. Id. at 24-25.
106. Id. at 25-26.
107. 153 F. 24 (1907).
108. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 18-19.
109. Id. at 44-45.
110. See id. at 26.
111. Id. at 40.
112. (1895) 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262 (QB) (UK).
113. Id. at 264.
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on packaging for patented medicine in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.114 The
Court confirmed the Bauer result in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co."1 5 refusing to enforce price restrictions attached to patented record
players. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufactur-
ing Co.," 7 the Court expressly overruled A.B. Dick, refusing to enforce a
trying restriction imposed via a label on a movie projector."
1 8
My claim here is not that these seminal cases establishing the doc-
trines of copyright and patent exhaustion were mere application of a
common law prohibition on chattel servitudes. They were primarily ex-
ercises in statutory interpretation, determining the meaning of the exclu-
sive rights to vend copies of copyrighted works and to use and sell arti-
cles embodying patented inventions. But these exercises in statutory in-
terpretation were conducted in the shadow of the common law hostility
to chattel servitudes, which made the question of statutory interpretation
partly whether Congress had spoken clearly enough to invade what
would otherwise be the province of the common law and to validate a
legal mechanism that the common law had rejected."19
III. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES
The contemporary commentary on personal property servitudes has
been motivated in part by controversies about the scope of IP exhaustion,
with its historical and doctrinal connection to the servitude case law.
Among the most pressing questions is whether exhaustion is a default
rule that IP owners can avoid merely by attaching restrictive labels to
objects embodying their IP, or by characterizing distribution of those
objects as "licenses" rather than sales.120 The commentators who address
this and related questions come to dramatically different conclusions
about the implications of the chattel-servitude connection.121
114. 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
115. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
116. Id. at 501 (concluding that he case fell "within the principles of" Bauer, 229 U.S. at 16,
and Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873)).
117. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
118. Id. at 518-19; see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., No. 89 C 4524, 1990 WL
19535, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1990), rev'd, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
119. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law . .. are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."); cf Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1353 (2013) ("'[W]hen a statute covers an issue previous-
ly governed by the common law,' it is presumed that 'Congress intended to retain the substance of
the common law."' (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 329 n.13 (2010))).
120. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (holding that patent exhaustion is defeated by a clearly communicated single use/no-resale
restriction); id. at 778 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . admits of no excep-
tion.").
121. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, Glen Robinson finds arguments against enforce-
ment of chattel servitudes unpersuasive.122 He contends that the doctrinal
prohibition should be abandoned and that chattel servitudes should be
enforced much as land servitudes are.123 Because Robinson sees IP ex-
haustion as sharing the same origins and logic as the ban on chattel servi-
tudes, he suggests that exhaustion should not operate to invalidate IP-
owner-imposed restrictions on use and resale, which should generally be
enforceable with both IP and state law remedies.124
In their work on copyright exhaustion, Aaron Perzanowski and Ja-
son Schultz also emphasize the common law origins of the IP exhaustion
concept, but their origin story is somewhat different.125 They point not
only to the common law's general hostility to chattel servitudes126 but
also to common law reasoning within copyright itself: cases preceding
the seminal chattel-servitude decisions in which judges permitted down-
stream owners of copyrighted works to do a variety of things without the
authority of copyright owners.127 They argue that the justifications moti-
vating this common law reasoning should continue to shape the law of
copyright exhaustion in the courts, even beyond the codification of copy-
right first sale as a specific limitation on the rights of distribution and
display.128 In addition, Perzanowski and Schultz harness the common law
rationales for exhaustion to resist attempts by copyright owners to avoid
exhaustion by re-characterizing sales as licenses.12 9 Beyond that, they
argue that the user privileges associated with exhaustion should some-
times extend beyond owners of tangible copies in a digital age in which
such copies are increasingly irrelevant.130
In a recent contribution to this debate, John Duffy and Richard
Hynes make a break with those who trace the origins of exhaustion to the
common law of either chattel servitudes or IP.13' They argue instead that
the doctrine is exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation.132 Its only
connection to the law of chattel servitudes is as a "boundary doctrine"
122. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Robinson, supra note 44.
124. See id at 1505 (approving of the result in Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2000), which held that the doctrine of first sale did not apply to a
software licensing agreement that granted end users with a right to use the software but did not
transfer title).
125. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
889 (2011).
126. Id. at 910-11.
127. See id at 910-12.
128. Id. at 912-18.
129. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1221-22 (2015).
130. Id. at 1256 ("Copy ownership, as currently construed by courts in software cases, is no
longer a useful benchmark for identifying the relationship between the consumer and the work that
triggers exhaustion.").




that prevents IP law from interfering more than Congress intended with
generally applicable commercial law.1 33 As to the substance of that
commercial law, Duffy and Hynes point out that distributors of chattels,
including chattels embodying IP, can in fact impose running restrictions
by complying with the Uniform Commercial Code's rules governing
secured transactions.'34 They argue that IP owners should also be able to
seek contractual, but not IP, remedies against users who violate terms
attached to IP embodiments.'13 This is not to say, however, that exhaus-
tion lacks teeth. Duffy and Hynes point out that the notice and other for-
mal requirements of these bodies of state law are more onerous, and the
remedies less generous, than those of IP.'36
My own view is that the information costs, problems of the future,
and externalities that long motivated doctrinal restrictions on land servi-
tudes are all the more relevant to both chattel servitudes and IP. Consider
notice and information costs, including the costs involved in identifying
and locating servitude beneficiaries for the purposes of renegotiating.37
Notice and information costs are minimized for land servitudes by re-
cording systems, but no comprehensive recording system exists for chat-
tels outside of the secured transactions context. And recording of IP is
notoriously imperfect. When IP owners are permitted to impose running
restrictions notwithstanding exhaustion, the ultimate recipient of the bur-
dened object may be remote in time and place, with little hope of identi-
fying and communicating with the current owner of the IP right for pur-
poses of renegotiating the restriction once it becomes obsolete. This is, of
course, a problem that plagues remote-control IP rights generally, includ-
ing the core rights of reproducing copies of copyrighted works and mak-
ing patented inventions. But at least with regard to the generally inex-
haustible rights of reproduction and making, there is a strong case that
the benefits gained by the remote-control property rights outweigh the
costs imposed, as where land servitudes are enforced to serve important
land-use planning goals. That is the basic logic of IP protection: the in-
centive effect relies on IP owners controlling the proliferation of embod-
iments that might compete in the marketplace with their authorized em-
bodiments.'3 That type of control limits the ruinous competition that
could make it impossible for at least some creators and inventors to gar-
ner returns on their investments. It is much less clear that adequate incen-
133. Id. at 36.
134. Id. at 60-64.
135. Id. at 8-9, 58-60.
136. Id. at 58-64 (discussing contract remedies and security interest notice requirements).
137. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Technology and Tracing Costs: Lessons from Real Prop-
erty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 385 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013). Guy Rub also emphasizes these costs in his recent work on copyright exhaustion. Guy A.
Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 788-89 (2015).
138. Cf Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 125, at 915 ("Of course, title to a copy cannot
confer on its owner an unbounded privilege to reproduce the work. Complete exhaustion of the
reproduction right would undermine the incentive structure at the heart of copyright law.").
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tives depend on IP owners' ability to control downstream use and trans-
fer of authorized embodiments.13 9
Furthermore, remote-control IP prompts concerns apart from those
related to notice and information costs. There is a special version of the
problem of the future that looms large here. The health of the intellectual
property system relies on a rich public domain, which depends in part on
the expiration of IP rights after "limited times." But the public domain
will not fuel future creativity and innovation if the works destined for the
public domain do not survive the period of exclusive rights. If TP owners
could exercise continued remote control over all manifestations of their
works and inventions, that control could curtail the ability of others to
preserve those works for future generations.
Perhaps most importantly, access to, preservation of, and autono-
mous enjoyment of works of IP generate spillover benefits for third par-
ties. If exhaustion could easily be evaded by private ordering, it would
effectively impose negative externalities on those beneficiaries of the IP
system.
So, to me, the argument for exhaustion stems in part from the costs
that are imposed by chattel servitudes generally, in part from costs spe-
cific to the IP context, and in part from the lack of justification for endur-
ing those costs, except in the limited circumstances in which creators'
and inventors' incentives would be undermined in a way that inhibits
progress in science and the useful arts."4 The proper reach of the exhaus-
tion doctrine is thus a question for IP policy-in Congress and the
courts-not for IP owners unilaterally deciding that exhaustion should
not apply to them, either by unilaterally placing post-sale conditions, re-
characterizing sales as licenses, or imposing nominally contractual re-
strictions that are so adhesive and ubiquitous that they function like
property rights. 14 Exhaustion should be subject to relaxation only if in-
formation costs problems are addressed.142 Even then, there should be a
screen, akin to the touch and concern requirement, 143 that would help
139. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013) ("[T]he Constitu-
tion's language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide
markets or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say
to increase or to maximize gain."). See generally Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Eco-
nomics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REv. 55, 57-60.
140. Cf Katz, supra note 139, at 99-100 ("[T]he marginal benefit from having enforceable
restraints diminishes as we move along the vectors of distance and time. At the same time, the mar-
ginal social costs associated with goods encumbered by restraints could easily increase over distance
and time because any use inconsistent with the restraint would require the IP owners' permission, yet
the cost of obtaining such permission could easily increase over time and distance.").
141. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 934-35. But see Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v.
Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that clearly communicated post-
sale restrictions may be enforced under patent law).
142. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 137.
143. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property




ensure that running restrictions on objects embodying IP promote pro-
gress rather than imposing negative externalities. These negative exter-
nalities could include waste of physical resources, destruction of cultural
heritage, and diminution of opportunities for innovation and expres-
sion.'" If running restrictions promote progress, but only in the short
term, or only when enforced against intermediaries but not end-users,
then they should be subject to durational limits or a changed circum-
stances doctrine designed to address the problem of the future.145
CONCLUSION
IP exhaustion should be understood against the backdrop of a long
history of skepticism toward what I call remote-control property rights.
Where IP owners try to exercise remote control over uses and transfers
that do not cut to the core of their need to limit ruinous competition, ex-
haustion can step in to maintain IP's balance between remote-control
property's benefits and costs. These costs and benefits are not just a mat-
ter of concern to IP owners and users: like the costs associated with per-
sonal property servitudes, they have implications for a property system
that is beset by high information costs, for future generations burdened
by obsolete restrictions, and for third parties harmed by other externali-
ties.
Although looking to the law of tangible property helps us to recog-
nize these costs, we should also keep in mind their unique character in
the IP context. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity and inven-
tion have implications for the promotion of progress of science and the
useful arts. Therefore, they should not be ratcheted up solely at the whim
of IP owners attaching labels to embodiments of their works. Nor should
they be left solely to generally applicable commercial law without regard
to IP's special policy concerns. Instead, courts and Congress hould con-
tinue to absorb the wisdom of the common law of tangible property
while crafting an IP-specific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the
specific costs and benefits of remote-control IP.
144. Katz, supra note 139, at 109-17.
145. I touch on the possibility of a changed circumstances doctrine for copyright, imported
from tangible property law, in Molly S. Van Houweling, Disciplining the Dead Hand of Copyright:
Durational Limits on Remote Control Property, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2016).
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